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The Reasonableness of Probable Cause
Craig S. Lerner
Abstract
Probable cause is generally cast in judicial opinions and the scholarly literature
as a fixed probability of criminal activity. In the weeks before the September 11
attacks, FBI headquarters, applying such an unbending standard, rejected a war-
rant application to search Zacarias Moussaoui’s laptop computer. This article,
which begins with an analysis of the Moussaoui episode, argues that the proba-
ble cause standard should be calibrated to the gravity of the investigated offense
and the intrusiveness of a proposed search. Tracing the evolution of probable
cause from the common law through its American development, the article argues
that the Supreme Court’s current insistence on a “single standard” lacks histori-
cal support. Probable cause should be recast within a reasonableness framework,
embracing the common sense view that not all searches equally trench on privacy
concerns and not all crimes equally threaten the social order.
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[A]lthough I thought that probable cause existed (“probable cause” 
meaning that the proposition has to be more likely than not, or if 
quantified, a 51% likelihood), I thought our United States Attorney’s 
Office . . . [is] regularly requiring much more than probable cause 
before approving affidavits, (maybe, if quantified, 75%–80% 
probability and sometimes even higher) . . . .1 
I. Introduction 
Nearly a month before the September 11 attacks, FBI agents in 
Minneapolis arrested Zacarias Moussaoui on an immigration overstay 
violation.  His perplexing determination to fly, or simply steer, a jumbo jet, 
combined with his links to radical Muslim fundamentalists, sparked concern 
in the FBI’s Minneapolis field office.  Moussaoui’s claims, when questioned, 
to being “just a businessman,” proved specious, and agents were eager to 
confirm, or allay, their relatively inchoate concerns by searching 
Moussaoui’s laptop computer.  Yet Moussaoui refused to consent.  Was there 
probable cause to obtain a warrant?2 
Coleen M. Rowley, the Chief Division Counsel of the FBI’s 
Minneapolis office, thought so.3  As reflected in the quotation that introduces 
this Article, she placed the likelihood of criminal activity at greater than fifty 
percent.  The established practice in the federal system, however, requires 
law enforcement officers to secure approval for warrant applications from a 
prosecutor, and in Rowley’s estimation, the U.S. Attorney’s Office in 
Minneapolis required showings akin to a “clear and convincing” evidentiary 
 
1. Memorandum from Coleen M. Rowley, FBI Special Agent and Minneapolis Chief Division 
Counsel, to Robert Mueller, FBI Director, para. 7 (May 21, 2002), at http://www.time.com/time/ 
covers/1101020603/memo.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2002) [hereinafter, Rowley Memorandum]. 
2. For a complete account of the FBI’s dealings with Moussaoui, see discussion infra Part II. 
3. Rowley Memorandum, supra note 1, paras. 6–7. 
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standard.  In late August, Rowley instead tried to convince FBI headquarters 
to approve a warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.  But 
headquarters balked, despite the persistent, and increasingly frantic, efforts 
on the part of Rowley and others in the Minneapolis office.  Months after the 
September 11 attacks, Rowley sent FBI Director Robert Mueller a memo 
excoriating headquarters for its refusal to approve the warrant application.4 
Among the important issues raised in the Rowley Memorandum5 is the 
meaning of probable cause, that elusive and perhaps hopelessly 
indeterminate constitutional standard for the issuance of law enforcement 
warrants.6  For her arguments on this point and several others, Rowley was 
hailed, after the memo’s publication, as “[t]he blunt Midwesterner” ulti-
mately vindicated in her struggle with Washington bureaucrats.7  And yet, 
was she vindicated?  The fact that a crime eventually occurs does not mean 
that probable cause existed at every antecedent point in time.  If a police 
officer sees four former felons gathering in the back room of a bar, probable 
cause does not then exist to arrest them and search their homes.  Even if it 
emerges that a bank robbery could have been prevented had warrants been 
issued, hindsight bias should not cloud an assessment of probable cause.  
Perhaps sensing the direction and violence of the political winds, Director 
Mueller declined to make this point forcefully in response to the Rowley 
Memorandum.  In fact, he joined the chorus of fulsome praise.  But in the 
midst of his commendation of the “aggressive[]” efforts of the Minneapolis 
field office, Mueller struck this discordant note: “The attorneys back at the 
FBI determined that there was insufficient probable cause for a [warrant], 
which appears to be an accurate decision.”8  In effect, then, Mueller seemed 
to suggest, if ever so tactfully, that with respect to one of the central points of 
her memo, Rowley was wrong.9 
 
4. Id. paras. 6–8. 
5. Rowley also questioned the failure of FBI headquarters to share pertinent information with 
field offices and to coordinate investigations conducted simultaneously in Phoenix and Minnesota.  
Id. paras. 6–8.  More generally, Rowley criticized the incentive structures within the FBI that have 
led, she argues, to an overcautious headquarters staffed with careerist mediocrities.  Id. para. 8 n.5. 
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause . . . .”). 
7. Maureen Dowd, Department of Political Security, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2002, § 4, at 15. 
8. Sarah Downey, Who Is Zacarias Moussaoui?, NEWSWEEK WEB EXCLUSIVE, Dec. 14, 2001, 
at http://www.msnbc.com/news/673068.asp?cp1=1 (emphasis added).  Mueller was questioned 
about this statement by Tim Russert in a television interview and stood by it.  NBC News: Meet the 
Press (NBC television broadcast, June 2, 2002), available at 2002 WL 7833837. 
9. Mueller was not Rowley’s only critic.  From a civil libertarian perspective, Professor 
Jonathan Turley assailed Rowley’s memo for betraying a skewed understanding of constitutional 
rights and probable cause.  Jonathan Turley, Commentary, Wrong, As a Matter of Law: FBI Agent 
Coleen Rowley Ignores Our Constitutional Rights In Her Memo, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 2002, at 
B15.  Curiously, Rowley’s claim that probable cause existed prior to September 11 has aroused 
skepticism on the political right as well.  See Richard Lowry, A Better Bureau, NAT’L REV., July 1, 
2002, at 28, 28 (“There was certainly evidence prior to September 11 that Moussaoui was a Muslim 
extremist, but ‘probable cause’ that he was an agent of a foreign power or terrorist group?  It was by 
no means a slam dunk.”); Ann Coulter, The Whistle-Blower They Like, FRONT PAGE MAGAZINE, 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
954 Texas Law Review [Vol. 81:951 
 
The layperson may be excused for finding all of this bewildering.  We 
are to understand that the FBI acted commendably in investigating 
Moussaoui, that there was a nontrivial likelihood that he was engaged in 
criminal activity of the gravest sort, and that the search the FBI proposed to 
conduct of Moussaoui’s laptop was narrowly tailored to address its concerns.  
If one weighed the expected social benefit of such a search against the cost of 
such a privacy intrusion, many would view the search as a reasonable one.  
With respect to many searches and seizures governed by the Fourth 
Amendment, courts conduct precisely this sort of balancing.  Magnetometer 
searches in airports, to take an easy example, are justified because the 
possible harm (extremely high) is balanced against the privacy intrusion 
(relatively minimal).10  Why was such a balancing not appropriate here? 
The curious answer is that probable cause is widely viewed in the legal 
community as a fixed standard.11  On this point, in fact, Rowley and her 
critics seem to find common ground.  The U.S. Attorney in Minneapolis, 
when asked about the Rowley Memorandum, stated: “We apply the same 
standard of probable cause in every case.”12  There may be a disagreement 
(among Rowley, FBI headquarters, and the U.S. Attorney’s Office) as to just 
how probable probable cause is, but there is a consensus that probable cause 
is, in the words of the Supreme Court, “a single, familiar standard.”13  Serial 
murder or agricultural subsidy fraud, aircraft piracy or taking the name of 
Smokey the Bear in vain,14 probable cause is treated as fixed and 
unvarying—the North Star of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Of course, 
the North Star is fabulously helpful for those embarking on long journeys in 
the Pacific;15 yet it is of virtually no assistance to those traveling around the 
block.  Likewise, the prevailing conception of probable cause has rendered 
this single standard, and the Warrant Clause, irrelevant for vast reaches of 
police activity. 
The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is marked by 
two presumptions which, on fuller inspection, turn out to be fictitious.  The 
first is that warrantless searches are presumptively unconstitutional.16  
 
June 20, 2002, para. 12, at http://www.frontpagemag.com/articles (“Being in league with known 
terrorists may be suspicious, but it is not probable cause to believe that a particular crime is being or 
has been committed by a specific individual.”). 
10. United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974). 
11. See infra subpart III(B)(1). 
12. Frederic J. Frommer, Minn. U.S. Attorney Challenges Rowley, AP ONLINE, June 6, 2002, 
para. 3, at 2002 WL 21844350 (emphasis added). 
13. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979) (emphasis added). 
14. See 18 U.S.C. § 711 (2000) (making the unauthorized use of the “Smokey the Bear” name 
punishable by up to six months in jail). 
15. For a riveting account of the uses early Pacific Islanders made of the North Star, at least 
when traveling in the Northern hemisphere, see JAMES A. MICHENER, HAWAII 86–90 (1959). 
16. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (proclaiming that “searches conducted 
outside the judicial process, without prior judicial approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se 
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art34
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Although the Supreme Court has not tired of repeating this proposition, the 
“warrant requirement,” as it is typically called, is so riddled with 
exceptions—at least two dozen at a recent count17—that the presumption in 
practice works in exactly the opposite direction.18  Indeed, with some, al-
though only some, exaggeration, the current state of the law seems to be that 
warrants are required only for residential searches.  The decline of the war-
rant requirement is already the subject of overheated protest and repetitive 
comment, and there is little need to add to the vast, yet still burgeoning, 
scholarship.19 
A second fiction, however, has received little attention.  It is what I will 
call the probable cause presumption: except in limited circumstances, 
searches for which the antecedent predicate is less than probable cause are 
unconstitutional.  The U.S. Supreme Court,20 the federal courts of appeal,21 
 
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and 
well-delineated exceptions”). 
17. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 582, 585 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that as 
of 1991 there were 22 exceptions to the warrant requirement (citing Craig M. Bradley, Two Models 
of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1473–74 (1985))); George C. Thomas III, When 
Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the Framers’ Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 
100 MICH. L. REV. 145, 169 (2001) (“Today, roughly twenty-four exceptions to this ‘warrant 
requirement’ exist, discovered by the Court largely in cases coming from state courts.”). 
18. See, e.g., James B. Haddad, Well-Delineated Exceptions, Claims of Sham, and Fourfold 
Probable Cause, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 198, 198 (1977) (“[T]he [per se rule] fails to 
reflect judicial practice . . . .”). 
19. See, e.g., Phyllis T. Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the 
Fourth Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473, 478 (1991) (lamenting “[t]he evisceration of the 
warrant requirement and its accompanying erosion of fourth amendment protections”); Wayne D. 
Holly, The Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance: Resurrecting the Warrant Requirement 
Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531, 543 (1997) (bemoaning the Supreme 
Court’s “hypocrisy” in exulting a warrant requirement and then riddling it with exceptions); Tracey 
Maclin, Justice Thurgood Marshall: Taking the Fourth Amendment Seriously, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 
723, 756 (1992) (applauding Justice Marshall for opposing “the Court’s current systematic 
evisceration of the Fourth Amendment’s traditional safeguards” including the warrant requirement). 
20. See, e.g., United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001) (stating that “the Fourth 
Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability embodied in the term ‘probable cause’”); 
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 74 n.7 (2001) (“[I]n limited circumstances, a search 
unsupported by either warrant or probable cause can be constitutional . . . .”); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (approving of searches conducted without probable cause “in certain 
limited circumstances” (quoting Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 277 (1973) 
(Powell, J., concurring))).  The Supreme Court has also occasionally stated, on a seemingly 
inconsistent and even schizophrenic note, that “the ultimate measure of the constitutionality of a 
governmental search is ‘reasonableness,’” that is, not probable cause.  Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. 
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995).  The very same paragraph in Acton that begins by touting 
reasonableness, not probable cause, as the “ultimate measure,” concludes as follows: “A search 
unsupported by probable cause can be constitutional . . . ‘when special needs, beyond the normal 
need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.’”  Id. at 
653 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).  The apparent import of the latter 
sentence is that probable cause, and not reasonableness, is the ordinary (and ultimate?) measure 
under the Fourth Amendment, except in the event of “special needs.”  See infra subpart V(C). 
21. See, e.g., Aubrey v. Sch. Bd., 148 F.3d 559, 562 (5th Cir. 1998) (recognizing departures 
from the probable cause requirement in “limited circumstances”); United States v. Ward, 131 F.3d 
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the federal district courts,22 and miscellaneous state courts,23 all recite this 
proposition with unfailing energy.  It makes a nice story, suggesting a 
contrast between a probable cause standard (fixed, easily knowable, 
relatively high), which governs the vast majority of police searches, and a 
reasonableness balancing that applies to a discrete set of circumstances.  
There’s only one problem: It is plainly not true.  The reality experienced by 
American citizens today is that they are searched and seized on a regular 
basis, and for the vast majority of these searches (e.g., airport searches, street 
stops, DUI checkpoints, urine testing of government employees), the consti-
tutionality seems to turn not on probable cause, but on the reasonableness of 
the search, factoring in the degree of the intrusion and the gravity of the 
investigated offense.24 
This Article argues for a reappraisal of the concept of probable cause.  
Part II explores, through an analysis of the proposed search of Moussaoui’s 
laptop computer, some of the multitude of problems that arise in the probable 
cause assessment.  It is useful to walk through the Moussaoui episode 
twice—first through the eyes of the agents on the scene, who surmised that 
Moussaoui was up to no good, and then through the eyes of a lawyer, 
analyzing whether probable cause existed.  Viewing the episode from a legal 
perspective, it is remarkable how little evidence there was, at least of a sort 
recognized as probative under current law, that Moussaoui was a terrorist.  
And yet there is the lurking question: Should it matter that the crime 
investigated here was of the gravest seriousness?  Should probable cause 
fluctuate, even the tiniest bit, when the crime under investigation is aircraft 
piracy and not taking the name of Smokey the Bear in vain? 
In answering these questions, Part III seeks guidance from English and 
colonial practice.  Although the past cannot supply neatly packaged answers 
 
335, 342 (3rd Cir. 1997) (noting that a warrant or “individualized suspicion” is not required for a 
search under limited circumstances); Ahern v. O’Donnell, 109 F.3d 809, 816–17 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(recognizing that the United States Supreme Court has permitted limited exceptions to the probable 
cause requirement); United States v. Drinkard, 900 F.2d 140, 144 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990) (finding that 
the “Supreme Court has moved away from the bright-line warrant requirement based on probable 
cause in certain limited circumstances”). 
22. See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 69 F. Supp. 2d 925, 929 (E.D. Mich. 1999) (recognizing 
departures from the probable cause requirement “in limited circumstances”); Andrews v. Crump, 
984 F. Supp. 393, 409 n.11 (W.D.N.C. 1996) (recognizing that while “both the concept of probable 
cause and the requirement of a warrant bear on the reasonableness of a search, . . . in certain limited 
circumstances neither is required” (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340)). 
23. See, e.g., State v. Russo, 790 A.2d 1132, 1160 (Conn. 2002) (recognizing departures from 
the probable cause requirement in “limited circumstances” (quoting Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 
532 U.S. 67, 74 n.7 (2001))); Anchorage Police Dep’t Employees Ass’n v. Municipality of 
Anchorage, 24 P.3d 547, 553 n.41 (Alaska 2001) (quoting Ferguson v. City of Charleston for the 
origins of the “special needs” test used to determine if a search unsupported by probable cause can 
be constitutional); N.J. Transit PBA Local 304 v. N.J. Transit Corp., 701 A.2d 1243, 1249 (N.J. 
1997) (asserting that “[g]enerally, under the Fourth Amendment . . . searches or seizures conducted 
without a warrant based on probable cause are considered per se unreasonable”). 
24. See infra subparts V(C–D). 
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to contemporary problems, historical study is often helpful in exposing the 
assumptions that clutter contemporary thinking.  Specifically, the contem-
porary insistence on probable cause as a “single standard,” as well as the now 
commonplace contrast of “probable cause” and “reasonable suspicion,” have 
little or no support in historical practice. 
Part IV sketches the development of probable cause in American courts.  
Painted with broadest strokes, probable cause in America started as a low 
evidentiary standard, ramped up in the mid-twentieth century, receded in the 
early 1980s, and has possibly risen again in recent years.  Yet this sweeping 
view fails to do justice to the nuances, and often the inconsistencies, within 
the doctrinal development.  Until the 1960s, however, the roughly inter-
changeable use of terms like “probable cause,” “reasonable cause,” and 
“reasonable grounds” was a consistent theme in the case law. 
As explored in Part V, the birth of “probable cause” as a doctrine 
distinct from “reasonable cause” dates to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Terry v. Ohio.25  Since Terry, courts have cast probable cause as a fixed 
standard, and therefore distinct from a freewheeling reasonableness inquiry.  
Even where a search is minimally intrusive, or especially imperative, prob-
able cause is often viewed as unwavering.  Preserved in all its pristine glory, 
probable cause has declined in significance and is no longer applied to a vast 
range of police activity.  The doctrines of “reasonable suspicion,” “special 
needs,” and exigent circumstances have eroded the domain governed by 
probable cause. 
Finally, Part VI proposes an alternative approach to probable cause.  
Factoring in the gravity of the investigated offense and the intrusiveness of 
the proposed search results in a more reasonable framework for thinking 
about probable cause.  Employing such a framework, Part VI returns to the 
Moussaoui episode and other scenarios that highlight the need for a reassess-
ment of the probable cause standard.  Probable cause reasonably understood 
can encourage police to more narrowly tailor proposed searches to minimize 
their intrusiveness.  Furthermore, recognizing the reasonableness of probable 
cause is a necessary precondition to a revitalized warrant requirement. 
II. Moussaoui’s Laptop: The Search That Wasn’t 
The debate within the FBI as to whether to search Zacarias Moussaoui’s 
laptop computer illuminates many of the problems that confront us.  It is by 
no means clear that the evidence supported Rowley’s claim that probable 
cause existed.  As we shall see, how much to weigh, if at all, each piece of 
evidence adduced by Rowley is in many instances uncertain under current 
law, and where probable cause exists along a spectrum of certainty appears 
hopelessly shrouded in mystery. 
 
25. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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A. Facts 
On August 15, 2001, a flight instructor at the Pan Am International 
Flight Academy in Minneapolis called a local FBI agent and expressed 
concerns about a student who had recently enrolled in classes in flying a 
Boeing 747.26  The instructor told the FBI agent that the student, whom the 
instructor appears to have identified as a Middle Eastern man, was at first 
evasive and then belligerent when asked to specify his country of origin.27  
Apparently reliable sources28 report that the instructor also told the FBI agent 
that Moussaoui had demonstrated little or no aptitude in the basics of flying, 
making even more perplexing his determination to navigate the cumbersome 
747.29  Although the instructor may not have attributed to Moussaoui the 
widely circulated remark that his interest was not in taking off or landing, but 
simply in flying the plane, Moussaoui’s insistence on flying a 747, despite 
his patent ineptitude, provoked the most dire of suspicions on the part of the 
flight instructor.  The instructor reportedly told the FBI agent, “Do you 
realize how serious this is?  This man wants training on a 747.  A 747 loaded 
with fuel could be used as a weapon!”30 
The following day, August 16,31 FBI agents confronted Moussaoui in 
his hotel room and asked for his immigration papers.  After finding evidence 
of an immigration violation, the FBI called in agents from the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (INS), who arrested Moussaoui for overstaying 
his visa.32  It is unclear what the FBI and INS agents found in Moussaoui’s 
hotel room at that time.33  What is clear is that the agents requested 
 
26. Moussaoui had attended classes on August 13 and 15.  Indictment ¶¶ 71–72, U.S. v. 
Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. Dec. 11, 2001), at http://notablecases.vaed.uscourts.gov/1:01-
cr-00455/docs/64329/0.pdf (last visited Nov. 8, 2002). 
27. Greg Gordon, At Flight School, Suspect Raised Eyebrows Quickly, MILWAUKEE J. 
SENTINEL., Dec. 26, 2001, at 1A. 
28. Precisely what else the flight instructor relayed to the FBI agent is, for the time being, 
cloaked in something akin to secrecy as the FBI conducts an internal investigation.  Whatever else 
the investigation ultimately accomplishes, it has, for several months, provided a pretext for filtering 
the information reaching the general public.  At a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on June 6, 
2002, Director Mueller repeatedly deflected questions about the sequence of events prior to 
September 11 with references to the conveniently ongoing internal probe.  Oversight Hearing on 
Counterterrorism, Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 107 Cong. (2002) (testimony of 
Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation), available at 2002 WL 1232579, 
at *13, *79 [hereinafter FBI Counterterrorism Hearings]. 
29. Prior to enrolling in aviation classes in Minneapolis, Moussaoui had studied briefly at a 
flight school in Norman, Oklahoma.  Indictment ¶ 46, Moussaoui (No. 01-455-A). 
30. Gordon, supra note 27. 
31. The Rowley Memorandum (and some subsequent press accounts) have reported that the 
initial confrontation and arrest occurred on August 15.  Rowley Memorandum, supra note 1, para. 
4.  In her Senate testimony, however, Rowley clarified that she had misdated the event, which in 
fact occurred on August 16.  FBI Counterterrorism Hearings, supra note 28, at *94. 
32. Romesh Ratnesar & Michael Weisskopf, The Whisteblower, TIME, June 3, 2002, at 24. 
33. The Rowley Memorandum indicates that the agents searched some of Moussaoui’s personal 
effects, but not as thoroughly as they would have liked, presumably because they lacked a warrant.  
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art34
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Moussaoui’s consent to search his laptop computer, which he denied.  In her 
memo to Mueller, Rowley wrote that “[t]he agents in particular believed that 
Moussaoui signaled he had something to hide in the way he refused to allow 
them to search his computer.”34 
With Moussaoui in custody, on the evening of August 16, the FBI and 
INS agents called Rowley to discuss their options.  Apparently, one of their 
first steps (after it emerged that Moussaoui was a French citizen of Moroccan 
descent) was to coordinate with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and 
FBI legal attaché in Paris, who in turn requested the assistance of the French 
Intelligence Service (FIS).35  The precise nature of the information relayed by 
the FIS has been debated.  Rowley writes that “reasonable suspicions quickly 
ripened into probable cause” when the FIS reported Moussaoui’s “affiliations 
with radical fundamentalist Islamic groups and activities connected to Osama 
bin Laden.”36  Unnamed “intelligence” sources have, however, leaked to the 
press (doubtless to undermine Rowley’s memo) that the precise information 
provided by the FIS was that Moussaoui had “a ‘radical fundamentalist 
background’ and that he had convinced a friend to fight with anti-Russian 
rebels in Chechnya.”37  The FIS made no mention of ties to bin Laden or Al 
Qaeda.38 
Soon after receiving information from the FIS, the Minneapolis agents 
decided to seek not a criminal warrant to search Moussaoui’s laptop, but a 
 
See Rowley Memorandum, supra note 1, paras. 5–6 (recounting the agents’ efforts to get a warrant 
because they wanted to “conduct a more thorough search of his personal effects”).  According to his 
December 2001 indictment, Moussaoui possessed, among other items, a pair of knives, fighting 
gloves, shin guards, a piece of paper referring to a handheld Global Positioning System receiver, a 
notebook (listing German Telephone #1, German Telephone #2, and the name “Ahab Sabet”), 
letters indicating that Moussaoui was a marketing consultant in the United States for Infocus Tech, 
and a flight manual for the Boeing 747.  Indictment ¶ 73, Moussaoui (No. 01-455-A).  The publicly 
available documents do not clarify which of these items were found on August 16 and which were 
found when a full search was conducted (with a warrant) after the September 11 attacks. 
34. Rowley Memorandum, supra note 1, para. 5. 
35. Id. paras. 4–5 (describing the phone call to Rowley and receipt of information from FIS a 
few days later); Gary Fields & David S. Cloud, U.S. Got Two Cables in August About Moussaoui 
from France, WALL ST. J. EUR., May 29, 1992, at A3 (describing the FBI’s contacting of French 
intelligence officials through the CIA). 
36. Rowley Memorandum, supra note 1, para. 5. 
37. Fields & Cloud, supra note 35.  It seems that the French initially reported that they had no 
knowledge of Moussaoui, but quickly followed up with the connection to the Chechen rebels.  That 
information may have been based on little more than the report of a French family that Moussaoui 
had lobbied their son to go fight in Chechnya, where he had died.  See Hill Probers Upgrade 
Evidence Gathered From Moussaoui, WASH. POST, June 6, 2002, at A18; see also Turley, supra 
note 9 (“Rowley also places importance on a French report that ‘confirmed [Moussaoui’s] radical 
fundamentalist Islamic’ affiliations.  This report was extremely vague and was discounted by the 
FBI and other intelligence and foreign agencies.” (quoting Rowley Memorandum, supra note 1, 
para. 5)). 
38. Fields & Cloud, supra note 35. 
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warrant under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).39  The FISA 
creates a different track for conducting surveillance and physical searches 
when a “significant purpose” is to gather foreign intelligence and not enforce 
the criminal law.40  Whereas in the law enforcement context the government 
must show probable cause of criminal activity,41 in the FISA context, the 
government must simply show probable cause to believe that the target of the 
surveillance or search is “an agent of a foreign power.”42  However, in part to 
ensure that FISA warrants are reserved for special cases and not used to 
conduct domestic surveillance of U.S. citizens, field officers seeking FISA 
warrants are required to obtain the approval of the Attorney General.43 
Over the course of a week, the Minneapolis office and FBI headquarters 
sparred over the FISA application, which headquarters ultimately rejected on 
August 28.44  An incredulous Rowley notes that at one point, her contact at 
FBI headquarters speculated that the FIS information “could be worthless 
because it only identified Zacarias Moussaoui by name and he . . . didn’t 
know how many people by that name existed in France.”45  The remarkable 
caution at FBI headquarters may have resulted from a fear of offending the 
 
39. Rowley Memorandum, supra note 1, para. 6.  The FISA is found in 50 U.S.C. §§ 1800–
1829 (2002).  Since the inception of the American republic, Presidents have authorized surveillance 
of citizens and aliens, domestically and abroad, in national security operations.  See William C. 
Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 
1, 10–18 (2000).  In United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (commonly 
known as the “Keith decision”), however, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the domestic 
surveillance of U.S. citizens with no proven connection to a foreign government.  Id. at 321.  The 
Court reserved judgment as to “the issues which may be involved with respect to activities of 
foreign powers or their agents.”  Id. at 322.  The FISA “sought to put to rest [this] troubling 
constitutional issue.”  ACLU Found. of S. Cal. v. Barr, 952 F.2d 457, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1991).  The 
FISA created a special court, consisting of seven (recently expanded to eleven) federal judges, 
authorized to hear applications for surveillance orders.  50 U.S.C. § 1803(a) (2002). 
40. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2002).  As originally drafted, the FISA provided that “the 
purpose” of the surveillance must be to gather foreign intelligence.  Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 1556, 92 Stat. 1783 (authorizing electronic 
surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information).  The U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. 
107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272 (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1823), amended the FISA to authorize 
surveillance when “a significant purpose” is the gathering of foreign intelligence.  The import of 
this change was the subject of protracted litigation.  See In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611 (Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. 2002) (dismissing the 
relevance of the Patriot Act in construing the FISA), rev’d, In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 
(Foreign Intel. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (holding that it was “error” on the part of the FISA not to 
consider the change effected by the Patriot Act).  The litigation is discussed in Craig S. Lerner, The 
USA Patriot Act: Promoting the Cooperation of Foreign Intelligence and Law Enforcement, 11 
GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2003). 
41. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983) (defining “probable cause” in the law 
enforcement context as a likelihood that “contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a 
particular place”). 
42. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3)(A). 
43. Id. § 1804(a). 
44. Rowley Memorandum, supra note 1, para. 10. 
45. Id. para. 8 n.6. 
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then-Chief Judge of the FISA Court, Royce Lamberth, who had reprimanded 
the head of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Unit for what he had deemed faulty 
warrant applications in the past.46 
Unbeknownst to Rowley, the section at FBI headquarters that was 
reviewing her application had recently received a memo from an FBI agent 
in Phoenix, who reported “aeronautical students with a large picture of 
Osama bin Laden in their room.”47  A 1998 memo from an Oklahoma City 
agent, also withheld from the Minneapolis office, likewise warned of “large 
numbers of Middle Eastern men receiving flight training at [Oklahoma’s] 
airports,”48 and added that “this is a recent phenomenon and may be related 
to planned terrorist activity.”49  Even without access to these memos, the 
Minneapolis office became increasingly desperate in its efforts to find some 
means to search the laptop.50  FBI headquarters eventually acquiesced in a 
last-ditch plan: Moussaoui (and his laptop) would be flown to Paris and 
turned over to French authorities, who would seek authority to search under 
the more permissive French law.51  After the attacks on the morning of 
September 11, the FBI abandoned this plan and quickly obtained a criminal 
warrant to search Moussaoui’s laptop and other personal belongings.52 
It is interesting to note that, in Rowley’s opinion, the events of 
September 11 did nothing to add to the probable cause that had existed prior 
to the attacks: 
To say . . . that probable cause did not exist until after the disastrous 
event occurred, is really to acknowledge that the missing piece of 
probable cause was only the FBI’s (FBIHQ’s) failure to appreciate 
 
46. James Risen, A Nation Challenged: Intelligence; In Hindsight, C.I.A. Sees Flaws That 
Hindered Efforts on Terror, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2001, at 1A.  The alleged misstatements and 
inaccuracies in the FISA applications are laid out in In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 620–21. 
47. 148 CONG. REC. S5795 (daily ed. June 20, 2002) (quoting Senator Specter, who had been 
briefed by “intelligence sources”).  The agent’s suspicions were subsequently corroborated.  At least 
one of the September 11 hijackers, Hani Hanjour, studied at the Phoenix Pan Am International 
Flight Academy.  Indictment, U.S. v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455-A (E.D. Va. Dec. 11, 2001), at ¶ 40. 
48. Michael Duffy & Nancy Gibbs, How Far Do We Want the FBI to Go, TIME, June 10, 2002 
at 24.  The FBI agent’s memo was entitled “Weapons of Mass Destruction.”  Dan Egan & Sue 
Schmidt, Mueller: Clues Might Have Lead to September 11 Plot, WASH. POST, May 30, 2002, at 
A1. 
49. Egan & Schmidt, supra note 48. 
50. Apparently, efforts were undertaken to convince the CIA to pursue a FISA warrant, but 
when FBI headquarters learned of this breach of protocol, it reprimanded the field office and 
ordered it to abort this effort.  Ratnesar & Weisskopf, supra note 32, at 34. 
51. Dan Eggen, Agent Claims Supervisor Thwarted Probe; Stopping Some Hijackers Said 
Possible, WASH. POST, May 27, 2002, at A1. 
52. Thomas Frank, Mistakes Were Made; Memos, E-mails Detail CIA, FBI Errors Before 9/11, 
NEWSDAY, Oct. 20, 2002, at A7. 
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that such an event could occur.  The probable cause did not otherwise 
improve or change.53 
Actually, Rowley’s contact at headquarters agreed that the September 11 
events did not add to the probable cause assessment.  In the initial hours after 
the attack, according to Rowley, the contact instructed the Minneapolis office 
to do nothing because the events of the morning were likely only a 
“coincidence.”54  When the search was eventually conducted, it in fact 
revealed links to Al Qaeda terrorists.55 
B. Analysis 
With respect to Moussaoui’s laptop, the question of probable cause is 
twofold: first, was there probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime 
would be discovered, which would justify a criminal warrant; and second, 
was there probable cause to believe Moussaoui was an agent of a foreign 
power, which would justify a FISA warrant? 
But before addressing these questions, it is worth noting one salient fact 
about the behind-the-scenes account of the warrant application process 
described in the Rowley Memorandum: Within the law enforcement 
community itself there was an intense disagreement as to whether probable 
cause existed.  Academic discussions of the warrant application process (and 
law enforcement generally) often have an air of unreality about them in that 
prosecutors and police officers are depicted as a vast monolith.  As anyone 
who has worked in a prosecutorial office can attest, the relationship between 
prosecutors and law enforcement agents is often one of, to put the matter 
delicately, creative dissonance.56  A frequent complaint among agents is that 
some prosecutors refuse to bring the close case or approve a certain course of 
investigative action.  In the federal system, agents generally cannot even 
approach a magistrate to obtain a warrant until an Assistant United States 
Attorney (AUSA) has given approval, and this preclearance mechanism is 
also observed in many state systems.57  Thus, the high success rate of warrant 
applications, sometimes trotted out to disparage the vitality of the warrant 
 
53. Rowley Memorandum, supra note 1, para. 6. 
54. Id. para. 6 n.2. 
55. Id. para. 8.  Moussaoui has apparently turned out not to be, as he was originally crowned, 
the “20th hijacker.”  That title has since been assigned to Ramzi Binalshibh, recently arrested in 
Pakistan.  See Kamran Khan & Susan Schmidt, Key 9/11 Suspect Leaves Pakistan in U.S. Custody, 
WASH. POST., Sept. 17, 2002, at A1 (reporting on the arrest of Ramzi Binalshibh, who claimed he 
would have been with the 19 hijackers if he had not been refused a U.S. visa). 
56. This is an ongoing theme in the television show Law and Order (NBC). 
57. See Laurence A. Benner & Charles T. Samarkos, Searching for Narcotics in San Diego: 
Preliminary Findings from the San Diego Search Warrant Project, 36 CAL. W. REV. 221, 225 
(2000) (citing a recent survey of search warrant applications in San Diego County revealing that 
98.4% were reviewed by a lawyer). 
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requirement,58 proves no such thing.  Warrant applications—such as 
Rowley’s—can be vetoed before a magistrate is ever consulted. 
The Rowley Memorandum reflects a perception among many law 
enforcement agents that AUSAs sometimes prefer to “play it safe.”  Indeed, 
the reason Rowley gave for seeking a FISA warrant, and not a law 
enforcement warrant, was her perception that the U.S. Attorney’s office in 
Minneapolis was excessively stringent in its warrant approvals.59  She 
explained in her memo: 
[A]lthough I thought probable cause existed (“probable cause” 
meaning that the proposition has to be more likely than not, or if 
quantified, a 51% likelihood), I thought our United States Attorney’s 
Office, (for a lot of reasons including just to play it safe) [is] regularly 
requiring much more than probable cause before approving affidavits, 
(maybe, if quantified, 75%-80% probability and sometimes even 
higher), and depending on the actual AUSA who would be assigned, 
might turn us down.60 
Rowley’s assessment that there was a greater than fifty-fifty likelihood of 
criminal activity may be hard to defend when the evidence is subject to legal 
analysis. 
1. French Citizen/Ethnic and Religious Origins.—It is worth 
emphasizing at the outset that Moussaoui was born in France and carried a 
French passport, unlike the nineteen September 11 hijackers, who were all 
citizens of Middle Eastern countries.61  However strained U.S.-French 
relations may have become in recent months,62 there has been no suggestion 
that French citizens visiting this country are any more inclined to commit 
crimes than citizens of other countries (or U.S. citizens, for that matter).  To 
be sure, Moussaoui’s parents were Moroccan, but he was nonetheless for all 
 
58. See Stephen Labaton, Before the Explosion, Officials Saw Little Risk for Building in 
Oklahoma City, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 1995, at A19 (noting that only 7 out of 8,950 wiretap 
applications were rejected over a 10-year period and concluding that these “figures show that 
Federal and state judges are largely rubber stamps for law enforcement”). 
59. Rowley Memorandum, supra note 1, para. 7 (“Although I think there’s a decent chance of 
being able to get a judge to sign a criminal search warrant, our USAO seems to have an even higher 
standard much of the time, so rather than risk it, I advised that they should try the other route.”). 
60. Id.  Rowley thus made, in her words, the “tactical choice” to pursue a FISA warrant, and not 
a criminal warrant, because she was concerned that if the U.S. Attorney’s Office rejected the latter, 
FBI headquarters might be even more skittish about approving the FISA application.  Id. 
61. See Mary Beth Sheridan, 15 Hijackers Obtained Visas in Saudi Arabia; Most Citizens of 
That Country Seeking to Visit U.S. Are Approved Without Interviews, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 2001, 
at A10 (noting that fifteen of the hijackers were from Saudi Arabia, two were from the United Arab 
Emirates, and the remaining two were from Lebanon and Egypt). 
62. See Peter Ford, ‘Evil Axis’ and Others Talk Back; State of Union Raises Hackles 
Worldwide, Even Among Allies, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 31, 2002, at A1 (reporting that 
European leaders have cautioned U.S. President Bush against taking action against Iraq). 
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legal purposes treated by American authorities as a French citizen.63  
Interestingly, in her memo to Mueller, Rowley never draws attention to 
Moussaoui’s Moroccan heritage. 
Moussaoui was, like the nineteen September 11 hijackers, Muslim, but 
the significance of his religion is opaque.  Over the course of the 1990s, 
some Muslim and Middle Eastern men have committed acts of terrorism, 
several of which were directed at U.S. citizens;64 nonetheless, it is unclear 
whether membership in a race, religion, or ethnic group that has been dispro-
portionately linked to terrorism against the United States is a constitutionally 
permissible factor in the probable cause calculus.65  Even after September 11, 
the Bush administration has often suggested that such factors should not be 
considered in formulating a terrorist profile.66  And even if they can be 
considered, it is of course the case that only an infinitesimal percentage of 
Muslim and Middle Eastern men, either in the United States or abroad, have 
committed terrorist acts against American citizens. 
2. Immigration Violation.—Although Moussaoui lawfully entered the 
United States with a student visa, his visa expired on May 23, 2002, nearly 
three months before FBI and INS agents confronted him on August 16.67  
Moussaoui had applied for a visa extension, but had not yet received it.68  It 
is perhaps fair to conclude that persons illegally in the United States are more 
likely to commit crimes than persons lawfully present here.  But Moussaoui 
 
63. Not surprisingly, France, not Morocco, has interceded on Moussaoui’s behalf during his 
trial.  See Tom Jackman, Judge Rejects Lawyers’ Bids To Visit Moussaoui, WASH. POST, July 23, 
2002, at A4. 
64. See PAUL R. PILLAR, TERRORISM AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 52 (2001) (“Islamists were 
responsible for all of the major anti-U.S. terrorist attacks in the 1990s except Oklahoma City.”). 
65. Courts have differed as to whether race or ethnicity can be considered as one piece of 
evidence that, considered in tandem with other evidence, can supply reasonable suspicion or 
probable cause to justify a stop.  Compare United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391, 934 n.2 (8th Cir. 
1992) (“As it is, . . . facts are not to be ignored simply because they are unpleasant—and the 
unpleasant fact in this case is that [the police officer] had knowledge . . . that young . . . black Los 
Angeles gangs were flooding the Kansas City area with cocaine.”), with United States v. Montero-
Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1132 (9th Cir. 2002) (“The likelihood that in an area in which the 
majority—or even a substantial part—of the population is Hispanic, any given person of Hispanic 
ancestry is in fact an alien, let alone an illegal alien, is not high enough to make Hispanic 
appearance a relevant factor in the reasonable suspicion calculus.”).  See generally Randall S. 
Susskind, Race, Reasonable Articulable Suspicion, and Seizure, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 327 (1994).  
For a criticism of ethnic and religious profiling, even after the September 11 attacks, see Samuel 
Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (2002). 
66. See Bush Angry About Pilot’s Ejection of Agent, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2001, at B3 (noting 
that President Bush was “angry” when he learned that an airline may have profiled a Secret Service 
agent of Arab descent as a possible risk); Jonathan D. Salant, Officials Debate Use of Ethnicity in 
Profiling of Airline Passengers, MIAMI HERALD, July 5, 2002, at 20A (discussing Secretary of 
Transportation Norman Mineta’s opposition to profiling). 
67. Dan Eggen, Moussaoui Probe Pushed U.S. Limits; FBI Wanted to Deport Suspect to 
France to Access His Computer, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2002, at A1. 
68. Id. 
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had overstayed his visa by only a matter of months.  In her memo, Rowley 
concedes that “Moussaoui’s overstay status was fortuitous.”69 
3. Flight Instructor Information.—Information provided by named 
citizens is treated as more reliable than information provided anonymously.70  
But even assuming the flight instructor’s reliability, what did his information 
prove?  With respect to Moussaoui’s manner, we can surmise that he resent-
ed prying questions about his past.  Such prickliness is, of course, consistent 
with criminal activity, although hardly very probative of it: Many people 
dislike snooping questions.  Moussaoui’s determination to fly a 747 is odd, 
given his sketchy aviation skills.  However, the lack of self-knowledge 
suggested by a misplaced confidence in one’s own abilities is, sadly, not 
uncommon.  Combined with other information, Moussaoui’s insistence on 
flying a 747 might take on a more sinister cast, but taken alone, it is hardly 
very probative of criminal activity. 
4. Refused Consent to Search.—According to Rowley, “The agents in 
particular believed that Moussaoui signaled he had something to hide in the 
way he refused to allow them to search his computer.”71  We know little, at 
this point, about the suspicious manner in which Moussaoui denied federal 
agents access to his laptop.  Perhaps he asserted his rights72 with gusto,73 or 
perhaps he did so with trepidation.74  Infinite is the variety of human 
behavior that trained police officers have deemed suspicious.75  (Alas, 
however, infinite is the variety of human criminality, so police suspicions are 
often justified.)  But was it the manner in which Moussaoui refused consent, 
or the fact of his refusal, that set off the agents’ suspicions?  The Rowley 
 
69. Rowley Memorandum, supra note 1, para. 4. 
70. See, e.g., United States v. Blount, 123 F.3d 831, 837 (5th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (holding that 
information from an identified citizen created probable cause because police “had no reason to 
disbelieve Ms. Cooksey, or to question her motives or credibility”).  Compare Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 227 (1983) (holding that an anonymous letter “provides virtually nothing from which one 
might conclude that its author is either honest or his information reliable”), with State v. Paszek, 
184 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Wis. 1971) (stating that a citizen informant is presumed to be motivated by 
“concern for society or for his own safety”). 
71. Rowley Memorandum, supra note 1, para. 5 (emphasis added). 
72. Some might question whether Moussaoui had any Fourth Amendment rights, given that he 
was present in the United States illegally, after his visa had lapsed.  Cf. United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 266 (1990) (holding that the Fourth Amendment’s use of the phrase “the 
people” includes only those “who are part of the national community or who have otherwise 
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part of that community”). 
73. See United States v. Hyppolite, 65 F.3d 1151, 1160 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that the 
defendant’s “pugnacious manner” contributed to probable cause). 
74. See United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1271 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that a 
“nervous” refusal of consent contributed to reasonable suspicion). 
75. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 13 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring to a 
drug profile’s “chameleon-like way of adapting to any particular set of observations” (quoting 
United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987), rev’d 490 U.S. 1 (1989))). 
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Memorandum implicitly posits a manner of refusal that would be wholly 
consistent with innocence, but it is unclear precisely what such a manner 
would be, at least in the eyes of the federal agents.76 
Whether the manner of Moussaoui’s refusal to consent can be 
considered in the probable cause assessment is, under existing law, 
uncertain.77  Although some courts have suggested that the Supreme Court 
foreclosed any use of a consent refusal in Florida v. Bostick,78 this is an 
extravagant reading of Bostick, which stated merely that “a refusal to 
cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective 
justification needed for a detention or seizure.”79  Other courts have 
suggested that allowing the police to weigh a refusal to consent 
impermissibly “burdens” the exercise of the Fourth Amendment right to be 
free from unreasonable searches.80  This “constitutional penalty” argument 
draws sustenance from Griffin v. California,81 a Fifth Amendment case in 
which the Court held that permitting prosecutorial comment on a defendant’s 
silence at trial would “cut[] down on the privilege [against self-
incrimination] by making its assertion costly.”82  Although the logic of 
 
76. Professor Jonathan Turley has dismissed this portion of the Rowley Memorandum with the 
curt observation that “Moussaoui’s assertion of a constitutional right cannot be used” in the 
probable cause calculus.  Turley, supra note 9.  Turley assumes this matter is a simple and settled 
one.  Id.  Many state and federal courts agree, holding briskly that a refusal to consent to a search 
cannot be weighed at all in the probable cause or reasonable suspicion balance.  E.g., United States 
v. Machuca-Berrera, 261 F.3d 425, 435 n.32 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Moreno, 233 F.3d 
937, 941 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Dozal, 173 F.3d 787, 794 (10th Cir. 1999); State v. 
Palenkas, 933 P.2d 1269, 1279–80 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Jennings, 430 S.E.2d 188, 200 
(N.C. 1993). 
77. See generally Kenneth J. Melilli, The Consequences of Refusing Consent to a Search or 
Seizure: The Unfortunate Constitutionalization of an Evidentiary Issue, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 901, 
903–05 (2002) (noting that while most cases hold that a refusal may not be considered, some 
authority and the underlying case law refute these holdings). 
78. 501 U.S. 429 (1991).  See, e.g., State v. McGovern, 45 P.3d 624, 627 n.18 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2002) (“King had the right to refuse consent, and his exercise of that right may not be used to 
establish probable cause.” (citing Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437)). 
79. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437 (emphasis added); see also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 
(1983) (plurality opinion) (“[R]efusal to listen or answer does not, without more, furnish [probable 
cause].”) (emphasis added). 
80. See Elson v. State, 659 P.2d 1195, 1199 n.15 (Alaska 1983) (recognizing that allowing 
evidence of a refusal to consent “would create opportunities for abuse since in the future police 
might seek permission to search, even if they know consent is not required, in an effort to bait a 
defendant into incriminating himself by refusing consent” and that “[t]he defendant in that position 
would face a potential no-win situation”); Whitehead v. State, 698 A.2d 1115, 1118 (Md. App. 
1997) (“For this Court, or any court, to condone the use of a citizen’s reaction to a consent form as a 
litmus test to determine probable cause would be to render the Fourth Amendment a dead letter and 
the requirement of the police to secure a valid waiver a nullity.”).  Of course, the question is not 
whether a refusal to consent to a search alone creates probable cause.  The question is whether 
police and magistrates can consider a refusal, along with other pieces of evidence, when 
determining whether probable cause exists. 
81. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 
82. Id. at 614. 
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Griffin has occasionally been extended to other contexts,83 the Court 
subsequently made clear that the Constitution does not “forbid[] every 
government-imposed choice in the criminal process that has the effect of 
discouraging the exercise of constitutional rights.”84  There is thus no 
requirement that every assertion of a constitutional right be costless.85 
Some judges have suggested that refusal to consent to a search should 
not be considered in the probable cause assessment because such a refusal is 
of no probative value.86  This is debatable.  To be sure, many innocent people 
value their privacy and would refuse to consent to a search.  One may 
wonder, however, whether a person carrying evidence of a crime is more 
likely than an innocent person to refuse consent.  Indeed, some courts have 
sanctioned the use of consent refusals in the probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion assessment when the nature of the refusal is especially vigorous87 
or takes a physical form.88  It is thus possible that Moussaoui’s refusal to 
consent could be weighed in the probable cause balance if the “manner” of 
 
83. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 583 (1968) (striking down the capital 
punishment provision of the federal kidnapping statute because it could be imposed only where the 
defendant had requested a jury trial). 
84. Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 30–31 (1973).  The question, according to Justice 
Harlan, is whether “compelling the election [to assert a right or waive it] impairs to an appreciable 
extent any of the policies behind the rights involved.”  McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 213 
(1971) (emphasis added). 
85. For example, courts have held that association with known criminals by itself cannot 
constitute probable cause.  Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979).  Yet associating with known 
criminals can be considered in the probable cause calculus.  See, e.g., State v. Milette, 727 A.2d 
1236, 1241 (R.I. 1999) (holding that evidence that a suspect belonged to a white supremacist group 
could be weighed). 
86. See State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 145 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (Greenwood, J., 
dissenting) (“[The] defendant’s reaction could just as easily be attributed to indignation that an 
officer would request consent to search the car after having pulled the pair over for the minor 
violation of not having a front license plate attached.”). 
87. See, e.g., State v. Green, 540 N.W.2d 649, 655–56 (Iowa 1995) (finding it relevant, 
although not dispositive, in deciding whether probable cause existed, that the defendant became 
“very agitated and upset” in response to a request to search); State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 142 
(Utah Ct. App. 1997) (finding it relevant, in deciding the existence of probable cause, that the 
suspect had “acted extremely nervous and became angry about a possible search of the car”).  But 
see Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 495–96 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding that “argumentative and 
difficult” behavior when refusing consent was not relevant in deciding whether reasonable suspicion 
existed). 
88. United States v. Hyppolite, 65 F.3d 1151, 1157 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Although we hold that an 
objectively reasonable officer should have known that the mere assertion of constitutional rights 
cannot establish probable cause, the question of whether the form of the assertion of those rights 
could be considered as a factor is less settled.”); United States v. Batti, No. 91-10318, 1992 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 4934, at *5 (9th Cir. Mar. 17, 1992) (holding that it was relevant, in deciding that 
reasonable suspicion existed, that the suspect “picked up the bag, put his arms through the handles, 
clutched the bag towards his body, and stepped a couple o[f] paces away from” the agent when the 
latter requested consent to search).  Compare State v. Brown, 825 P.2d 282, 285 (Or. App. 1992) 
(dismissing the relevance of the nature of the suspect’s refusal to consent to a search), with id. at 
286 (Rossman, J., dissenting) (finding it relevant, in concluding that probable cause existed, that the 
suspect clutched the keys in his fist in response to a request to search). 
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the refusal, to which Rowley refers, was truly out of the ordinary.  If, 
however, Moussaoui simply articulated a preference to be left alone, most 
courts would likely conclude that this refusal is of no weight in the probable 
cause balance.89 
5. Foreign Intelligence Information.—Although Rowley and FBI 
headquarters agree that the French Intelligence Service reported that a man 
named “Zacarias Moussaoui” had a radical fundamentalist background,90 
they disagree as to the precise nature of the information.  Rowley contends 
that the FIS linked Moussaoui to bin Laden; “intelligence sources,” however, 
have suggested that the FIS simply tied Moussaoui to anti-Russian Muslim 
rebels in Chechnya, and not to bin Laden or Al Qaeda.91  Those sources 
further argue that Rowley’s characterization of Moussaoui prior to 
September 11 reflected an unproven leap from abettor of Muslim rebels in 
Chechnya to terrorist associated with bin Laden.92 
Although Russia had long contended that the Chechen rebels were 
terrorists, the U.S. State Department had for many years resisted that 
characterization.93  Furthermore, although Russian intelligence and press 
accounts had insisted that the Chechen rebels were funded by bin Laden,94 
the Chechens themselves95 and some Western observers regularly discounted 
the claims.96  To be sure, in a post-September 11 case, a federal district court 
 
89. See United States v. Prescott, 581 F.2d 1343, 1351 (9th Cir. 1978) (holding that the 
“passive refusal to consent to a warrantless search is privileged conduct which cannot be considered 
as evidence of criminal wrongdoing”). 
90. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.  In her memo, Rowley mocked the concern 
voiced by FBI headquarters that the name may have been a common Muslim name.  See Rowley 
Memorandum, supra note 1, para. 6 n.6.  However, courts have at times chided police for a failure 
to familiarize themselves with foreign names.  See United States v. Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d 714, 
715 (7th Cir. 1994) (criticizing police for confusing the Hispanic names “Miguel Ledesma Ornelas” 
and “Miguel Orlenas Ledesma”). 
91. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text. 
92. See Hill Probers Upgrade Evidence Gathered from Moussaoui, WASH. POST, June 6, 2002, 
at A18 (“Headquarters officials . . . insist that the French information detailed no direct ties between 
Moussaoui and any designated terrorist group, a requirement for obtaining a FISA warrant.  The 
Chechen rebels, while believed to have links with bin Laden, were not considered a terrorist group 
by the State Department.”). 
93. See Daniel Schorr, Stateless Rogues, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 14, 2002, at 11. 
94. See, e.g., Osama bin Laden Sponsors Cooperation Between Taliban, Chechens, INTERFAX 
(Moscow), Dec. 9, 2000, available at 2000 WL 30076725 (“The office of the Kremlin[] . . . is in 
possession of information to the effect that the leadership of the Taliban movement in Afghanistan 
is strengthening its cooperation with the Chechen separatists and this cooperation is being 
underwritten by notorious terrorist Osama bin Laden.”). 
95. In a letter to the Editor of the Washington Times on September 24, 2000, Ilyas Arkhmadov, 
self-described “Foreign Minister, Chechen Republic of Ichkeria,” wrote, “We again state 
emphatically that no official ties exist between our republic and the Taliban, much less with Osama 
bin Laden.”  Ilyas Arkhmadov, Letter to the Editor, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2000, at B5. 
96. In December 2000, for example, the Boston Globe dismissed Russian claims of a link 
between the Chechen rebels and bin Laden, arguing that the only thing they had in common was 
that “both [can] be described as Muslim.”  Editorial, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 26, 2000, at A22. 
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credited the affidavit of an FBI agent linking an Islamic organization in the 
United States to terrorists in part based on its “dealings with the Chechen 
mujahideen . . . .”97  Prior to September 11, however, the FBI and other 
federal agencies seemed reluctant to draw this conclusion.  In short, then, the 
FIS information suggested that Moussaoui possibly had ties to groups that 
had used violence against Russians in Chechnya, but it is unclear whether 
those groups were, for our purposes, “terrorists,” or had violent plans against 
Americans. 
6. Other FBI Information (Not Shared with the Minneapolis Office).—
FBI agents in Oklahoma City and Phoenix had sent memos to FBI 
headquarters expressing the concern that Middle Eastern men with apparent 
ties to bin Laden had been taking flight training lessons.98  This information, 
unaccountably, was not shared with the Minneapolis office, but it is worth 
briefly examining whether it would have materially changed the probable 
cause assessment. 
As an initial matter, Moussaoui is a French citizen, and it may not be 
fair to lump him together with other “Middle Eastern men.”99  Even assum-
ing it is fair, many would question the appropriateness of triangulating with 
the other two memos to form probable cause in his particular case.  Perhaps it 
is suspicious that many Middle Eastern (and presumptively Muslim) men 
were taking flight training classes in America, and perhaps this fact would 
enhance, if ever so marginally, the suspicious nature of any individual 
Middle Eastern man’s decision to take such classes.  All of this assumes, 
however, that one can draw attention to a suspect’s ethnic or religious 
background in the probable cause assessment, an issue that is still 
unresolved.100 
7. Hunches.—Given the (relatively underwhelming) evidence, it is 
surprising that Rowley placed the odds of criminal activity at greater than 
fifty-fifty and that the Minneapolis office was so frantic about searching 
Moussaoui’s laptop.  One explanation is that Rowley and her colleagues irra-
tionally jumped to conclusions, and although they happened to be right in 
this particular instance, one might wonder how many other times they cried 
wolf.  Another explanation is that the Minneapolis agents developed a hunch, 
based on collective years of experience, that Moussaoui’s was not just 
another immigration overstay case. 
 
97. Benevolence Int’l Found., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 200 F. Supp. 2d 935, 937 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
98. See supra text accompanying notes 47–49. 
99. Moussaoui is of Moroccan descent, but Morocco is, of course, in North Africa.  In contrast, 
the 19 hijackers were all from the Middle East—Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, 
and Egypt.  See Sheridan, supra note 61. 
100. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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The case law is littered with disparagement of police officers’ 
“hunches.”101  A burgeoning scientific literature suggests, however, that 
many unarticulated, and perhaps unarticulable, feelings reflect a dimension 
of real information, sometimes called “tacit knowledge.”102  Rowley may 
have declined to express her inchoate suspicions about Moussaoui because 
she was well aware that judges unsparingly mock such feelings in judicial 
opinions.  However reasonable hunches may in fact be, it would, of course, 
be impossible to provide meaningful checks on police behavior if courts 
credited police claims that “this guy looked fishy to me, but I can’t tell you 
why.”  Still, it is worth acknowledging that a possibly valuable source of 
information is excised from the probable cause assessment when hunches, 
and the tacit knowledge they may reflect, are discarded. 
8. Gravity of Offense/Nature of Intrusion.—Clearly, one factor that 
propelled the Minneapolis field office was the perception that Moussaoui 
may have been planning to hijack an airplane.  The question never addressed 
by the Rowley Memorandum is whether probable cause should be a lower 
standard when the crime under investigation is such a grave one.  Indeed, she 
implicitly assumes that probable cause is a fixed standard that applies equally 
to aircraft piracy and crimes of lesser seriousness.103  This is, in fact, the view 
of the U.S. Attorney for Minneapolis, who stated, after the release of the 
Rowley Memorandum, that “[w]e apply the same standard of probable cause 
in every case.”104 
Another nonfactor in the probable cause assessment was the 
intrusiveness of the proposed search.  At issue here was not a search of 
Moussaoui’s residence but, far more discretely, of his laptop computer.105  
Should the relative degree of the proposed invasion of privacy alter the 
probable cause calculus?  Or, for probable cause purposes, can no distinction 
be drawn between a search of a computer, a house, a warehouse, and a car 
trunk?  Courts regularly imply that, for probable cause purposes, a search is a 
search.106  This Article argues that, in omitting the gravity of the offense and 
 
101. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez-Valenzuela, 268 F.3d 719, 724 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that a hunch “cannot withstand scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment”); United States v. Salzano, 
158 F.3d 1007, 1111 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating that “inchoate suspicions and unparticularized 
hunches” do not provide reasonable suspicion of criminal activity); United States v. Staples, 194 F. 
Supp. 2d 582, 585 (W.D. Tex. 2002) (“[A]n officer’s reliance on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to 
justify a [traffic] stop.”). 
102. MICHAEL POLYANI, THE TACIT DIMENSION (1966).  Polyani explores the experienced fact 
that we often know more than we can tell.  Id. at 4.  For example, we can often pick an acquaintance 
out of a crowd even if we cannot remember where we met, how we know the person, or even who 
the person is.  Id. 
103. See Rowley Memorandum, supra note 1, para. 5. 
104. Frommer, supra note 12, para. 3. 
105. To be sure, this is a fairly intrusive search.  Indeed, several people whom I canvassed said 
that they would regard a search of their computer as more intrusive than a search of their home. 
106. See infra notes 144–46. 
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the degree of the proposed intrusion, courts have cast probable cause in 
unreasonable terms.107 
9. Conclusion.—As stated at the outset of this analysis, the question is 
whether there was (1) probable cause under the FISA that Moussaoui was an 
agent of a foreign power and (2) probable cause under the Fourth 
Amendment that Moussaoui was engaged in criminal activity.  
Commentators sometimes suggest that the probable cause requirement 
imposed by FISA is a less rigorous showing than that imposed by the 
traditional warrant requirement.108  The meaning of this claim is unclear.  
One suggestion might be that “probable cause” in the FISA context implies a 
lower burden of proof than in the ordinary warrant context, perhaps more 
akin to the Terry “reasonable suspicion” standard.109  The difficulty with this 
suggestion is that in other statutes, Congress explicitly employs the standard 
of “reasonable suspicion.”110  Ordinary principles of interpretation would 
lead one to conclude that by failing to use the “reasonable suspicion” 
standard in the FISA, Congress did not intend for its application there. 
Another suggestion might be that the FISA showing is a lesser one 
because the government need only show probable cause that the target is an 
agent of a foreign power and not that he or she has engaged in criminal 
activity.  The difficulty with this argument is that it is hardly clear in all 
instances that the latter showing is an easier one to make.  In the wake of the 
September 11 attacks, a Wall Street Journal op-ed called for jettisoning the 
FISA precisely because, according to the author, it is often harder to link the 
subject of a proposed search to a foreign power than it is to marshal evidence 
of criminal activity.111 
However the probable cause question is cast, when the evidence 
available to the Minneapolis office is totaled up, one may be struck by how 
little of it there was.  Current case law may exclude some pieces of evidence 
altogether from the probable cause assessment (the FBI agents’ “hunch” 
about Moussaoui, his ethnic and religious status, the gravity of the offense, 
 
107. See infra Part VI. 
108. See Jeffrey Toobin, Crackdown, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 5, 2001, at 60 (quoting Morton 
Halperin, a former member of the National Security Council, saying that “there is a lower standard 
to getting FISA taps”). 
109. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29–30 (1967) (holding that an officer was justified in 
searching for and confiscating a revolver when he “observe[d] unusual conduct which [led] him 
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity [was] afoot” and that the 
suspect was armed) (emphasis added). 
110. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7301(b) (2000) (authorizing the Secretary of Defense to conduct drug 
testing upon “reasonable suspicion”); 18 U.S.C. § 1169(a)(2) (2000) (criminalizing the failure to 
report child abuse in Indian territories where there is “reasonable suspicion”); 29 U.S.C. § 
2006(d)(3) (2000) (permitting employers to require employees to submit to polygraphs where the 
employer has “reasonable suspicion” that the employee engaged in theft). 
111. Mark Riebling, Uncuff the FBI, WALL ST. J., June 4, 2002, at A20. 
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the nature of the intrusion, and possibly the refusal to consent); and some 
pieces are of negligible value (such as the immigration overstay).  Essentially 
all that is left is the flight instructor’s tip and the French intelligence 
information.  Do these two facts, when coupled together, amount to probable 
cause, either that Moussaoui was an agent of a foreign power or that he was 
embarking on criminal activity? 
Whichever answer one gives, there is, it must be acknowledged, the 
hovering and unpleasant aroma of “I know it when I see it” jurisprudence.  
Rowley argues that probable cause existed because the flight instructor’s tip 
strongly suggested that Moussaoui had nefarious plans, and the FIS 
information cemented the issue by showing his proclivity to violence.112  A 
critic responds that the FIS information shows nothing more than 
Moussaoui’s involvement in a political cause, and the flight instructor’s tip 
was wholly consistent with an innocent failure to recognize the limits of 
one’s own abilities.113  (“I’m sorry, son, you’ll never fly a 747, because you 
simply have no talent for this sort of thing.”) 
What we need is a theory of probable cause.  Judicial debates about 
whether probable cause exists in any particular case are often mired in 
inconsequential details.  We need to step back from the trees and assess the 
forest: Just how probable is probable cause? 
III. Lessons from History? 
A natural starting point for those trying to solve the various puzzles of 
the Fourth Amendment, including the meaning of probable cause, is in the 
English and American colonial past.  And a natural citation for those embark-
ing on such an historical inquiry is Justice Story’s Commentaries, in which 
the Fourth Amendment is pronounced to be “little more than the affirmance 
of a great constitutional doctrine of the common law.”114  Following Story, a 
long line of distinguished jurists have based their miscellaneous, and often 
contradictory, interpretations of the Fourth Amendment on the “common 
law,” from Chief Justice Taft,115 to Justice Frankfurter,116 to Justice Scalia,117 
 
112. Rowley Memorandum, supra note 1, para. 5. 
113. See Turley, supra note 9 (“If this hunch amounted to probable cause, it is hard to imagine 
what would not satisfy such a standard.”). 
114. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 748 
(Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833). 
115. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 157 (1925) (“The reason for arrest for 
misdemeanors without warrant at common law was promptly to suppress breaches of the peace.” 
(citing JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 193 (London, 
MacMillan 1883))). 
116. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority for its “disregard of the history embedded in the Fourth Amendment and 
the great place which belongs to that Amendment in the body of our liberties”). 
117. See Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 61–62 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(discussing the traditional protections against unlawful arrest which are derived from the common 
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to Justice Thomas,118 and most recently Justice Souter.119  Could all of these 
jurists be wrong?120  The first Part of this Article shows that they are.  I then 
pirouette (although not quite 180 degrees) and offer some modest lessons 
from a study of the common law. 
A. Why Not to Study the Past 
An American who spends four weeks in Rome returns with various 
impressions, but with no plausible claim to understanding, through and 
through, the Italian people.121  By contrast, a jurist who spends four hours in 
the library (or delegates this irksome task to a clerk) emerges with definite 
opinions about a legal system that existed over 200 years ago.  And upon 
these opinions, the court grounds its decisions.  Yet, what is the competence 
of jurists to judge the distant past?  There is little in a modern lawyer’s 
training that prepares him or her to parse the meaning of eighteenth-century 
documents: only a small percentage of law students take a class in legal 
history, and a similarly small percentage majored in history in college.122 
Evidence of the modern jurist’s doubtful competence in evaluating the 
past is found in the persistent references to “the common law,” as if this 
constituted a unified doctrine of law.  The more one learns about the com-
mon law, the less this view can be seriously maintained.  Take, for example, 
the evidentiary standard for the issuance of an arrest or search warrant—in 
our terminology, “probable cause.”  Even among the great authorities on the 
common law, there were vigorous disagreements on precisely this point.123  
 
law, and citing Matthew Hale’s Pleas of the Crown for the particular protection of bringing persons 
arrested without a warrant before a magistrate as soon as reasonably possible). 
118. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 931 (1995) (holding that, in interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court is guided by “the traditional protections against unreasonable searches and 
seizures afforded by common law at the time of the framing”). 
119. See Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 334–40 (2001) (concluding that the founding-era 
common law authorized constables to make warrantless arrests for misdemeanors). 
120. My suggestion is not that all of these judges embraced an identical methodology, but that 
all claimed to be guided, to some degree, by their assessment of the historical background to the 
Fourth Amendment.  See David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1763–70 (2000) (contrasting the purposive historical studies of Frankfurter, 
the eclectic use of history by Taft, and the orginalism of Scalia). 
121. In this vein, English novelist Somerset Maugham commented that Henry James, who was 
born in America but lived virtually his entire adult life in England, “never managed to create an 
Englishman who was through and through English.”  SOMERSET MAUGHAM, THE RAZOR’S EDGE 3 
(1944). 
122. At George Mason University Law School, for example, about 20 students (or roughly nine 
percent of the graduating class) took a class in Legal History last year.  About nine percent of the 
incoming class majored in history in college.  George Mason University School of Law, Fall 2002 
Matriculants (2002) (on file with the Texas Law Review) (indicating that 23 of 260 entering law 
students majored in history). 
123. For sweeping surveys of the evolving law of probable cause, from the medieval ages to the 
present day, see BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT AND PROBABLE CAUSE 
114–85 (1991); Jack K. Webber, The Birth of Probable Cause, 11 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 155 (1982).  
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Coke, writing in the early seventeenth century, argued that a warrant could 
issue only after an indictment and not upon what he termed “bare 
surmise.”124  This view was forcefully and repeatedly criticized in the mid-
seventeenth century by Matthew Hale.  In his History of the Pleas of the 
Crown, Hale argued that Coke’s restrictive approach to warrants “would be 
of public inconvenience,” which he considered especially problematic “in 
these times, where felonies and robberies are so frequent.”125 
The various enactments of the First Congress of the United States 
suggest, furthermore, that “probable cause was in a state of flux when the 
Fourth Amendment was framed.”126  The historian William Cuddihy con-
trasts the Collection Act of 1789 and the Excise Act of 1791, which 
“embraced opposing concepts of judicial sentryship and different thresholds 
of reasonableness for search warrants.”127  The former created a low 
evidentiary standard for the issuance of a warrant, removed altogether a 
magistrate’s discretion to refuse a warrant, and largely insulated the officer 
from suit if the search failed to uncover evidence of crime.  The Excise Act, 
by contrast, created a higher evidentiary burden, invested magistrates with 
the discretion to refuse warrants, and was far more liberal in affording those 
searched with civil remedies.128  Professor Thomas Davies has recently 
argued that the search and seizure law of Revolutionary America may have 
been trending in a certain direction and coalescing around certain 
principles.129  And one should, in general, not fall into the trap of overstating 
the inconsistencies of the pre-industrial common law.130  Still, judicial 
 
Webber concludes that the “shifting standards as to the precise amount of cause needed does not 
conceal the fact that the insistence on probable cause is a glory of American legal history, and of the 
English and common law.”  Id. at 166.  See also SHAPIRO, supra, at 145 (stating that the current 
American probable cause standard represents the latest stage in a long historical evolution of the 
justification for arrest). 
124. 4 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF ENGLAND 176 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 
1817) (1644). 
125. 2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 149 (Professional Books 
Ltd. 1971) (1736).  Hale died in 1676, and the work was published posthumously.  The 
disagreement between Coke and Hale is noted in 1 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 191–92 (London, MacMillan 1883). 
126. William J. Cuddihy, The Fourth Amendment: Origins and Original Meaning 1550 (1990) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Claremont Graduate School) (on file with the Texas Law Review). 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 1527–28, 1543. 
129. See Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism, A Case 
Study of the Distortions and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 239, 281–82 (2002) (“[A]lthough there certainly are aspects of common-law 
criminal procedure doctrine that are problematic, if one actually examines the framing-era sources 
one finds they give essentially consistent accounts of the more salient aspects of criminal 
procedure.”). 
130. Cf. PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA: FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE 
CIVIL WAR 164 (1965) (arguing that the common law “had grown up by accident”). 
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invocations of “the common law” seem comically facile the more one 
confronts that law’s richness and diversity.131 
The foregoing, moreover, posits a judge who earnestly seeks out “the 
common law” but may be handicapped by his or her doubtful competence as 
a historian.  This may have been a generous assumption.  One might wonder 
precisely how many judges turn to the past with a genuine and objective 
desire to know it and have it guide and dictate their views of the Fourth 
Amendment (or any other constitutional provision).  There are grounds for 
the suspicion that, in the context of modern legal debates, appeals to history 
are in fact purely forensic.132  Judge Richard Posner has dismissed the 
“originalist” enterprise as a sham, with a “judge . . . do[ing] the wildest 
things, all the while presenting himself as the passive agent of the sainted 
Founders—don’t argue with me, argue with Them.”133 
According to the pragmatist Posner, even assuming modern jurists could 
learn with certainty what the founding-era common law meant, there would 
remain the brutal question, “So what?”134  Professor Akhil Amar has argued 
 
131. Indeed, Story’s oft-repeated claim that the Fourth Amendment (in prohibiting general 
warrants) was simply a codification of the common law has been challenged in recent years.  See 
William Cuddihy & B. Carmon Hardy, A Man’s House Was Not His Castle: Origins of the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 371, 372 (1980) (“[T]he [Fourth] 
[A]mendment broke new ground.  Its circumscriptions far exceeded the precedents of Anglo-
American tradition.”)  There was, in fact, no consensus in the common law prohibiting the issuance 
of general warrants.  See Morgan Cloud, Searching Through History; Searching for History, 63 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1707, 1719 (1996) (“Warrantless general searches were common in England and 
America during the centuries preceding the adoption of the Fourth Amendment.”).  The 1618 
edition of Michael Dalton’s magistrate manual, still widely used in England and in the colonies 
throughout the 1700s, approved of house-to-house searches “[t]o Search for stolen goods” and “for 
a generall search fir Rogues.”  Sklansky, supra note 120, at 1797–98.  The only colony to abandon 
indiscriminate searches was Massachusetts, “which . . . began the process by rejecting the common 
law as a basis for search or seizure.”  Id. at 1798.  In response to Sklansky’s arguments, Professor 
Davies has recently drawn a distinction between the “origins” of the Fourth Amendment and the 
“original meaning” of the provision.  Davies, supra note 129, at 281 n.123.  The former—the 
common law generally—embraced several centuries of laws and precedents and of course reflected 
inconsistencies; the latter—the colonial-era common law—was, Davies argues, far less “unsettled” 
than Sklansky contends.  See id. at nn.123 & 125. 
132. See Cloud, supra note 131, at 1707–12 (criticizing “[l]awyers’ histories of the Fourth 
Amendment”). 
133. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 251 (1995).  Posner’s account of originalism is 
somewhat more sympathetic in other writings.  See Richard A. Posner, Past Dependency, 
Pragmatism, and Critique of History in Adjudication in Legal Scholarship, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 573, 
595–96 (2000) [hereinafter Posner, Critique of History] (“The originalists want to minimize judicial 
discretion and they have devised a kind of algorithmic mechanism in doing so . . . .  Originalism is 
thus, in a queer but I think valid sense, a response to the difficulty of resolving contested historical 
issues rather than a school of historical jurisprudence.”). 
134. As a gloss on Nietszche, Posner has written, 
Historical knowledge . . . provide[s] good solutions to current problems only if the 
present resembles the past very closely.  If it does not, then a person who “only repeats 
what he has heard, learns what is already known, imitates what already exists” will not 
be able to solve any of these problems.  History provides a template for framing and 
“sizing” contemporary problems; but the template may prove to be a straitjacket. The 
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that the Framers did not intend the Amendment to require warrants and has 
adduced a variety of Framing-era materials to buttress his view.135  In 
response, some have conceded,136 perhaps unnecessarily,137 the correctness of 
Amar’s historical account, but have nonetheless argued that changed 
conditions—principally, the dramatic growth of the modern police force—
force us to reassess the utility and even the necessity of warrants in checking 
the police.138  For these and other reasons, Professor Anthony Amsterdam 
concluded that history provides “no help” in construing the Fourth 
Amendment.139 
B. Modest Lessons 
Yet to say that history is of “no help” seems overstated.  The past does 
not provide neatly packaged answers to the pressing criminal procedure 
questions that confront us today, but a familiarity with the past may help in 
stripping away some of the faulty assumptions that underlie our thinking.  In 
this modest sense, the study of history may be valuable.140  Contemporary 
thinking about probable cause and the Fourth Amendment is rife with faulty 
assumptions.  Consider the statement in Dunaway v. New York141 that 
probable cause is “[a] long-prevailing” standard that has emerged from “the 
accumulated wisdom of precedent and experience” and which is readily 
 
use of historical analogies (“another Munich”) is full of pitfalls.  Hence the adage that 
the only lesson of history is that there are no lessons of history. 
Posner, Critique of History, supra note 133, at 578–79 (quoting Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Uses 
and Disadvantages of History for Life, in FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, UNTIMELY MEDITATIONS 57 
(R.J. Hollingdale, trans., 1983)). 
135. See Akhil Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 762–71 
(1994) (“[T]he Framers did say what they meant, and what they said makes eminent good sense: all 
searches and seizures must be reasonable.”). 
136. See Carol Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820, 823 
(1994) (“Even if I were convinced that one could derive plausible versions of the Framers’ 
intentions by viewing the Constitution’s text in historical context, I would question the 
programmatic implications of those intentions.”). 
137. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 
547, 575–90 (1999) (criticizing Amar’s interpretation of the search and seizure provisions of the 
Excise Act and Collection Act each passed by the First Congress); Tracey Maclin, The Complexity 
of the Fourth Amendment: A Historical Review, 77 B.U. L. REV. 925, 950–59 (1997) (criticizing 
Amar for ignoring the Framers’ apparent belief in the value of specific warrants). 
138. See Steiker, supra note 136, at 830–38 (arguing that the rise of the modern police force, 
together with our country’s history of racial discrimination in law enforcement, make focusing on 
the Framers’ intentions shortsighted). 
139. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 
395 (1974) (stating that the Fourth Amendment’s “language is no help and neither is its history”). 
140. Cf. Craig S. Lerner, Impeachment, Attainder, and a True Constitutional Crisis: Lessons 
from the Strafford Trial, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 2057, 2095–2101 (2002) (drawing some modest 
lessons from English history for contemporary American impeachment debates). 
141. 442 U.S. 200 (1979). 
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distinguished from a reasonableness balancing test.142  This terse statement is 
a rich source of historical inaccuracies.143 
1. “Single.”—Modern American courts tend to treat probable cause as 
the North Star of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  It is depicted as a fixed 
point, indispensably guiding police officers as they navigate the treacherous 
terrain the Supreme Court has made of constitutional criminal procedure.  
Whether the police are making an arrest or conducting a search,144 whether 
they are searching a car or a house,145 probable cause is typically, though not 
always,146 cast as a single evidentiary standard.  To be sure, police need not 
obtain a warrant to make an arrest in public,147 nor search a car,148 but these 
are exceptions to the “warrant requirement,” not to a probable cause 
requirement.  Even in exigent circumstances, at least in the view of some 
courts, police are excused from obtaining a warrant but are not cast free of 
the probable cause requirement.149 
This approach to probable cause—search, arrest, car, house, urgent, not 
urgent, one-size-fits-all—whatever its merits as a matter of policy, has 
 
142. Id. at 208. 
143. The remainder of this Part is a brief account of the English and colonial practice with 
respect to probable cause and its evidentiary antecedents.  The subject has been treated more 
completely by historians such as William Cuddihy and Thomas Davies.  See generally Cuddihy, 
supra note 126; Davies, supra note 137.  Although not a historian by training, Joseph Grano also 
supplies a compelling account of the topic in Joseph D. Grano, Probable Cause and Common 
Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 465, 478–88. 
144. American courts tend to view “probable cause” as an equivalent standard for searches and 
arrests.  See Whitley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 564–66 (1971) (applying the same probable cause 
standard for an arrest warrant and for a warrantless arrest); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 
417 n.5 (1969) (“While Draper involved the question whether the police had probable cause for an 
arrest without a warrant, the analysis required for an answer to this question is basically similar to 
that demanded of a magistrate when he considers whether a search warrant should issue.”). 
145. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 594 (1974) (equating the probable cause needed to 
search a house and a car).  Unlike searches of homes, searches of cars do not require warrants; yet 
courts often suggest that the probable cause standard applies equally to both categories of searches.  
See, e.g., McNeal v. State, 617 So. 2d 999, 1006 (Miss. 1993) (stating that, while a warrant is not 
required, the same probable cause considerations apply to issuing warrants and admitting evidence 
that is the product of a warrantless search); State v. Eliason, 544 P.2d 1124, 1127 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1976) (requiring probable cause for a vehicle search).  But see State v. Lesnick, 530 P.2d 243, 251 
(Wash. 1975) (Hale, C.J., dissenting) (“What is probable cause to search and seize an automobile 
may not rise to the standards of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant to search a house.”); 
United States ex rel. Clark v. Mulligan, 347 F. Supp. 989, 991 (D.N.J. 1972) (“As a general 
principle, automobile searches may not demand the same variety of probable cause required for a 
search of a home or other structure.”). 
146. See infra subpart VI(A). 
147. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 416–17 (1976) (summarizing cases upholding 
the constitutionality of warrantless arrests). 
148. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). 
149. See United States v. Winsor, 846 F.2d 1569, 1571 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (“[H]ot pursuit 
may excuse police from the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, but never does it excuse the 
absence of the requisite degree of suspicion before effecting a search.”).  Winsor and the Fourth 
Amendment law with regard to exigent circumstances are discussed infra subpart V(D). 
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doubtful support in history.  The authorities on the common law did not 
embrace the one-size-fits-all approach.  Much to the contrary, Hale’s History 
of the Pleas of the Crown, for example, is replete with taxonomies of rules 
for arrests and searches, calibrated to the degree of suspicion present, as well 
as to the offense under investigation.  For Hale, the evidentiary predicate 
required to justify an arrest was a separate issue from the evidentiary 
predicate required to justify a search or seizure.150  Likewise, the Collection 
Act of 1789 distinguished between ships and houses not only for purposes of 
obtaining a warrant, but also with respect to the requisite degree of suspicion 
justifying a search.151 
Moreover, the “centuries of precedent” to which the Dunaway Court 
refers does not reflect a “single” evidentiary standard for a search or arrest.  
The standard fluctuated over time.  At times, it seems to have been, at least to 
the modern observer, astonishingly low.  A thirteenth-century statute autho-
rized town guards to arrest “any Stranger” walking the roads after sunset.152  
Fifty years later, in the midst of crime wave, a 1331 statute went even further 
and authorized constables to arrest anyone, anytime, who showed an “evil 
suspicion” of having committed certain violent felonies.153  The constable 
was commanded to bring the suspect to a magistrate, who conducted further 
inquiries to determine if the suspect had in fact committed a crime.154  The 
1331 statute drifted into obsolescence over the course of the next few cen-
turies as more rigorous standards were employed to regulate the constable’s 
arrest power.155  Yet it is interesting to note that the seventeenth-century 
author Hale, responding to Coke, sought to shift the pendulum back, at least 
to some degree, “in these times, where felonies and robberies are so 
frequent.”156  Probable cause, far from being a single standard, seems to have 
been a variable one, both across time and within a given time period.157 
 
150. See 2 HALE, supra note 125, at 85–98 (“Concerning arrests or apprehension of felons, or 
persons suspected of [a] felony by [an] officer.”); id. at 149–51 (“Concerning warrants to search for 
stolen goods, and seizing of them.”). 
151. See Cuddihy, supra note 126, at 1529 (stating that in order to search a ship, a customs 
officer needed “reason to suspect,” but to search cargoes awaiting importation, “a suspicion of 
fraud” was required); Cloud, supra note 131, at 1740–41 (discussing the statute’s three search and 
seizure categories and their varying requisite degrees of suspicion). 
152. Statute of Winchester, 13 Edw. 1, stat. 2, c. 4 (1285) (Eng.), cited and discussed in Grano, 
supra note 143, at 479 n.80 and accompanying text (noting that “the statute was directed at 
‘roberdsmen,’ men who patterned their behavior after Robin Hood”); see also Atwater v. Lago 
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 333 (2001) (discussing the Statute of Winchester to illustrate that warrantless 
misdemeanor arrests at common law were not confined to breaches of the peace). 
153. Statute of Westminster, 5 Edw. 3, c. 14 (1331) (Eng.), cited and discussed in Grano, supra 
note 143, at 479 n.81. 
154. Id. 
155. See 1 STEPHEN, supra note 125, at 189 n.2 (“[Although] [t]he Statute of Winchester was 
not repealed till 1828, it had for centuries before that time been greatly neglected.”). 
156. 2 HALE, supra note 125, at 149. 
157. See Cuddihy, supra note 126, at 863 (“No single limit applied universally . . . to define an 
unreasonable class of searches or seizures . . . .”). 
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2. “Familiar.”—The Dunaway Court is surely correct that the probable 
cause standard is now a familiar one, thanks to its inclusion in the Fourth 
Amendment.  Curiously, however, the precise phrase appears to have been 
relatively uncommon in colonial practice.  As late as 1766, George Mason 
protested against a British revenue statute, which insulated customs officers 
from trespass claims in which there was “probable Cause of Complaint,” that 
the word probable was “a word before an unknown in the Language and 
Style of Laws!”158 
At the time of the Revolution, many states enacted declarations of rights 
to restrict the practice of general warrants, but none of these documents 
referenced a probable cause standard.159  To the extent that the phrase 
“probable cause” was used, it appears to have been restricted to customs 
disputes.160  Persons whose ships or property had been seized would bring an 
action for recovery of the seized goods, as well as for damages from the 
official who had executed the forfeiture.  According to common practice, the 
official was immune from any claims if he could show that probable cause 
had existed.  Madison may have drawn the phrase “probable cause” from this 
practice in customs disputes; but prior to the Fourth Amendment, few 
colonial or early American statutes drew upon this standard in restricting the 
issuing of warrants.161 
3. Probable Cause vs. Reasonableness.—The relatively infrequent use 
of the probable cause standard brings us to another point: The contrast of 
probable cause and reasonable suspicion, to which the Dunaway Court 
referred, has little basis in history.  Revolutionary-era statutes typically 
authorized warrants to search or execute an arrest whenever it was 
“reasonable” or the evidentiary predicate for such actions was “satisfactory,” 
rather than upon a showing of probable cause.162 
 
158. Letter from George Mason to the Committee of Merchants in London (June 6, 1766), in 1 
PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 65, 67 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970).  As Professor Davies notes, 
“James Madison innovated when he used ‘probable cause’ as the standard for warrants in the proto-
fourth amendment.”  Davies, supra note 129, at 370. 
159. For example, Pennsylvania’s Declaration of Rights condemned warrants issued “without 
oaths or affirmations first made, affording a sufficient foundation.”  PA. CONST. of 1776, art. X, 
quoted in Davies, supra note 137, at 677.  Massachusetts proscribed warrants “if the cause or 
foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation.”  MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 
1, art. XIV, quoted in Davies, supra note 137, at 684. 
160. See Davies, supra note 129, at 370–71 (stating that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment 
“anticipated that custom warrants would be the primary sort of searches that federal officers might 
conduct”); Davies, supra note 137, at 703–06 (postulating that the adoption of the probable cause 
standard without the additional common-law requirement of an offense “in fact” suggests that the 
Framers were concerned with custom searches rather than criminal warrants). 
161. Professor Davies notes that Madison’s usage of the phrase in the Fourth Amendment 
would seem to have a single precedent in colonial practice: a Pennsylvania customs statute.  Davies, 
supra note 137, at 703 n.444. 
162. A 1779 Connecticut statute authorized a magistrate to issue a warrant to search hoarded 
provisions if the magistrate considered it “reasonable.”  An Act for Ascertaining the Quantity of 
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The best evidence of the Framers’ understanding of probable cause is 
the Collection Act of 1789,163 which was enacted contemporaneously with 
the passage of the Fourth Amendment.164  As in prior American statutes, the 
1789 statute essentially equated probable cause with some unscientific notion 
of reasonableness.  The Collection Act authorized warrantless searches of 
vessels where officials had “reason to suspect” that illegal goods were 
aboard.165  It also authorized searches of homes, with warrants, where of-
ficials had “cause to suspect” the presence of illegally concealed goods.166  
Another act of the First Congress, which imposed duties on alcohol products, 
authorized judges to issue search warrants “upon reasonable cause of 
suspicion.”167  Officials were authorized to “enter into all and every such 
place or places in which any . . . spirits shall be suspected . . . .”168 
The contrast of probable cause on the one hand and reasonable 
suspicion or reasonableness on the other has become a cornerstone of the 
modern understanding of the Fourth Amendment.  But this is the work of 
decades, not centuries, of precedent; it did not really take hold until the 1968 
decision of Terry v. Ohio.169  Probable cause in American courts has shown a 
remarkable ability to evolve over time, and there would seem to be little 
reason to think that its current meaning will be a permanent one.  A survey of 
the development of probable cause in America, to which I now turn, 
underscores the doctrine’s adaptability, and it may further help in suggesting 
avenues of departure, if needed, from the doctrine in its present form. 
 
Grain, Ct. St., 7 Apr. 1779, Ct. State Recs., vol. 2 (1778–80), quoted in Cuddihy, supra note 126, at 
1524.  A 1782 New Jersey statute provided that a magistrate should issue a warrant when smuggling 
had been alleged after “due and satisfactory Cause and Suspicion” had been shown.  N.J. St. 6th 
Gen. Assemb., 2nd Sitting, c. 32, sec. 18 (June 24, 1782), quoted in Cuddihy, supra note 126, at 
1525.  A 1784 New York statute approved warrants after a “reasonable cause of suspicion” had 
been stated, “of the sufficiency of which” the magistrate “were to judge.” N.Y. St. sess. 7, c. 28 
(April 13, 1784), quoted in Cuddihy, supra note 126, at 1524–25. 
163. Collection Act of 1789 § 24, 1 Stat. 29 (repealed 1790). 
164. See Amar, supra note 135, at 766 (noting that the act was “passed during the same session 
in which [the First Congress] adopted the Fourth Amendment”); Cloud, supra note 131, at 1740; 
Cuddihy, supra note 126, at 1556 (relying on the Collection Act as evidence of Framers’ 
understanding of probable cause because it was passed contemporaneously with the Fourth 
Amendment). 
165. Collection Act of 1789 § 24, 1 Stat. 29, 43 (repealed 1790). 
166. Id. 
167. Excise Act of 1791 § 32, 1 Stat. 207. 
168. Id. 
169. 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that a search conducted by an officer with reason to believe 
that he is dealing with a dangerous person was valid under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of 
whether the officer had probable cause to make an arrest).  The birth of “reasonable suspicion” as a 
doctrine distinct from “probable cause” is discussed infra subpart V(B). 
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IV. The Ebb and Flow of American Probable Cause 
After the Supreme Court decided Illinois v. Gates170 in 1983, there was 
a great deal of gnashing of teeth in the legal academy.  The professoriat 
surveyed the decision and pronounced it not good.171  A common theme in 
the criticisms was that the Court had diluted the probable cause requirement 
reflected in the 1969 decision, Spinelli v. United States.172  Although this was 
indisputably true, it is worth recalling that the American republic predates the 
Warren Court.173  In certain respects, Spinelli reflected a high-water mark in 
the ebb and flow of probable cause in America.  The Gates decision pulled 
back from the Court’s 1960s decisions on probable cause, but it is doubtful 
that it retreated all the way to the views of Chief Justices Marshall or Taft.174 
The account below draws out the competing understandings of probable 
cause that coexisted in the same period.  A court decision that suggested that 
probable cause was little more than the barest suspicion would soon be 
qualified by a decision casting the standard in more stringent language.  A 
decision that suggested that any evidence could be weighed in the probable 
cause balance would soon be opposed by a decision limiting the evidence a 
magistrate or court could consider.  Until the 1960s, however, a consistent 
theme seems to have been the interchangeability of terms like “probable 
cause,” “reasonable cause,” and “reasonable grounds”; it is only starting with 
Terry v. Ohio that the juxtaposition, so familiar today, firmly took hold. 
A. Forfeiture Cases 
The Supreme Court first explored the meaning of probable cause at 
length in an 1813 forfeiture case, Locke v. United States.175  The 1799 
Collection Act provided that a claimant of forfeited goods bore the burden of 
proof that his goods had been wrongfully seized, but only after the 
government had established probable cause.176  (The phrases “probable 
 
170. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
171. See, e.g., Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 257, 336–40 (1984) (criticizing the Court’s revised definition of probable cause as 
providing insufficient protection for civil liberties); Yale Kamisar, Gates, “Probable Cause,” 
“Good Faith,” and Beyond, 69 IOWA L. REV. 551, 570–84 (1984) (denouncing the Court’s adoption 
of the “totality of the circumstances” approach to probable cause as overly accommodating of law 
enforcement interests).  But see Grano, supra note 143, at 512–19 (defending the Gates decision as 
in accord with historical understandings of probable cause and common sense). 
172. 393 U.S. 410 (1969).  For an example of one such criticism, see Kamisar, supra note 171, 
at 570–71. 
173. But see Ronald J. Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Flux: The Rise and Fall of Probable 
Cause, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 763, 767–76 (providing an insightful treatment of “traditional probable 
cause” but beginning with the Supreme Court’s 1960s decisions). 
174. For the view of Marshall, see infra text accompanying notes 182–85.  For the view of Taft, 
see infra text accompanying notes 224–25, 227–28. 
175. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339 (1813). 
176. Act of Mar. 2, 1799, ch. 22, § 71, 1 Stat. 627, 678 (regulating the collection of duties on 
imports and tonnage). 
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cause” and “reasonable cause of seizure” were used interchangeably in the 
Collection Act.)177  In Locke, a claimant of goods forfeited under the 
Collection Act argued that officials had lacked probable cause when they had 
searched his ship.  He contended that the various factors cited by customs 
officials to justify their antecedent suspicions were all amenable to innocent 
explanations.178  The officials had maintained that probable cause had 
existed, in part, because the claimant (Locke) had used a “fictitious name[]” 
when shipping the goods.179  To this, Locke answered that “[i]t was done to 
screen the goods from his creditors, he being in embarrassed circumstances 
at that time.”180  More fundamentally, Locke urged the Court to embrace a 
theory of probable cause akin to a preponderance of the evidence standard: 
“[P]robable cause must mean presumptive evidence.”181 
Chief Justice Marshall rejected all of the claimant’s arguments.  He first 
noted that Locke had “reviewed [the] circumstances separately” and argued 
that “they are either indifferent in themselves—mere casualties—or are 
reasonably accounted for.”182  Marshall instead embraced a “combined 
circumstances” approach to probable cause, looking at the suspicious factors 
in the aggregate, rather than one by one.183  Thus, Locke’s ability to offer an 
innocent explanation for each of the suspicious factors failed to negate the 
existence of probable cause: “It is certainly unusual for a merchant to cover 
his transactions with a veil of mystery,” and the fact that some innocent, 
albeit destitute, shippers employed this device did not deprive the evidence 
of its power to contribute to probable cause.184 
 
177. Compare id. (stating that the burden shifts to the claimant only after the prosecution shows 
“probable cause”), with id. § 89 (stating that the claimant has no cause of action for malicious 
prosecution if there was a “reasonable cause of seizure”).  In construing these provisions, the 
Supreme Court later emphasized that “reasonable cause” and “probable cause” had identical 
meanings: 
In the case before us, the certificate was of “probable cause of seizure.”  The 
authorities we have cited speak of “probable” cause.  The statute of 1799, however, 
uses the words “reasonable cause of seizure.”  No argument is made that there is a 
substantial difference in the meaning of these expressions, and we think there is none.  
If there was a probable cause of seizure, there was a reasonable cause.  If there was a 
reasonable cause of seizure, there was a probable cause.  In many of these reported 
cases the two expressions are used as meaning the same thing. 
Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 646 (1878). 
178. For example, the claimant argued that his failure to produce a certificate of entry was not 
necessarily evidence that the goods were improperly imported and that the partial erasure of 
identifying marks on the goods was an innocent error.  Locke, 11 U.S. at 342. 
179. Id. at 344. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 345. 
183. See id. at 347–48 (“If these circumstances were ever light, taken separately, they derive 
considerable weight from being united in the same case.”); accord Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 
233 (1983) (holding that probable cause is a “totality-of-the-circumstances” analysis). 
184. Locke, 11 U.S. at 346. 
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At the most fundamental level, Marshall took issue with the theory of 
probable cause advanced by the claimant: 
  It is contended, that probable cause means prima facie evidence, or, 
in other words, such evidence as, in the absence of exculpatory proof, 
would justify condemnation. 
   . . . [However,] the term “probable cause,” according to its usual 
acceptation, means less than evidence which would justify 
condemnation; and, in all cases of seizure, has a fixed and well known 
meaning.  It imports a seizure made under circumstances which 
warrant suspicion.185 
The approach to probable cause advanced by Marshall in Locke—
“circumstances which warrant suspicion”—is among the broadest ever 
articulated in an American court, and it has exerted a continuing power in 
debates over the doctrine’s meaning.  In recent Congressional hearings on the 
FBI’s failure to search Zacarias Moussaoui’s laptop computer prior to the 
September 11 attacks,186 Senator Arlen Specter advanced a concept of 
probable cause explicitly based on the Locke decision.187  Citing Chief 
Justice Marshall, Specter argued that officials can form probable cause at a 
very early stage in an investigation, long before suspicion has necessarily 
focused on any particular person, and simply when circumstances “warrant 
suspicion” in a general sense.188 
Yet Marshall’s approach in Locke was soon qualified by the Supreme Court.  
In The Apollon,189 an 1824 forfeiture case, the plaintiff again argued that 
customs officials had lacked probable cause when they had seized his ship.190  
The government countered that probable cause was present because the ship 
was traveling through an area which, according to “general notoriety,” was 
“infested, at different periods, by smugglers.”191  Although this rather 
inconclusive evidence might have satisfied Marshall’s approach to probable 
cause—it is a circumstance that warrants suspicion—Justice Story, writing 
for a unanimous court, rejected the government’s argument.192  Story wrote 
that the question whether probable cause was present “must be decided by 
the evidence in this record, and not by mere general suspicions drawn from 
other sources.”193  It was, he noted, “perfectly lawful” to traverse the waters 
 
185. Id. at 348 (emphasis added). 
186. See supra Part II. 
187. See FBI Counterterrorism Hearings, supra note 28, at 108 (arguing that, unlike the 
standard of proof required in an ordinary judicial proceeding, “probable cause” in a magistrate’s 
decision need only consist of “circumstances which warrant suspicion,” as stated in Locke). 
188. Id.; see also Grano, supra note 143, at 490 (arguing that Marshall’s formulation of 
probable cause comported with the lenient common-law standard). 
189. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824). 
190. Id. at 367. 
191. Id. at 374. 
192. Id. 
193. Id. 
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where the Apollon was seized, and the government could not establish 
probable cause on mere rumor and hearsay evidence.194 
Locke and The Apollon, when viewed together, suggest that probable 
cause had an ambiguous meaning even in the earliest days of the republic.  
Marshall’s suggestion that probable cause consisted of little more than 
“circumstances which warrant suspicion,” was rejected by Justice Story, who 
distinguished probable cause from “mere general suspicions.”  The tension 
between these two views would be played out in a series of legal contexts in 
ensuing years. 
B. Malicious Prosecution Cases 
Malicious prosecution cases provided one such context in the nineteenth 
century.  These cases arose when a person who had been wrongfully arrested 
or searched brought an action against the individuals responsible for the 
issuance of the warrant initiating the criminal proceeding.  A defendant in a 
malicious prosecution case could raise as a defense that probable cause had 
originally existed to believe the plaintiff guilty, even if he was later 
exonerated. 
Lemuel Shaw, the renowned Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts, wrote one of the influential opinions on this issue.  
In Bacon v. Towne,195 the plaintiff, who had been charged with arson and was 
ultimately acquitted, brought a malicious prosecution suit against those who 
had leveled the charges against him.196  Appealing a jury verdict, the defen-
dants argued that the trial court had improperly excluded evidence supporting 
the existence of probable cause.197  This evidence included secondhand re-
ports that the plaintiff had set fire to the factory and the plaintiff’s unsavory 
reputation.198  Shaw, agreeing with the defendants on both points, reversed 
the trial court’s judgment and ordered a new trial.199  With respect to the 
hearsay evidence, Shaw wrote that “in the ordinary transactions of life, men 
do not hesitate to act on information until they put their informants upon 
oath.”200  And with respect to the evidence of the plaintiff’s reputation, Shaw 
added that “[t]he same facts, which would raise a strong suspicion . . . against 
a person of notoriously bad character for honesty and integrity, would make a 
slighter impression if they tended to throw a charge of guilt upon a man of 
good reputation.”201 
 
194. Id. at 374–75. 
195. 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 217 (1849). 
196. Id. at 235. 
197. Id. at 236–41. 
198. Id. at 240. 
199. Id. at 242. 
200. Id. at 240. 
201. Id. at 241. 
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The Apollon and Bacon cannot easily be reconciled.  In the former, 
Story held that vague sorts of rumors, which would be inadmissible at trial 
(e.g., that the waters were “infested by smugglers”) were not relevant in the 
probable cause assessment;202 in the latter, Shaw held that equally vague 
rumors (to the effect that the plaintiff had a bad character) could be weighed 
in the probable cause balance.203  Although this tension is significant, a 
common feature in the forfeiture and malicious prosecution cases was the 
interchangeable usage of “probable cause,” “reasonable cause,” and 
“reasonable belief.”  There is no indication that probable cause had yet to 
suggest to the judicial mind an idea more sophisticated than a belief or 
suspicion that a reasonable person might entertain.204 
C. The Era of Boyd 
Justice Bradley’s decision in the 1886 case of Boyd v. United States205 is 
widely recognized as a broader reading of the protections of the Fourth and 
Fifth Amendments than any contemplated by the Warren Court.206  Although 
Boyd did not address the meaning of probable cause, several lower court 
decisions in the decades that followed did, and their language suggests a shift 
from Justice Marshall’s understanding in Locke. 
Veeder v. United States207 is illustrative.  The case involved the 
execution of a warrant issued pursuant to the Espionage Act of 1917.208  
After an impassioned tribute to the Fourth Amendment as a protection 
against the prying eyes of government agents,209  the Seventh Circuit defined 
probable cause as follows: 
 
202. See supra text accompanying notes 189–94. 
203. See supra text accompanying notes 198–201. 
204. “Probable cause,” Shaw wrote, “is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as 
would lead a man of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest and strong 
suspicion, that the person arrested is guilty.”  Bacon, 58 Mass. at 238–39; see also Wheeler v. 
Nesbitt, 65 U.S. 544, 550 (1861) (stating that everyone who “puts the criminal law in force 
maliciously, and without any reasonable or probable cause, commits a wrongful act; and if the 
accused is thereby prejudiced, . . . the injury and loss so sustained constitute the proper foundation 
of an action to recover compensation”). 
205. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
206. See, e.g., Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on Criminal Procedure and Constitutional Law: 
“Here I Go Down That Wrong Road Again,” 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1565 (1996) (noting the 
Warren Court’s abandonment of Boyd). 
207. 252 F. 414 (7th Cir. 1918). 
208. Act of June 15, 1917, 40 Stat. 228, ch. 30 (repealed 1948).  Section 3 of the Espionage Act 
provided, “A search warrant cannot be issued but upon probable cause, supported by affidavit, 
naming or describing the person and particularly describing the property and the place to be 
searched.”  Veeder, 252 F. at 416. 
209. The court in Veeder stated: 
  One’s person and property must be entitled, in an orderly democracy, to protection 
against both mob hysteria and the oppression of agents whom the people have chosen 
to represent them in the administration of laws which are required by the Constitution 
to operate upon all persons alike. 
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No search warrant shall be issued unless the judge has first been 
furnished with facts under oath—not suspicions, beliefs, or 
surmises—but facts which, when the law is properly applied to them, 
tend to establish the necessary legal conclusion, or facts which, when 
the law is properly applied to them, tend to establish probable cause 
for believing that the legal conclusion is right.  The inviolability of the 
accused’s home is to be determined by the facts, not by rumor, 
suspicion, or guesswork.210 
Applying this standard, the court concluded that the evidence supplied by the 
government—little more than rumor, suspicion, and guesswork—failed to 
constitute probable cause.211 
On its facts, Veeder was a relatively easy case.  The federal agent’s terse 
affidavit in support of a warrant stated that “he [had] good reason to believe, 
and [did] verily believe” that the defendants had committed a financial crime, 
without providing any factual basis for the belief that the magistrate could 
independently evaluate.212  Most narrowly read, Veeder and a string of sim-
ilar court of appeals decisions in the era213 simply required federal agents to 
provide some, if minimal, factual support for their suspicions in warrant 
applications.214  Yet the sweeping language in Veeder and other decisions, 
contrasting probable cause with “suspicions, beliefs, or surmises,”215 
reflected the evolution of a standard with far more vigor than the rather limp 
test—“circumstances which warrant suspicion”—set forth by Marshall in 
Locke. 
D. Prohibition 
Long before the “war on drugs,” the National Prohibition (or 
“Volstead”) Act216 provided an engine for the expansion of federal criminal 
law enforcement.  The 1921 amendment to the Volstead Act authorized 
warrantless searches of automobiles whenever government agents had 
 
  One’s home and place of business are not to be invaded forcibly and searched by 
the curious and suspicious; not even by a disinterested officer of the law, unless he is 
armed with a search warrant. 
Veeder, 252 F. at 418. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. at 419. 
212. Id. at 416, 419. 
213. See, e.g., Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371, 374 (1901) (stating that a warrant issued solely on 
information and belief is invalid); United States v. Baumert, 179 F. 735, 738 (1910) (holding that 
the information and belief of the U.S. Attorney is insufficient for probable cause and the issuance of 
a warrant); United States v. Premises in Butte, Mont., 246 F. 185, 186 (1917) (stating that German 
heritage and suspicion of German sympathies were not sufficient for the issuance of a warrant). 
214. See Veeder, 252 F. at 418 (“The finding of the legal conclusion of probable cause from the 
exhibited facts is a judicial function, and it cannot be delegated by the judge to the accuser.”). 
215. Id. 
216. Ch. 85, 41 Stat. 305 (1919) (repealed 1933). 
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“reasonable cause” that alcohol was present.217  In Carroll v. United States,218 
the Supreme Court held that “reasonable cause” in the Volstead Act had the 
same meaning as “probable cause” in the Fourth Amendment,219 further 
evidence that the two terms had yet to assume distinct meanings. 
Although Carroll’s lasting influence is in upholding the 
constitutionality of warrantless automobile searches, the decision also sheds 
light on the Court’s understanding of the probable cause standard in the 
1920s.  A brief synopsis of the facts of the case reveals Chief Justice Taft’s 
willingness to credit the government’s argument that probable cause existed 
on the basis of astonishingly flimsy evidence.  On September 29, 1921, three 
undercover prohibition agents arranged to purchase alcohol from Carroll and 
two other persons in Grand Rapids, Michigan.220  After the price was fixed, 
Carroll drove off in an Oldsmobile to obtain the spirits, only to return empty-
handed, explaining to the agents that he had been unable to locate his 
source.221  Two months later, the agents observed Carroll and his two 
confederates in the same Oldsmobile about sixteen miles east of Grand 
Rapids.222  Concluding that probable cause existed, the agents stopped the 
car, searched its interior, and discovered alcohol in the trunk.223 
The evidence that alcohol was concealed in Carroll’s trunk was, to put it 
mildly, underwhelming, but Taft brushed aside the argument that the search 
was not supported by probable cause.  After a thorough, if slanted, survey of 
nineteenth-century judicial pronouncements on the issue, Taft defined 
probable cause as simply a “reasonable ground for belief of guilt.”224  In the 
case before him, Taft held that the prohibition agents’ suspicions were 
reasonable given that the area between Detroit and Grand Rapids was “one of 
the most active centers for introducing illegally into this country spirituous 
liquors” and that Carroll and the other defendants had offered to sell liquor 
two months before the search.225  A dissenting Justice McReynolds criticized 
the majority’s theory of probable cause as overly broad and mocked its 
application in the case before the Court.  “Has it come about,” McReynolds 
asked rhetorically, “that merely because a man once agreed to deliver 
whisky, but did not, he may be arrested whenever thereafter he ventures to 
drive an automobile on the road to Detroit!”226 
 
217. Stanley Amendment, ch. 134, § 6, 42 Stat. 222, 223 (1921) (repealed 1933). 
218. 267 U.S. 132 (1924). 
219. Id. at 144–45 (summarizing the congressional debates about the language in the Stanley 
Amendment). 
220. Id. at 134–35. 
221. Id. at 135–36. 
222. Id. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 161 (quoting McCarthy v. DeArmit, 90 Pa. 63, 69 (1881)). 
225. Id. at 160. 
226. Id. at 174 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
988 Texas Law Review [Vol. 81:951 
 
Indeed, Taft’s summary of the nineteenth-century treatment of 
probable cause failed to do justice to the nuances of that doctrine’s 
development and strained all the evidence to support the broadest possible 
reading of the term.  For example, Taft included a shorn quotation from The 
Apollon that mangled Justice Story’s decision.  Taft quoted Story’s obser-
vation that “this remote part of the country has been infested . . . by 
smugglers,”227 as if Story relied on this piece of evidence in upholding a 
finding of probable cause to seize the ship.  In fact, Story’s conclusion was 
precisely the opposite, as the very next sentence in the opinion, omitted by 
Taft, illustrates: “But the question . . . must be decided by the evidence in this 
record, and not by mere general suspicions drawn from other sources.”228  
Story would thus have rejected the argument in Carroll, embraced by Taft, 
that probable cause could be based on the suspect’s mere presence in an area 
reputed to be one favored by bootleggers. 
Within a decade, the Court would cast the Carroll decision into 
doubt, at least with respect to its approach to probable cause.  In Grau v. 
United States,229 the Court advanced a remarkably stringent understanding of 
probable cause.230  Reverting to Story’s approach in The Apollon, the Court 
in Grau held that “a search warrant may issue only upon evidence which 
would be competent in the trial of the offense before a jury . . . .”231  Thus, 
mere rumors or hearsay that a location was popular with bootleggers or 
smugglers, or that an individual was of ill repute, would be valueless in the 
probable cause calculus. 
The approach to probable cause adopted by the Grau Court, in 
rigorously limiting the evidence that could be weighed in the probable cause 
balance by the trial rules of admissibility, proved difficult to administer, and 
the Court was impelled to overrule Grau seventeen years later.  In Brinegar 
v. United States,232 the facts of which closely resembled those of Carroll,233 
 
227. Carroll, 267 U.S. at 159–60 (citing The Apollon, 22 U.S. 362, 374 (1824)). 
228. The Apollon, 22 U.S. at 374. 
229. 287 U.S. 124 (1932). 
230. In Grau, a police officer filed an affidavit, in support of a warrant, claiming that he 
saw persons haul cans, commonly used in handling whisky, and what appeared to be 
corn sugar up to and into the place and saw the same car or truck haul similar cans, 
apparently heavily loaded away from there and smelled odors and fumes of cooking 
mash coming from the place, and he says there is a still and whisky mash on the 
premises. 
Id. at 127.  The Court found the affidavit insufficient: “While a dwelling used as a manufactory or 
headquarters for merchandising may well be and doubtless often is the place of sale, its use for 
those purposes is not alone probable cause for believing that actual sales are there made.”  Id. at 
128–29. 
231. Id. at 128. 
232. 338 U.S. 160 (1949). 
233. The defendant, who had been arrested for bootlegging five months previous, was spotted 
traveling near a city regarded as a source city for liquor.  Id. at 162, 166.  Two federal agents 
stopped him, searched his car, and found alcohol.  Id. at 163.  Although the court below had 
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the Court contrasted the hard and fast evidentiary rules that govern trial 
proceedings with the far more elastic rules that govern questions of probable 
cause: 
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we 
deal with probabilities.  These are not technical; they are the factual 
and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and 
prudent men, not legal technicians, act.234 
The emphasis on the nontechnical character of probable cause might have 
suggested a return to Marshall’s approach in Locke, but the Brinegar Court 
was careful to prevent such a reading.  Although the Court cited Marshall’s 
observation that probable cause “means less than evidence that would justify 
condemnation,” the majority acknowledged that “[s]ince Marshall’s time . . . 
[probable cause] has come to mean more than bare suspicion.”235  The maj-
ority was even candidly ambivalent about the results in both Brinegar and 
Carroll, which it noted fell on the “troublesome line . . . between mere 
suspicion and probable cause.”236  Nor did the Court evince great enthusiasm 
for the Carroll decision, remarking that it could not “say that the conclusion 
[in Carroll] was [so] wrong . . . that it should now be overridden.”237 
Although the majority decision in Brinegar is still good law today, 
Justice Jackson’s dissenting opinion continues to exert a persuasive power in 
discussions of probable cause.238  Jackson expressed dissatisfaction with the 
majority’s rejection of Grau and its embrace of a nontechnical approach to 
probable cause.239  More interestingly, Jackson articulated the intuition that 
 
excluded from Brinegar’s trial the evidence of the prior arrest (for which charges had been 
dropped), the officer was allowed to introduce that evidence to establish that he had had probable 
cause to make the stop in the first place.  Id. at 163–64. 
234. Id. at 175.  I note in passing that one may wonder why criminal trials are not also governed 
by similarly nontechnical rules.  Indeed, American criminal procedure seems, from a comparative 
perspective, cluttered with technical rules.  See CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION 96–108 (1993) (comparing American criminal procedure to 
that of England and Wales); id. at 112–17 (comparing American criminal procedure to Canadian 
criminal procedure); Renée Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems: An American on Trial 
for an American Murder in the French Cour D’Assises, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 791 (comparing 
American criminal procedure to French criminal procedure). 
235. Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175. 
236. Id. at 176. 
237. Id. at 177–78. 
238. See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 274 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (beginning 
his dissenting opinion with the complaint that the majority “patently disregards Justice Jackson’s 
admonition” in Brinegar); State v. Yeargan, 958 S.W. 626, 639 (Tenn. 1997) (seeking “guidance as 
to the circumstances in which an investigative stop is justified” in Jackson’s dissent in Brinegar); 
Gross & Livingston, supra note 65, at 1429 (stating that Jackson’s dissent in Brinegar may be the 
“most widely cited statement of [the] position” that “[t]he greater the threat, the more we are willing 
to accept restrictions on our liberty”). 
239. Id. at 186 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he proof that Brinegar was trafficking in illegal 
liquor rests on inferences from two circumstances, neither one of which would be allowed to be 
proved at a trial.”). 
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the societal interest in the apprehension of a mere bootlegger is less than the 
interest in the capture of a violent criminal.  As a consequence, Jackson 
argued, a search that might be reasonable, given inconclusive evidence, for a 
kidnapped boy trapped in a trunk would not be reasonable, on the basis of the 
same evidence, when alcohol was suspected there.240  Jackson’s sense that 
probable cause should fluctuate depending on the nature of the crime 
investigated is explored at length below.241 
E. Drugs 
With the enactment of the Narcotic Control Act of 1956,242 the problem 
of probable cause found yet another arena in federal courts.  Although the 
statute authorized federal agents to “make [warrantless] arrests” when there 
were “reasonable grounds to believe” that a suspect was transporting 
drugs,243  the Supreme Court soon clarified that “[t]he terms ‘probable cause’ 
as used in the Fourth Amendment and ‘reasonable grounds’ as used in . . . the 
Narcotic Control Act . . . are substantial equivalents of the same meaning.”244  
Over the course of several decades, the Supreme Court debated, albeit in an 
oblique fashion, the meaning of probable cause.  Instead of squarely ad-
dressing the issue of how probable “probable cause” really is, the Justices 
skirmished repeatedly, if inconclusively, as to the probative value of hearsay 
evidence, usually in the form of tips from informants, in determining whether 
probable cause existed in any particular case. 
The first installment in this debate was the 1959 case of Draper v. 
United States.245  A previously reliable informant tipped police off that an 
African-American man of medium height, “wearing a light-colored raincoat, 
brown slacks and black shoes,” would be arriving at a train station carrying 
heroin.246  A police officer corroborated the tip (a man, as described and as 
predicted, emerged from the train), and made an arrest.  The Supreme Court 
affirmed the conviction, holding that there was probable cause, on the basis 
of the corroborated tip, to make the arrest.247  In emphasizing the “exact” and 
“precise” nature of the tip,248 the Court failed to recognize that the tip was in 
fact sufficiently generic that it could have been “corroborated” at any urban 
train station on any morning anywhere in America.  At its core, then, the case 
turned on the trustworthiness of the informant, and on this point the Court 
 
240. Id. at 183 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
241. See infra text accompanying notes 421–22; infra subpart VI(B). 
242. Pub. L. No. 70-727, 70 Stat. 567 (1956). 
243. Id. § 104(a). 
244. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310 n.3 (1959). 
245. 358 U.S. 307 (1959). 
246. Id. at 309 & n.2. 
247. Id. at 311–14. 
248. Id. at 309. 
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was prepared to allow police to give great weight to a reliable informant’s 
tip, at least for purposes of developing probable cause to make an arrest.  
Drawing extensively upon the Brinegar decision, the Draper Court stressed 
the difference between guilt in a criminal trial and a finding of probable 
cause and even suggested that hearsay evidence alone could amount to 
probable cause.249  A dissenting Justice Douglas responded that “the mere 
word of an informer” failed to supply reasonable grounds, or probable cause, 
to make an arrest.250 
The Warren Court substantially undercut Draper (and implicitly 
Brinegar as well) in Spinelli v. United States.251  In Spinelli, a previously 
reliable informant reported to the police that the defendant was using an 
apartment to conduct a gambling operation over the telephone.252  Police 
confirmed that the defendant visited the apartment on a daily basis and that 
two telephone numbers, correctly identified by the informant, were in service 
there.253  The Court nonetheless held that the tip, even as partially 
corroborated, was insufficient to establish probable cause.254  The majority in 
Spinelli expressed doubts about the probative value of an informant’s tip for 
purposes of establishing probable cause, and it insisted that police 
corroborate both the basis of the informant’s knowledge as well as his 
credibility.255  Noting that the police had simply observed Spinelli engaged in 
“innocent-seeming activity,”256 the majority rejected the argument that 
probable cause existed to obtain a warrant.257  An odd trio of dissenting 
Justices (Black, Fortas, and Stewart) complained that the majority had con-
verted probable cause into an overly technical and constraining standard.258  
In effect, the Spinelli Court required law enforcement to develop a greater 
degree of certainty that criminal activity was afoot before taking action.  
Probable cause after Spinelli became relatively more probable. 
 
249. “It is well settled that an arrest may be made upon hearsay evidence.”  Id. at 312 n.4 
(quoting United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105, 106 (2d Cir. 1945)). 
250. Id. at 321 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
251. 393 U.S. 410 (1969). 
252. Id. at 413–14. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. at 418. 
255. Id. at 415 (“Where, as here, the informer’s tip is a necessary element in a finding of 
probable cause, its proper weight must be determined by a more precise analysis.”). 
256. Id. at 414. 
257. Id. at 418–19. 
258. See id. at 431 (Black, J., dissenting) (“Although the statement [of the informant] is hearsay 
that might not be admissible in a regular trial, everyone knows, unless he shuts his eyes to the 
realities of life, that this is a relevant fact which, together with other circumstances, might indicate a 
factual probability that gambling is taking place.”); id. at 438 (Fortas, J., dissenting) (“A 
policeman’s affidavit [to obtain a warrant] is not to be judged in an essay contest.  It is not 
‘abracadabra.’”). 
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Spinelli was overturned two decades later in Illinois v. Gates.259  The 
Justices in Gates focused yet again on the narrow issue of the value of 
hearsay evidence and the necessary degree of police corroboration.  The 
investigation in Gates began when the Bloomingdale, Illinois police received 
an anonymous letter stating that Lance and Sue Gates were drug dealers.260  
The letter predicted that on May 3, Sue would drive to Florida, and Lance 
would join her two days later.  According to the anonymous informant, Sue 
would then fly back to Illinois, and Lance would make the twenty-hour 
return drive by himself in a car loaded with drugs.261  The police did not 
receive the letter until May 5 and were able to corroborate only portions of 
the letter.  They observed Lance board a plane on May 5 to Florida and join 
Sue in a hotel in Miami, but they were unable to confirm that Sue had herself 
made the journey two days before.262  On the morning of May 6, police 
observed the couple embark together on the northbound interstate highway in 
the direction of Chicago—contrary to the anonymous letter which had 
predicted that Lance would return in the car alone—and they obtained 
warrants to search the Gates’ car and home.263 
Lower courts, applying Spinelli, found that the police had failed to 
establish probable cause because they had witnessed merely “innocent 
activity” on the Gates’ part.264  In reversing, the Supreme Court rejected the 
Spinelli test for evaluating hearsay information as overly rigid.265  Probable 
cause, Justice Rehnquist explained, “is a fluid concept—turning on the 
assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or 
even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”266  Drawing upon Locke 
and Brinegar, Rehnquist emphasized that “[f]inely tuned standards, such as 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence, 
useful in formal trials, have no place in a magistrate’s decision [on probable 
cause].”267  Noting that “Florida is well known as a source of narcotics,” 
Rehnquist concluded that that Gates’ overnight stay in a hotel in Miami, 
combined with their immediate return north, amply supported a finding of 
probable cause.268 
In dissent, Justice Brennan criticized the majority’s use of the words 
“practical,” “nontechnical,” and “common sense” as “code words for an 
 
259. 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
260. Id. at 225. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. at 226–27. 
264. Id. at 269 (White, J., concurring) (quoting People v. Gates, 423 N.E.2d 887, 887 (Ill. 
1981)). 
265. Id. at 230–31. 
266. Id. at 232. 
267. Id. at 231, 235–36. 
268. Id. at 243. 
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overly permissive attitude towards police practices.”269  Although Brennan 
suggested that the majority decision reflected a radically new interpretation 
of probable cause,270  he never acknowledged that much of Rehnquist’s 
language in Gates was drawn from Brinegar.  Indeed, the Gates decision is 
best understood as a return to a pre-Spinelli vision of probable cause.  
Brennan was so focused on defending the Spinelli approach to corroborating 
hearsay evidence that he failed to articulate a positive theory of probable 
cause.  Even if Rehnquist’s approach is “overly permissive . . . towards 
police practices,”271 what would be an appropriate standard?  After all, 
society presumably benefits when, at some point in an investigation 
collecting mounting evidence of wrongdoing, police conduct searches and 
make arrests.  The hard question is how much, and what kind of, evidence we 
will require of them.  In his majority opinion, Rehnquist argued that the 
Gates approach to probable cause “hold[s] the balance true,” recognizing on 
the one side the legitimate needs of law enforcement and on the other the 
privacy concerns of citizens.272  Brennan would strike the balance differently, 
but where is unclear. 
Justice Stevens’s dissenting opinion is far shorter and more persuasive 
than Justice Brennan’s, in part because it condescends to address the facts of 
the case.  Stevens noted that police corroborated only two details from the 
anonymous letter—that Lance flew down on May 5 and that the couple 
started off the following morning northward, in the general direction of 
Illinois.273  The police did not confirm that Sue had driven down on May 3—
she might, therefore, have resided in Florida for weeks or even years.274  And 
the police did not confirm that the couple drove all the way back to Illinois 
the next morning—when they obtained the warrant on the morning of May 6, 
police simply knew that the couple had started off on a northbound interstate 
(in the direction of Disney World and ultimately Illinois).275  Thus, an ad-
ditional few hours of surveillance might have eliminated the innocent 
explanation that the Gates were bound for Disney World.  A higher probable 
cause standard would mean a greater investment of law enforcement 
resources in any particular investigation, for before searching and seizing 
citizens, police would need to develop greater certainty that criminal activity 
is in fact afoot. 
Unresolved in Gates is whether the degree of certainty needed to satisfy 
the probable cause standard might fluctuate from case to case.  On the one 
 
269. Id. at 290 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
270. Id. at 286–90 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
271. Id. at 290 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
272. Id. at 241. 
273. Id. at 291 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
274. Id. 
275. Id. at 291–92 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
994 Texas Law Review [Vol. 81:951 
 
hand, Rehnquist emphasized that probable cause involves an exercise of 
judgment, which “turn[s] on the assessment of probabilities in particular 
factual contexts.”276  On the other hand, although the majority opinion pro-
vides an engaging summary of the comings and goings of Lance and Sue 
Gates, the “factual context” does not include either the gravity of the crime 
under investigation or the nature of the search executed by the police.  
Nowhere in the majority opinion does the Court deem it necessary to refer, as 
it has in other cases, to the “severe and intractable nature of the drug 
problem.”277  Nor is it deemed relevant that the police had obtained a warrant 
to search not only the Gates’ car, but also their home.278  Would the case 
have been different if the warrant had authorized solely the search of a car 
trunk (obviously less intrusive than a house search) or the crime under 
investigation had been serial murder?  There is not the slightest inkling that 
either of these facts would alter the analysis.  Implicit is the assumption that 
probable cause is independent of both the crime under investigation and the 
nature of the proposed search.279 
Although the dissenters in Gates lost the day, their arguments have 
found a receptive audience in a few state courts, which have retained the 
Spinelli test for evaluating hearsay evidence.280  More interestingly, if the 
Rowley Memorandum is at all a fair reflection of the prevailing norms in the 
federal system, warrant applications are now judged by a more stringent 
standard than what was intimated by the Gates decision.  Although 
Rehnquist defined probable cause as merely a “substantial chance” of crim-
inal activity, Rowley places probable cause at greater than fifty percent, and 
the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Minneapolis (in Rowley’s view) considers it a 
seventy-five to eighty percent likelihood of criminal activity.281  It seems that 
 
276. Id. at 232 (emphasis added). 
277. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000); see also United States v. 
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) (noting the “veritable national crisis in law 
enforcement caused by smuggling of illicit narcotics”); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 
561 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) (“Few problems affecting the health and welfare of our 
population, particularly our young, cause greater concern than the escalating use of controlled 
substances.”). 
278. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 226 (mentioning, without further discussion, the fact that a warrant 
was issued for both the Gates’s home and their car). 
279. This assumption is perhaps explicit in Justice Brennan’s dissenting opinion.  He writes, 
“Everyone shares the Court’s concern over the horrors of drug trafficking, but under our 
Constitution only measures consistent with the Fourth Amendment may be employed by 
government to cure this evil.”  Id. at 290 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Brennan seems to be suggesting 
that Fourth Amendment limits against searches do not vary with the gravity of the offense under 
investigation. 
280. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 557 (Mass. 1985) (retaining the 
Spinelli test because it “aids lay people, such as the police and certain lay magistrates, in a way that 
the ‘totality of the circumstances’ test never could”). 
281. Rowley Memorandum, supra note 1, para. 7.  It is worth noting that Rowley’s equation of 
the probable cause and preponderance of the evidence standards is fairly commonplace nowadays.  
Consider, for example, a warrant application in Washington, D.C., in which the Metropolitan Police 
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a “substantial chance” has morphed into a “preponderance of the evidence” 
or even a “clear and convincing evidence” standard.  Perhaps the pendulum 
has swung back yet again toward a higher standard of probable cause. 
V. The Vanishing Probable Cause Requirement 
Courts often state that probable cause is the default standard by which a 
search is to be judged (even if, for whatever reason, a warrant is not 
required).  Except in “limited circumstances,” the absence of probable cause 
is said to be the death knell of a search or seizure.282  This depiction of the 
world of the Fourth Amendment is, however, at odds with reality.  For most 
citizens, in the vast majority of searches to which they are subject (stop-and-
frisks, airport searches, drug testing, DUI checkpoints, business inspections, 
etc.), the governmental search is supported not by probable cause, but on the 
basis of its reasonableness.  The probable cause standard has retained its 
pristine quality, free of any tinge of a reasonableness balancing, but the 
necessary corollary is that it has become increasingly impractical and 
irrelevant in assessing the constitutionality of most searches or seizures.  
Indeed, an inflexible probable cause requirement has led to perplexing, and 
perhaps even perverse, results, foreclosing searches that seem eminently 
sensible and allowing searches that seem misguided.  The first section below 
contrasts the probable cause standard with other common evidentiary 
standards.  The following sections catalog a trio of doctrines that have eroded 
the reach of the probable cause standard: reasonable suspicion, “special 
needs,” and exigent circumstances. 
A. The Illusion of Mathematical Precision 
Perhaps it results from the influence of modern science, or perhaps it 
simply reflects a deep human need, but the impulse to quantify legal 
doctrines such as probable cause is a powerful one.  Whatever the merits of 
such an impulse,283 the question inevitably arises in any discussion of 
probable cause: just how probable?  There is the vague impression that, if 
law were truly a serious enterprise, the answer would be amenable to 
mathematical form. 
Few courts have summoned the courage, or foolhardiness, to propose 
such a number (e.g., thirty percent probability) for probable cause.  Loathe to 
say precisely what probable cause is, courts have instead told us what it is 
 
Department Sergeant certified, in summing up the evidence, that “it [was] more probable than not 
that [the suspect] is in possession of illegal guns and ammunition.”  Application and Affidavit of 
Sergeant Donald Gossage in Support of a Search Warrant 2 (Jan. 11, 1992) (on file with the author). 
282. See supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text. 
283. The attempt to express legal doctrines in mathematical terms is criticized in Laurence H. 
Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 
(1971). 
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not—that is, how probable cause compares to other evidentiary standards.  
For example, the Supreme Court has stated that while probable cause must be 
based on more than mere suspicion,284 it does not require “proof sufficient to 
establish guilt.”285 
An image that easily, if speciously, comes to mind is a spectrum of 
certainty ranging from a zero likelihood of criminal activity to a total 
certainty.  If an experienced police officer, in good faith, has a hunch that 
criminal activity is afoot, it seems only reasonable to assign some positive 
probability to that assessment, even if the number is placed as low as 
.01%.286  On the other hand, proof beyond a reasonable doubt is generally 
defined, insofar as it or any burden of proof can be quantified, as a 
percentage as high as 85% or 95%.287  Thus, the Court’s statement that 
probable cause is more than a suspicion and less than beyond a reasonable 
doubt places it somewhere between .01% and 90%, which, when all is said 
and done, is not all that helpful.  Further guidance may be found in cases that 
define probable cause as less than the “more probable than not” or 
“preponderance of the evidence” standards.288  As these standards are widely 
assumed to be something around 51%,289 probable cause is thus a percentage 
nestled somewhere between .01% and 51%.  This is a substantial improve-
ment, but is still unlikely to impress a modern scientist as particularly 
precise. 
Perhaps the most interesting marker for probable cause provided by 
modern courts is a comparison to the “reasonable suspicion” standard first 
articulated by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio.290  Courts often opine that 
 
284. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959). 
285. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 312 (1959) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 
U.S. 160, 173 (1949)); see also United States v. Danhauer, 229 F.3d 1002, 1005 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(holding that probable cause requires “more than mere suspicion but less evidence than is necessary 
to convict” (quoting United States v. Burns, 624 F.2d 95, 99 (10th Cir. 1980))). 
286. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (discussing the phenomenon of “tacit 
knowledge”). 
287. See United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (reporting that in a 
survey of ten judges in the Eastern District of New York, one said the standard of beyond a 
reasonable doubt was not quantifiable, and the mean percentage assigned by the remaining nine was 
85%); C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or 
Constitutional Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1332 (1982) (reporting that in a poll of 167 
federal judges, the mean probability assigned to “beyond a reasonable doubt” was 90.28%); Barbara 
D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal Cases, 86 
YALE L.J. 1299, 1311 (1977) (“[A]lmost a third of the responding judges put ‘beyond a reasonable 
doubt’ at 100%, another third put it at 90% or 95%, and most of the rest put it at 80% or 85%.”). 
288. See Samos Imex Corp. v. Nextel Communications, Inc., 194 F.3d 301, 303 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(stating that the “phrase ‘probable cause’ is used, in the narrow confines of Fourth Amendment 
precedent, to establish a standard less demanding than ‘more probable than not’”); United States v. 
Limares, 269 F.3d 794 (7th Cir. 2001) (“‘Probable cause’ is something less than a preponderance.”). 
289. See, e.g., Fatico, 458 F. Supp. at 410 (noting that ten judges polled in the Eastern District 
of New York placed the preponderance of the evidence standard between 50–51%). 
290. 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968). 
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“[r]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause,”291 
thus allowing police to stop or frisk a suspect with less certainty of criminal 
activity than would be required to make an arrest.  Yet there is no clear sense, 
and no offered guidance, as to how probable “reasonable suspicion” is, other 
than its being, like “probable cause,” more than a mere hunch.292  
Accordingly, its utility as a comparison point is undermined by its 
indeterminate nature. 
The still more substantial difficulty with using reasonable suspicion as a 
marker on the spectrum of probability is that it is not a fixed point.  It is, 
therefore, both an undefined and a moving target.  Because, as shown below, 
reasonable suspicion has evolved into a variable standard, calibrated to the 
degree of both the privacy intrusion and the state interest, it is not simply a 
lower standard than probable cause, but a different kind of standard.293  
Facile comparisons of the two evidentiary standards therefore bring to mind 
the proverbial apples and oranges.  Although the disparagement of a reason-
ableness balancing in the context of the Fourth Amendment is a recurring 
theme in judicial opinions294 and scholarship,295 the effort to preserve the 
concept of probable cause in some mathematically fixed form has succeeded 
only in limiting it, and not the reasonableness approach, to narrowly defined 
circumstances. 
B. The Birth of Reasonable Suspicion 
The contrast of probable cause and reasonable suspicion is by now an 
established part of our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  As was noted 
 
291. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000); Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 
(1990); see also United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (“Although an officer’s reliance 
on a mere ‘hunch’ is insufficient to justify a stop, the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to 
the level required for probable cause, . . . and it falls considerably short of satisfying a 
preponderance of the evidence standard.”). 
292. See, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) (finding that an anonymous tip alone was 
insufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion). 
293. See infra subpart V(B).  Recent events in the Washington, D.C. area demonstrated how 
low a probability can justify a Terry stop when police are investigating a particularly serious crime.  
The area was paralyzed for several weeks by a series of “sniper” attacks on random individuals, 
principally at gas stations.  A few witnesses reported a white van near a few of the shootings.  After 
one murder, police stopped traffic on a major interstate and, with guns drawn, searched “hundreds 
of white vans.”  Carol Morello & Josh White, 8th Killing Intensifies Search For Sniper, Pa. Father 
of 6 Slain at Spotsylvania Pump, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 2002, at A1.  Obviously, the likelihood that 
any one van harbored the sniper was infinitesimal, but the compelling social interest was deemed to 
justify the broad search. 
294. See, e.g., Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 213–14 (1979) (rejecting a “multifactor 
balancing test” because a “single familiar standard is essential to guide police”). 
295. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 139, at 393–94. Professor Amsterdam lamented an 
alleged judicial tendency to convert the Fourth Amendment into a “monstrous abyss.”  Id. at 415.  
He described Fourth Amendment law as “splendid in its flexibility, awful in its unintelligibility, 
unadministerability, unenforceability and general ooziness,” id., and in sum, “an immense Rorsach 
blot.”  Id. at 393. 
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earlier, however, at common law and for much of American history, the two 
phrases would likely have had, even to the discerning legal ear, roughly the 
same connotations.296  This would all begin to change with Terry v. Ohio.297 
Such a development was hardly inevitable.  Just a year before the Terry 
decision, the Supreme Court, in Camara v. Municipal Court,298 intimated that 
probable cause could be construed as a variable standard, lesser or greater 
depending upon the degree of the privacy intrusion imposed by a search or 
seizure.299  The Court there considered a challenge to a San Francisco hous-
ing code provision that authorized warrantless safety inspections.300  In such 
circumstances, the Court held that probable cause “involve[s] a balancing 
[of] the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.”301  On 
the facts presented, the Court found that probable cause existed because 
safety inspections “involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen’s 
privacy.”302 
Camara is one of the doctrinal dead ends in American constitutional 
criminal procedure.303  The suggestion that probable cause might vary with 
the degree of the intrusion was implicitly rejected the following year in 
Terry.  The Court there considered a stop-and-frisk situation in which a 
plainclothes detective frisked a man whom the officer reasonably believed 
was casing a store with two other men.304  When construing statutes with 
“reasonableness” requirements in the past, the Court had readily interpreted 
their meaning as roughly equivalent to “probable cause” as the phrase is used 
in the Fourth Amendment.305  And following Camara, the Court might have 
 
296. See supra notes 177, 185, 202–04, 219, and accompanying text. 
297. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
298. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
299. Id. at 538–39. 
300. Id. at 525. 
301. Id. at 527. 
302. Id.  The Court nonetheless invalidated the provision because it permitted city officials to 
conduct inspections without a warrant.  Id. at 534. 
303. Another noteworthy example is Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), which extended 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to pre-arrest custodial interrogations.  After Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was decided, Escobedo slipped away into irrelevance.  See Moran v. 
Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 416 (1986) (pointing out that after Miranda, “subsequent decisions foreclose 
any reliance on Escobedo”). 
304. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 5–7 (1968).  In a companion case to Terry, Sibron v. New York, 
392 U.S. 40 (1968), the Court interpreted a New York statute authorizing a police officer to briefly 
detain and question a suspect the officer “reasonably suspects is committing, has committed, or is 
about to commit a felony.”  Id. at 43 (quoting New York’s stop-and-frisk statute, N.Y. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. § 180-a (1967)).  For a brief history of the New York stop-and-frisk statute, see Wayne R. 
LaFave, “Street Encounters” and the Constitution: Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 
39, 44 n.18 (1968). The medieval precursors to stop-and-frisk statutes permitted town guards to 
detain a suspect overnight where they had a “suspicion,” but required the suspect to be presented to 
a magistrate the next morning to determine whether the suspicion was justified.  Grano, supra note 
143, at 479–80. 
305. See supra notes 177, 185, 202–04, 219, and accompanying text. 
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said, with respect to the stop-and-frisk statutes, that a police officer, having 
observed two or three men nervously pace up and down a street a dozen 
times, apparently “casing” a store, does have probable cause—if not to make 
an arrest, at least to question briefly and protectively frisk the individuals.306  
Instead, the Court held that not probable cause, but “specific and articulable 
facts” supporting an inference of criminal activity, were required to justify 
the “invasion of . . . personal security” effected by a pat-down search.307  The 
degree of suspicion was less than probable cause, but so too, Chief Justice 
Warren emphasized, was the invasion of privacy that would have resulted 
from an arrest or full custodial search.308 
Defenders of Terry have suggested that the creation of a reasonable-
and-articulable-suspicion standard preserved probable cause in all its pristine 
glory.  Had courts applied probable cause to street stops, the standard would 
possibly have been “water[ed] down.”309  Yet the balancing approach sanc-
tioned by the Terry Court, weighing the degree of an intrusion against the 
state’s interest, would quickly prove imperialistic, colonizing vast reaches of 
police activity.  Within a decade, courts would approve searches or seizures 
conducted with a lesser predicate than was present in Terry but where the 
degree of the intrusion was also less than a pat-down frisk.310 
As the influence of Terry and the reasonableness balancing of interests 
has spread throughout Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the Court has 
proven determined to protect probable cause from any taint of balancing.  A 
notable illustration is Dunaway v. New York,311 where the Court rejected the 
argument that police could, when they had reasonable suspicion, detain and 
question a suspect for several hours in a police station.312  Rejecting “a 
multifactor balancing test” of reasonable police conduct under the 
circumstances,313 the Court held that “[a] single, familiar standard is essential 
to guide police officers, who have only limited time and expertise to reflect 
on and balance the social and individual interests involved in the specific 
 
306. A point made in LaFave, supra note 304, at 54–56. 
307. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21.  Chief Justice Warren elaborately cataloged the objective facts cited 
by Officer McFadden to justify his perception that the men he frisked were planning to commit 
armed robbery.  Id. at 22–23. 
308. See id. at 30 (“[Officer McFadden] never did invade [the suspect’s] person beyond the 
outer surfaces of his clothes . . . .  [He] confined his search strictly to what was minimally necessary 
to learn whether the men were armed . . . .”). 
309. Daniel Richman, The Process of Terry-Lawmaking, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1042, 1047 
(1998). 
310. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109–10 (1977) (conducting a Terry 
balancing and upholding a police officer’s right to order drivers out of their cars in the course of a 
legal stop); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880 (1975) (“Because of the limited 
nature of the intrusion, stops [made by roving border patrols for illegal aliens] may be justified on 
facts that do not amount to the probable cause required for an arrest.”). 
311. 442 U.S. 200 (1979). 
312. Id. at 207. 
313. Id. at 213 (referring to People v. Morales, 366 N.E.2d 248 (1977)). 
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circumstances they confront.”314  Departures from such a standard should be 
adopted, the Court added, reluctantly and only in “narrowly defined” 
circumstances.315 
Such grandiose language was likely unnecessary to decide the case.  
The seizure effected by the police in Dunaway was far more invasive than a 
brief street stop and may have been tantamount to a full-fledged arrest.316  
Accordingly, it would have been appropriate to apply a rigorous evidentiary 
standard in assessing the constitutionality of the suspect’s seizure.  Yet the 
Dunaway Court’s inflexible view of probable cause would find remarkable 
expression a decade later in Arizona v. Hicks,317 where the Court suggested 
that the probable cause needed to nudge a piece of furniture was identical to 
that needed to make an arrest or enter a home.318  In Hicks, police entered a 
squalid apartment after a gunshot had been fired and observed a pair of 
expensive stereos.319  Suspecting that the stereos were stolen, a police officer 
moved the turntable in order to see the serial numbers, and subsequent 
investigation revealed that the stereos were indeed stolen.320  There was no 
question that the police were lawfully present in Hicks’s apartment (the 
exigency of the gunshot justified the warrantless entry); the issue concerned 
the manipulation of the stereo equipment.  In a six-three decision, Justice 
Scalia suggested that, for purposes of determining probable cause, the 
relative degree of intrusion was of no moment whatsoever.321  Police had 
seized and searched Hicks’s property, albeit briefly, to ascertain the serial 
numbers, and they had done so without probable cause.322  A dissenting 
Justice O’Connor countered that reasonable suspicion should have sufficed to 
justify the brief search of the turntable, given the de minimis privacy 
intrusion.323 
Applying Hicks, lower courts have repeatedly dismissed arguments that 
probable cause might entail a lower evidentiary predicate when the privacy 
intrusion resulting from a search or seizure is minimal.324  United States v. 
 
314. Id. at 213–14. 
315. Id. at 210. 
316. See Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 227, 245 (1984) (“[T]he detention in Dunaway was so little different from a ‘technical arrest’ 
that the state’s argument that it should be judged by an entirely different standard seemed 
strained.”). 
317. 480 U.S. 321 (1987). 
318. Id. at 324–26. 
319. Id. at 323. 
320. Id. 
321. Id. at 326. 
322. Id. 
323. Id. at 333 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
324. For example, in United States v. Paulino, 850 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1988), a police officer 
questioned passengers in a double-parked car at night in a high-crime area.  Id. at 94.  When a 
passenger in the back seat seemed to reach under a mat, the officer ordered all of the men out of the 
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Winsor325 is a wonderful illustration.  The factual scenario of Winsor is of the 
sort that, had it not actually occurred, a law professor somewhere would have 
had to dream it up.  Police officers followed a fleeing bank robber into a 
residential hotel, which had approximately twenty rooms on each of its two 
stories.326  The officers knocked on each door and commanded, “Police.  
Open the door.”327  After checking all the rooms on the first floor and a few 
on the second, the police came to Winsor’s room.  When he opened the door, 
the officers recognized him and made an arrest.328 
All parties conceded that exigent circumstances existed to search the 
hotel.  Yet the Ninth Circuit held, and all parties seemed to agree, that “‘hot 
pursuit may excuse police from the Fourth Amendment’s warrant 
requirement, but never does it excuse the absence of the requisite degree of 
suspicion before effecting a search.’”329  It was also common ground that, in 
the words of the majority, “at the time the police knocked on Winsor’s door, 
they had reasonable suspicion to believe that the suspected bank robber was 
inside, but did not have probable cause to believe so.”330  So the central issue 
was the level of suspicion needed to justify the search—that is, the non-
consensual visual inspection of the room from the doorway.  The majority 
concluded that the Supreme Court’s decision in Hicks established “a rule that 
the police violate the Fourth Amendment whenever they effect a search of a 
dwelling without probable cause.”331 
The government and the dissenting justices accepted the majority’s 
framing of the issue: everything turned on the evidentiary standard that 
would be applied.332  If probable cause was required, then the search was 
illegal; if reasonable suspicion was applied, the search was valid.333  Neither 
the government nor the dissenters suggested that probable cause was present, 
albeit not to conduct a full-fledged search, but simply to conduct a visual 
inspection of each room from the doorway.  In arguing that reasonable 
 
car.  He lifted up the mat and saw a roll of $50 bills, which he picked up and quickly realized were 
counterfeit bills.  Id.  It was clear that the officer acted properly in lifting up the mat.  See Michigan 
v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1035 (1983) (authorizing searches of the passenger compartments of cars 
when an officer has reasonable suspicion that a weapon is hidden there).  The Paulino case turned 
on the officer’s decision to pick up, and briefly study, the counterfeit bills.  The Second Circuit held 
that, “[a]s Hicks makes clear, probable cause is required to move an object for purposes of a 
search—no matter how seemingly minor is the invasion of an individual’s possessory interest—
beyond the justified bounds of the lawful search.”  Paulino, 850 F.2d at 98 (emphasis added). 
325. 846 F.2d 1569 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc). 
326. Id. at 1571. 
327. Id. 
328. Id. 
329. Id. (quoting the previous panel’s decision in United States v. Winsor, 816 F.2d 1394, 1396 
(9th Cir. 1987)). 
330. Id. at 1572. 
331. Id. at 1574. 
332. Id. at 1573. 
333. Id. at 1572. 
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suspicion justified the police actions, a dissenting judge emphasized the 
unreasonableness of applying probable cause (understood as some high and 
fixed standard) to the facts of the case.334  He noted that “the police could 
have waited indefinitely, as the majority would have them do, until probable 
cause arose.  This would have required the police to wait until they could 
pinpoint the room in which the suspect could be hiding.”335  The majority 
would have agreed that probable cause meant “pinpoint[ing]” the room 
before any action was taken.  But how much pinpointing was required?  It is 
worth recalling that by the time the police knocked on Winsor’s hotel room, 
they had essentially eliminated all of the rooms on the first floor and a few 
(let us say five) rooms on the second floor.  So in knocking on Winsor’s door 
and effectively searching his room from the doorway, police had a one in 
fifteen, or seven percent, chance of finding him.  Although the majority 
conceded that a seven percent chance constituted reasonable suspicion, it 
gave no indication of what percentage would have qualified as probable 
cause.  Would the result have been different had the police eliminated all but 
five or two of the rooms before arriving at Winsor’s door?336 
In any event, as the dissent noted, “[t]he suspect knew that he was 
trapped . . . and he posed a grave danger to the occupants of the hotel and to 
the policemen pursuing him.”337  The majority offered no response to the 
dissent’s practical challenge—what would you have the police do in such a 
circumstance?—other than miscellaneous bromides about the price we pay 
for having a Fourth Amendment.338  Winsor illustrates the unreasonableness 
of requiring probable cause (understood as a fixed percentage, to some 
degree greater than seven percent) independent of the intrusiveness of the 
search and the intensity of the public interest in authorizing the search.  It 
further highlights the importance of the divergent labels “probable cause” 
and “reasonable suspicion” in modern Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  If 
the latter label applies, then courts freely engage in a multifactor balancing 
test, weighing the privacy intrusion and the state’s interest, among other 
factors.  If the former label applies, then police must have “pinpoint[ed]” 
suspicion corresponding to some fixed, but undefined, percentage higher than 
seven percent. 
The importance of these labels was illustrated again in United States v. 
Knights,339 where the Supreme Court considered whether the warrantless 
search of a probationer’s home should be evaluated under a probable cause 
 
334. Id. at 1581 (Farris, J., dissenting). 
335. Id. (emphasis added). 
336. For a discussion of Winsor, see STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 221–22 (6th ed. 2000). 
337. Winsor, 846 F.2d at 1581 (Farris, J., dissenting). 
338. Id. at 1579. 
339. 534 U.S. 112 (2001). 
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or reasonable suspicion standard.340  It was stipulated in the case that the 
police had reasonable suspicion, but not probable cause, that the defendant 
had committed a crime.341  In explaining why probable cause was not 
required to search the probationer’s home, Chief Justice Rehnquist offered 
the following thought: “Although the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires 
the degree of probability embodied in the term ‘probable cause,’ a lesser 
degree satisfies the Constitution when the balance of governmental and 
private interests makes such a standard reasonable.”342  Rehnquist thus 
contrasts the higher (and inexorably fixed?) probable cause standard with 
reasonable suspicion, which involves a “balance of governmental and private 
interests.”  When is reasonable suspicion, and not probable cause, the 
appropriate standard?  According to Rehnquist, the reasonable suspicion 
analysis is applied when it is “reasonable.” 
Among other difficulties, Rehnquist’s sentence in Knights is hopelessly 
at odds with itself.  On the one hand, he suggests that “ordinarily” the test of 
a search or seizure is probable cause; on the other hand, he concedes that the 
reasonable suspicion test applies whenever the application of “such a 
standard [is] reasonable.”343  But if “reasonable suspicion” is the 
“reasonable” standard much of the time, it makes little sense to glorify 
probable cause as the ordinary standard.  Indeed, in many instances, it would 
be unreasonable to apply the probable cause standard, as it has come to be 
understood, to police conduct.344  And the fact is that, with the exception of 
house searches and full custodial arrests, most Fourth Amendment events are 
evaluated not based on probable cause, but for their reasonableness.345  A 
major engine in this development has been the special needs doctrine, to 
which we now turn. 
C. “Special Needs” 
The Fourth Amendment does not, on its face, draw a distinction 
between searches and seizures intended to enforce the criminal law and those 
performed as part of a regulatory scheme.  Yet the Court now regularly 
draws such a distinction.  When the government’s claimed need in con-
ducting a search or seizure is somehow “special,” distinct from a need to 
enforce the criminal law, a far lesser evidentiary showing is required.  DUI 
 
340. Id. at 120–21. 
341. Id. at 116, 122. 
342. Id. at 121. 
343. Id. 
344. See infra text accompanying notes 346–55. 
345. See infra subparts V(C–D) (discussing the courts’ use of a reasonableness test when the 
government has a “special need” to conduct a search or seizure and when there are “exigent 
circumstances”). 
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checkpoints346 and airport magnetometer searches347 are perhaps the classic 
examples of such special needs searches, but the situations governed by this 
regime have multiplied to include drug testing (among schoolchildren348 and 
government employees349), regulatory inspections of businesses,350 safety 
inspections of homes,351 searches of government offices,352 searches of 
prisons,353 inventory searches,354 and border patrols.355 
The rationales offered in support of the special needs doctrine do not 
fare well on close analysis, as the Supreme Court’s latest effort illustrates.  In 
Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie 
County v. Earls,356 the Court upheld mandatory drug testing of all 
schoolchildren participating in extracurricular activities.357  Explaining why 
such a search did not violate the Fourth Amendment, Justice Thomas wrote: 
In certain limited circumstances, the Government’s need to discover 
such latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their development, is 
sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion on privacy entailed by 
conducting such searches without any measure of individualized 
suspicion.  Therefore, in the context of safety and administrative 
regulations, a search unsupported by probable cause may be 
reasonable when special needs, beyond the normal need for law 
 
346. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990) (concluding that “the 
balance of the State’s interest in preventing drunken driving, the extent to which this system can 
reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the degree of intrusion upon individual motorists 
who are briefly stopped, weighs in favor of the state program”). 
347. See United States v. Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1974) (stating that “the danger 
[of airplane hijacking] alone meets the test of reasonableness”). 
348. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661–63 (1995) (discussing the 
importance of the school’s interest in preventing drug usage by school children and comparing this 
interest to other “special” interests). 
349. See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989) (stating that 
a government agency’s interest in enacting a drug-testing program for its employees qualifies as a 
“special need”). 
350. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987) (concluding that the government’s 
interest in regulatory inspections of businesses in a “closely regulated industry” is a “special need”). 
351. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 372–73 (1959) (holding that safety inspections of 
homes without a warrant are constitutional because of the important government interest involved). 
352. See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 725 (1987) (holding that the “special needs” of the 
government to search its employees’ offices requires a reasonableness standard rather than probable 
cause). 
353. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559–60 (1979) (holding that “visual body-cavity 
inspections [of inmates can] be conducted on less than probable cause”). 
354. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (holding that an inventory search 
following “standard police procedures . . . was not ‘unreasonable’ under the Fourth Amendment”). 
355. See United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977) (reaffirming that border searches 
are “reasonable” and do not have to meet the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause standard). 
356. 122 S. Ct. 2559 (2002). 
357. Id. at 2562. 
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enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement 
impracticable.358 
Unlike Rehnquist’s cryptic statement in Knights that “reasonable suspicion” 
is the appropriate standard when it is “reasonable,”359 the Court here attempts 
to provide some guideposts to establish when a reasonableness balancing of 
governmental and private interests, and not a probable cause analysis, is 
appropriate. 
First is the suggestion that in certain situations there may be “latent or 
hidden conditions” that make it difficult to formulate any individualized 
suspicion, let alone probable cause.  The “hidden conditions” rationale has 
been employed to remove searches from the probable cause analysis in the 
context of safety inspections360 and drug testing.361  But it is unclear why the 
hidden conditions present in such cases are any different from the hidden 
conditions posed in the garden-variety criminal investigation.  For good and 
obvious reasons, criminals tend to ply their trade in secret, which is precisely 
why considerable resources must often be expended to develop probable 
cause.  Indeed, one may wonder whether the conditions the Court deems so 
hidden are less concealed than in many criminal enterprises.  Evidence of 
safety code violations may be difficult to obtain without entering the home, 
but it is hardly impossible.  Indeed, in the very case that established the 
“administrative search” doctrine, inspectors reported that the alley behind the 
house in question was infested with rats.362  Furthermore, as a dissenting 
Justice O’Connor has noted, it is often easier to determine which children are 
using drugs in the highly supervised school setting than it might be in other 
contexts.363  To be sure, drug use and safety code violations may be hidden, 
but so too, all too often, is most crime; indeed, the more serious the crime, 
the greater the expected precaution costs incurred to conceal any evidence.  
 
358. Id. at 2564 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
359. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001). 
360. See Lesser v. Espy, 34 F.3d 1301, 1308 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding a warrantless 
regulatory search because safety code violations are “quickly concealed”). 
361. See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989) (holding that 
“the Government’s need to discover such latent or hidden conditions, or to prevent their 
development, is sufficiently compelling to justify the intrusion on privacy by conducting such 
searches without any measure of individualized suspicion”). 
362. See Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 361 (1959) (noting that the inspector found evidence 
of decay and lack of sanitation, which were safety code violations, on the outside of the house). 
363. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 679 (1995) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
O’Connor claimed that 
[t]he great irony of this case is that most (though not all) of the evidence the District 
introduced to justify its suspicionless drug testing program consisted of first- or 
second-hand stories of particular, identifiable students acting in ways that plainly gave 
rise to reasonable suspicion of in-school drug use—and thus that would have justified a 
drug-related search . . . . 
Id. 
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The hidden conditions rationale thus inadequately explains why certain 
searches are not judged by the probable cause standard. 
A second suggestion in the passage quoted from Earls is that certain 
searches are motivated by “special needs, beyond the normal need for law 
enforcement.”364  The thought seems to be that when the governmental 
interest is particularly robust or special, above and beyond the interest in the 
enforcement of the criminal law, the probable cause standard is so high as to 
be inappropriate.  The problem is that when the special need is fleshed out, it 
almost always consists simply of health and safety.  The special need said to 
justify DUI checkpoints is that of safety;365 the special need said to justify 
drug testing of schoolchildren is health.366  Yet surely an interest in health 
and safety is also implicit in the criminal law; after all, society has an interest 
in being protected from both drunk drivers and murderers.  Indeed, the 
special needs doctrine is perplexing in that it seems to reverse the ordinary 
understanding of priorities.  Isn’t the interest in the enforcement of the 
criminal code greater than the interest in the enforcement in the panoply of 
noncriminal regulations that are said to be outside the requirements of 
probable cause?  It is worth noting that during the federal budget crisis of 
1995–1996, the Department of Justice continued criminal prosecutions but 
placed all civil cases on indefinite hold.367 
The methodical application of the special needs doctrine can generate 
bizarre results.  Consider the case of Lesser v. Espy,368 especially against the 
backdrop of the Moussaoui episode and the conclusion in that investigation 
that the FBI lacked probable cause to search the suspected terrorist’s laptop 
computer.369  Craig Lesser started in the business of raising rabbits when he 
was a teenager and did so for twenty years with a virtually unblemished 
record for safety.370  When a new Department of Agriculture inspector was 
assigned to Lesser’s region in 1989, she began painstakingly citing him for 
the most trivial of infractions.371  One day the inspector showed up and 
demanded entrance into the facilities, as was authorized by the Animal 
 
364. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 122 S. Ct. 2559, 
2564 (2002). 
365. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (“Drunk drivers cause an 
annual death toll of over 25,000 and in the same time span cause nearly one million personal 
injuries and more than five billion dollars in property damage.” (citing 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.8(d), at 71 (2d ed. 1987))). 
366. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 661 (“School years are the time when the physical, psychological, 
and addictive effects of drugs are most severe.”). 
367. Howard Gleckman, What Bill Didn’t Tell You, BUS. WK., Feb. 5, 1996, at 44. 
368. 34 F.3d 1301 (7th Cir. 1994). 
369. See supra Part II. 
370. Lesser, 34 F.3d at 1303. 
371. Among other reasons for citing Lesser, the inspector noted that “one bag of rabbit food 
was left open [and] the lighting was too dim for the rabbits’ comfort.”  Id. at 1304. 
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Welfare Act.372  Lesser granted the request, but on certain conditions, be-
cause of a professed fear that the inspector might contaminate his rabbits.373  
The inspector stormed off, and Lesser was fined and his license to raise 
rabbits was revoked.374  In explaining why the Fourth Amendment did not 
foreclose the official from demanding unfettered access, the Seventh Circuit 
trotted out the powerful governmental interest at stake: “[T]he use of rabbits 
and other animals for research is instrumental in advancing knowledge of 
cures and treatments for diseases and injuries that afflict both humans and 
animals across the nation.”375  One can enthusiastically embrace the Seventh 
Circuit’s assessment of the nation’s keen interest in healthy rabbits.  But was 
the interest in inspecting Lesser’s rabbit facilities really greater than the 
interest in a search of Moussaoui’s laptop computer? 
But perhaps the special needs doctrine is something of a misnomer.  
Indeed, the Supreme Court at times has suggested that the principal 
justification for the doctrine is not that the supplied need is beyond or above 
the enforcement of the criminal law; rather, it is that the search is minimally 
intrusive—less intrusive, in fact, than the sorts of searches conducted in the 
criminal context.376  The logic would seem to be that when the state only 
minimally intrudes upon an individual’s privacy, the constitutionality of a 
search or seizure will be judged not by the probable cause standard, but by a 
reasonableness balancing (minimal privacy intrusion versus robust societal 
interest). 
The difficulty with this argument is that special needs searches are often 
quite intrusive; indeed, they are often more intrusive than those analyzed 
under the probable cause rubric.  Consider the manipulation of Hicks’s 
turntable,377 the inspection of Lesser’s farm,378 and drug testing of govern-
ment employees.379  Although the first search seems to be the least intrusive 
 
372. Id.  The Animal Welfare Act is found at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159. 
373. Lesser, 34 F.3d at 1304.  Lesser’s concern may have been a reasonable one.  When I 
recently visited a facility for raising pigs in Iowa, the owner required me to shower before I entered. 
374. Id. 
375. Id. at 1307. 
376. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212 (1979) (stating that a balancing test, rather 
than a Fourth Amendment probable cause standard, will be applied only when intrusions fall “far 
short of the kind of intrusion associated with an arrest”); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537 
(1967) (finding that “inspections [that] are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of 
evidence of crime . . . involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen’s privacy” and thus 
suggest that code-enforcement inspections are reasonable); Wayne R. LaFave, Administrative 
Searches and the Fourth Amendment, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 20 (noting that one of the proffered 
justifications for “special needs” searches is the “relatively minor invasion of personal privacy and 
dignity”). 
377. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 323 (1987). 
378. Lesser, 34 F.3d at 1303–04. 
379. See Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989) (upholding 
suspicionless drug testing of certain Customs Services agents). 
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of the three,380 it was the only one evaluated by the stringent probable cause 
standard.  The explanation offered by the Hicks Court was that the search in 
that case occurred within a home; and the home, Justice Scalia argued, is 
different for Fourth Amendment purposes, for “[a] dwelling-place search 
[always] requires probable cause.”381  More recently, in Kyllo v. United 
States,382 Justice Scalia emphasized that “[a]t the very core [of the Fourth 
Amendment] stands the right of a man to retreat into his home and there be 
free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”383 
Kyllo, which involved the use of a device that crudely measured heat 
dispelled from a home,384 exemplifies the menagerie of doctrinal boxes the 
Court has made for itself in the realm of the Fourth Amendment.  The major-
ity and dissent framed the issue in the case as whether the use of the thermal 
imaging device constituted a “search,” with Justice Scalia answering in the 
affirmative and Justice Stevens, in dissent, disagreeing.  Stevens’s dissent is 
the most recent in a long line of judicial opinions that have strained credulity 
to define actions by the police plainly intended to gather evidence as 
somehow not searches and therefore outside Fourth Amendment scrutiny.385  
A more common sense view would be that when the police directed the 
device at Kyllo’s home and gathered evidence about his domestic heat usage, 
they conducted a search of the interior of the home.  With respect to the 
threshold question posed by the Court, Scalia has the better argument. 
And yet how intrusive was the search?  Although Scalia exercises his 
imagination by positing scenarios raising privacy concerns,386 the thermal 
imaging device used by the police would generally be unable to detect how 
many people were at home, let alone what they were doing.  In the end, 
however, none of this matters to Scalia’s analysis, for he writes that “[t]he 
Fourth Amendment’s protection of the home has never been tied to 
measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained,” and 
 
380. Indeed, Justice Scalia essentially conceded that the search of the turntable was “minimally 
intrusive.”  See Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325 (“Merely inspecting those parts of the turntable that came 
into view during the latter search would not have constituted an independent search, because it 
would have produced no additional invasion of [the] respondent’s privacy interest.”). 
381. Id. at 328. 
382. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
383. Id. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)). 
384. Id. at 28–30. 
385. See id. at 41–43 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that the thermal imaging device more 
closely resembles a search of property in plain view); see also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–
52 (1989) (finding that aerial surveillance from a helicopter hovering at an altitude of 400 feet was 
not a search under the Fourth Amendment); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 37 (1988) 
(finding that a search of trash was not a search); United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 303–04 
(1987) (finding that a search of open fields was not a search); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 
707 (1983) (finding that a dog-sniff is not a search). 
386. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 38 (“The Agema Thermovision 210 might disclose, for example, at 
what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna or bath—a detail that many would 
consider intimate . . . .”). 
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therefore “[i]n the home . . . all details are intimate details.”387  Whether 
police physically search a bedroom, nudge a turntable, or use a thermal 
detection device, it is all the same.  Because they are all “dwelling-place 
search[es],”388 police can perform them only after obtaining a warrant.  And 
the evidentiary predicate needed to obtain a warrant is the unvarying 
probable cause standard.389 
The practical upshot of Kyllo is that thermal detection devices will 
seldom be used, at least for homes.  Police need probable cause to search a 
home, however the search is framed and regardless of how unobtrusive it is.  
If police have probable cause to search a home, however, why will they 
bother using a thermal detection device?  They will simply obtain a warrant 
to physically enter the premises.  After all, there is no benefit (in terms of 
obtaining a warrant) in using the most minimally intrusive means to conduct 
the search.  It is thus hardly clear that Kyllo will be, in practice, a triumph for 
civil liberties.390 
The ultimate irony of the special needs doctrine is that its name belies 
its breadth.  “Special” suggests out-of-the-ordinary: in the uncommon case, 
the argument seems to run, the state is liberated from the unyielding require-
ments of probable cause and permitted to engage in searches on the basis of 
their reasonableness (weighing the intrusiveness of the search and the gravity 
of the investigated offense).  As Justice Scalia stated in Vernonia School 
District 47J v. Acton,391 upholding drug testing of schoolchildren, “A search 
unsupported by probable cause can be constitutional . . . when special needs, 
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and 
probable-cause requirement impracticable.”392  And yet, a moment’s reflec-
tion suggests that the special needs required to trigger this emancipation are 
so varied and numerous that they are hardly special or uncommon.  When the 
so-called special needs doctrine is considered in tandem with Terry and its 
myriad applications, it no longer seems sensible to suggest that probable 
cause, and not reasonableness, is the default Fourth Amendment standard. 
 
387. Id. at 37. 
388. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987). 
389. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877–78 (1987) (rejecting the argument that 
constitutionally mandated judicial warrants can issue on reasonable suspicion rather than probable 
cause). 
390. It is interesting to note that in Kyllo’s case the police had substantial grounds for 
suspecting him of criminal activity.  Other drug dealers had apparently given police information 
raising suspicions about Kyllo, his electrical usage was high relative to his neighbors (consistent 
with the use of heat bulbs to grow marijuana), Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29–30, and his wife had recently 
been arrested for dealing in drugs.  United States v. Kyllo, 190 F.3d 1041, 1043 (9th Cir. 1999).  
After the Kyllo decision, police in such a circumstance will simply try to convince the prosecutor 
and the magistrate that probable cause exists on the basis of the evidence they have already 
gathered.  Accordingly, they will not even bother to use a thermal detection device to confirm or 
dispel their suspicions before effecting a physical entry. 
391. 515 U.S. 646 (1995). 
392. Id. at 653 (emphasis added). 
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As if in acknowledgment of this reality, the Court has at times upheld 
the primacy of a reasonableness analysis.  In Acton, for example, the Court 
stated that “[a]s the text of the Fourth Amendment indicates, the ultimate 
measure of the constitutionality of a governmental search is 
‘reasonableness.’”393  This glimpse of reality is soon lost, however.  Within a 
few sentences, Justice Scalia is parroting the standard line that “[a] search 
unsupported by probable cause can be constitutional . . . when special needs” 
are present.394  Likewise, Justice Rehnquist has written in Knights that “the 
Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability embodied in 
the term ‘probable cause.’”395 
Such conflicting pronouncements point to a confusion at the core of the 
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  There is, on the one 
hand, the lingering and comforting notion that probable cause is the pre-
dominant and ordinary standard in answering Fourth Amendment questions.  
Yet case after case exposes the inapplicability of probable cause, cast as a 
high and inflexible standard, to particular contexts.  Thus, the Court has 
qualified the fairy tale account of the Fourth Amendment, emphasizing that 
reasonableness, and not probable cause, is in fact the ultimate measure.  
Cases such as Hicks and Kyllo nonetheless demonstrate that with respect to a 
fundamental category of searches—dwelling-place searches—probable cause 
is alive and well.  And yet the next section, which takes up the doctrine of 
exigent circumstances, puts even this principle to the test. 
D. Exigent Circumstances 
In exigent circumstances, special Fourth Amendment rules apply.  
Where there is an “urgent need,” police are excused from obtaining a warrant 
before taking action.396  In measuring the intensity of the claimed 
justification for a warrantless search, courts have considered the gravity of 
the suspected offense, the possibility that the suspect is armed, and the 
likelihood that the suspect will escape or evidence will be destroyed.397  The 
 
393. Id. at 652. 
394. Id. at 653 (emphasis added). 
395. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001). 
396. See Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 391 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc) (holding that 
“a principle of urgent need . . . operates to justify warrantless entries with requisite need determined 
by an officer and not by a court”).  For a compendium of exigent circumstances cases, see John F. 
Decker, Emergency Circumstances: Police Responses, and Fourth Amendment Restrictions, 89 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 433 (1999). 
397. Dorman, 435 F.2d at 392–93.  Dorman set forth the factors to be considered in evaluating 
a warrantless entry as follows: 
(1) the gravity or violent nature of the offense with which the suspect is to be charged; 
(2) whether the suspect “is reasonably believed to be armed”; (3) “a clear showing of 
probable cause . . . to believe that the suspect committed the crime”; (4) “strong reason 
to believe that the suspect is in the premises being entered”; (5) “a likelihood that the 
suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended”; and (6) the peaceful circumstances of 
the entry. 
http://law.bepress.com/gmulwps/art34
2003] The Reasonableness of Probable Cause 1011 
 
Supreme Court has generally resisted efforts to expand the exigent cir-
cumstances doctrine.  In Mincey v. Arizona,398 the Court rejected a proposed 
“categorical exception to the warrant requirement” when a murder has 
occurred in a home.  Instead, the Court emphasized that claims of exigency 
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis and sustained only when police 
“reasonably believe that a person . . . is in need of immediate aid.”399 
Significantly, the exigent circumstances doctrine is styled as an 
exception to the warrant requirement and not to the probable cause 
requirement.  Exigent circumstances thus resembles, in this respect, the doc-
trine authorizing police to use deadly force to stop certain fleeing suspects.  
Police can avail themselves of either doctrine only when they have probable 
cause plus something else.  Police can use deadly force when they have 
probable cause to believe that a fleeing suspect committed a violent felony 
plus evidence that the suspect poses a threat to the safety of the police or the 
public.400  Likewise, police may effect a warrantless entry of a home only 
when there is probable cause that a crime has been or is about to be 
committed plus some reasonable basis for believing that exigent 
circumstances exist (e.g., that the suspect will flee or evidence will be 
destroyed). 
Consider again the case of United States v. Winsor,401 which involved 
an armed robber chased by police into a residential hotel.402  The Ninth 
Circuit held that “[h]ot pursuit may excuse police from the Fourth 
Amendment’s warrant requirement, but never does it excuse the absence of 
the requisite degree of suspicion before effecting a search.”403  Accordingly, 
police were required to have probable cause, and not simply reasonable 
suspicion, to search the rooms of the hotel.  At least to the dissenting judges 
in Winsor, a lesser evidentiary predicate should have sufficed given the 
 
United States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 769–70 (2d Cir. 1990) (summarizing and quoting 
Dorman, 435 F.2d at 392–93).  The Dorman factors have been regularly followed in both 
federal and state courts.  See 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 6.1(f), at 264–68 (3d ed. 1996) (citing numerous federal and 
state cases that apply the Dorman factors).  One factor that the Dorman court omitted “but 
which is often of significance in this context concerns the preservation of evidence . . . .  [I]t 
makes great sense to recognize that frequently an immediate entry to arrest is necessitated so 
that the defendant can be disabled from destroying or distributing evidence.”  Id. § 6.1(f), at 
274. 
398. 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 
399. Id. at 392–93. 
400. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 3 (1985) (holding that deadly force “may not be used 
unless it is necessary to prevent the escape [of a suspected felon] and the officer has probable cause 
to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious injury to the officer or 
others”). 
401. United States v. Winsor, 846 F.2d 1569 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc). 
402. See supra text accompanying notes 324–38. 
403. Winsor, 846 F.2d at 1571. 
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robust societal interest in the immediate capture of the armed robber.404  
Nonetheless, the Winsor majority correctly stated the law as it is now 
understood: Exigent circumstances authorize police to act without a warrant, 
but they do not authorize searches or seizures with less than probable cause. 
Although probable cause is said to be an invariant standard, there is the 
sense that it would at times be unreasonable to require the identical 
evidentiary predicate in exigent and non-exigent circumstances.  Indeed, as 
one reads exigent circumstances cases, the suspicion builds that courts 
sometimes apply not the same probable cause standard, but a lesser standard, 
when police confront an urgent need to act.  In Oliver v. United States,405 for 
example, police entered the defendant’s home when they suspected, with 
relatively flimsy evidence, that she was hiding a recently kidnapped baby.406  
The D.C. Court of Appeals pondered the constitutionality of the search, and 
the result is so deeply unintelligible that it must be quoted at length: 
  We begin by examining the concept of “probable cause” as it relates 
to the application of the emergency doctrine.  In that context, we 
interpret “probable cause” to mean “reasonable grounds to believe”—
a formulation that says what we think the Supreme Court meant by 
“reasonable belief” in Mincey; a formulation that reflects the need for 
solid facts warranting probable cause, not mere reasonable suspicion 
(as in Terry v. Ohio); a formulation that is commonly used to mean 
probable cause; and a formulation that fits well with a perceived 
emergency, in contrast with a basis for prospective arrest, for which 
“probable cause” is the traditional language.407 
The court at times suggests that probable cause might have a special (and 
lesser?) meaning in the emergency context: “reasonable grounds to believe.”  
At other times, the court writes that this special standard is nothing more than 
the “formulation . . . commonly used to mean probable cause.” 
As the court embarks on its legal analysis, it seems to embrace the latter 
view, writing that police can engage in rescue operations only when 
“probable cause exists to believe that a kidnapping victim is being held on 
the premises.”408  The court then sifts through the convoluted facts and 
concludes that probable cause was in fact present.409  The evidence offered to 
support probable cause was tenuous and often contradictory.  Indeed, the 
existence of probable cause was not only persuasively challenged by a 
 
404. Id. at 1581 (Farris, J., dissenting). 
405. 656 A.2d 1159 (D.C. 1995). 
406. Id. at 1161–62. 
407. Oliver, 656 A.2d at 1166 (citations omitted). 
408. Id. at 1168.  The court then drew from classic probable cause cases such as Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), and Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), implying that 
probable cause, as articulated in these cases, and not some lower standard, is the appropriate test 
even in rescue operations.  Oliver, 656 A.2d at 1169–70. 
409. Oliver, 656 A.2d at 1170. 
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dissenting judge,410 but also explicitly disavowed by a prosecutor in a pretrial 
hearing.411 
The judicial impulse to find probable cause on doubtful facts runs 
through several exigent circumstances cases.  Although courts claim that they 
are applying the probable cause standard, a fair appraisal of the facts suggests 
otherwise.  In State v. Boggess,412 a social worker received an anonymous tip 
that children had been battered and needed immediate medical attention.413  
That evening, a social worker and police officer arrived at the apartment 
identified by the caller and forcibly entered.414  The majority purportedly 
applied the Supreme Court’s decision in Gates and concluded that probable 
cause existed on the facts presented.  The court noted that the anonymous tip 
had been highly detailed, thus suggesting that it was credible.  Furthermore, 
police had at least partially corroborated the tip when the man who answered 
the door upon their arrival acknowledged both that his name was as the tip 
had predicted and that children resided in the apartment.415 
The court’s assertion that probable cause existed, at least as the term is 
used in non-emergency situations, is untenable.  Imagine that a fulsomely 
detailed anonymous tip claimed that cocaine was present in a given apart-
ment and that police had forced entry into the apartment when a man, with 
the name given by the informant, had answered the door.  Is it even plausible 
to argue that reasonable suspicion, let alone probable cause, was present to 
justify the search?416  Courts confronting genuinely exigent circumstances, as 
in Winsor and Boggess, thus all agree that the relevant test is probable cause.  
But whereas the Winsor court applied probable cause in all its rigor, the 
Boggess court imported the notion, melodramatically presented by Justice 
Jackson’s dissent in Brinegar v. United States, that the intensity of the social 
interest in a police search must be weighed in the balance.417  Probable cause, 
at least for courts following Boggess, means a lesser evidentiary predicate in 
 
410. See id. at 1173–78 (Ferren, J., dissenting) (arguing that the police may have had Terry 
reasonable suspicion, but they did not have probable cause). 
411. Id. at 1168.  The prosecutor said, “I don’t think probable cause . . . existed at that time 
[when they took the defendant from her home].”  Id.  The state’s argument below was that the 
defendant consented to the search of her home, so there was no need for the lower court to address 
the issue of whether exigent circumstances justified a warrantless entry.  Id. at 1177–78 (Ferren, J., 
dissenting). 
412. 340 N.W.2d 516 (Wis. 1983). 
413. Id. at 519. 
414. Id. at 519–20.  They claimed to be acting pursuant to the Wisconsin Children’s Code, but 
the court found that the provision did not authorize forced entry, and to the extent that it did, it 
would be contrary to the Wisconsin Constitution.  Id. at 520. 
415. Id. at 524. 
416. See Florida v. J.L. 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000) (holding that a tenuously corroborated 
anonymous tip did not constitute reasonable suspicion to conduct a pat-down frisk). 
417. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
(reasoning that, with the same evidentiary predicate, a police road block for the purpose of catching 
a child kidnapper would be permissible, while a road block to catch a bootlegger would not). 
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cases of exigency, because the social costs of not searching are potentially so 
high.418 
The idea that probable cause—though famously touted as a single 
standard—may in fact fluctuate is not an altogether alien notion in the case 
law.  On the one hand, there is a scattering of court opinions suggesting that 
the probable cause needed to search a car is less than the predicate needed to 
search a home, precisely because one has a lesser expectation of privacy in a 
car.419  On the other hand, courts as well as legislatures seem to apply a more 
stringent idea of probable cause when the search (e.g., of a lawyer’s or 
reporter’s office) is deemed more intrusive than a garden-variety search of a 
home.420  These cases, and exigent circumstances cases like Boggess, gnaw 
away at the notion of a singular probable cause standard. 
VI. Probable Cause Reconsidered 
This Part of the Article sketches an alternative approach to probable 
cause.  The opening section discusses the sprinkling of support in the case 
law and academic literature for a more common sense approach to probable 
cause.  The following section fleshes out this approach, proposing a rea-
sonableness framework for analyzing questions of probable cause that draws 
upon Learned Hand’s test for evaluating claims of negligence.  The 
superiority of such a framework to the single standard approach is 
demonstrated in a trio of case studies, including that of the proposed search 
of Zacarias Moussaoui’s laptop computer.  As argued in the final section, a 
more reasonable approach to probable cause could enhance its relevance, as 
well as that of the warrant requirement, to various categories of police 
 
418. United States v. Richardson, 208 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 2000), is a good example in that the 
court is almost, but not quite, candid in its application of a lower evidentiary standard than probable 
cause as it is generally understood.  See id. at 629 (“We find this to be a very close case.”).  More 
typically, courts, as in Boggess, purport to apply the probable cause standard when the facts of the 
case make clear that a lesser standard is in fact being applied because of the exigency confronted by 
police.  See, e.g., People v. Sirhan, 497 P.2d 1121, 1140 (Cal. 1972) (upholding a search of Sirhan’s 
home after he assassinated Senator Robert Kennedy with little evidentiary predicate, but noting that 
the crime was one of “enormous gravity”).  For an explicit embrace of the idea that exigent 
circumstances can result in the application of a lesser probable cause standard, see Llaguno v. 
Mingey, 763 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc).  For a discussion of Llaguno, see infra text 
accompanying notes 434–44. 
419. See State v. Lesnick, 530 P.2d 243, 251 (Wash. 1975) (Hale, C.J., dissenting) (“What is 
probable cause to search and seize an automobile may not rise to the standards of probable cause for 
the issuance of a warrant to search a house.”); United States ex rel. Clark v. Mulligan, 347 F. Supp. 
989, 991 (D.N.J. 1972) (“As a general principle, automobile searches may not demand the same 
variety of probable cause required for a search of a home or other structure.”). 
420. See, e.g., Gordon v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. Rptr. 2d 53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (applying 
section 1524(c) of the California Penal Code to extend greater protection to lawyers’ offices); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 9.695 (2001) (protecting lawyers’ offices from search and seizure by warrant or 
otherwise); 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa (extending greater protection to journalists). 
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activity.  Indeed, one benefit of a recast probable cause framework, 
emphasizing its reasonableness, would be a revitalized warrant requirement. 
A. The Minority View 
Although probable cause is widely viewed, in both the courts and the 
academy, as a single and inflexible standard, there is a minority view.  The 
most famous, if somewhat confused, articulation of this position is found in 
Justice Jackson’s dissent in the Brinegar decision.421  Jackson’s starting point 
was the sensible premise that the social interest in searching a car trunk is 
greater when a kidnapped child, rather than bootlegged alcohol, might be 
hidden there.  It logically followed, Jackson argued, that a search for a child 
would be reasonable on a lesser evidentiary predicate.  This said, Jackson 
nonetheless conceded that as a judge, humbly obeying the letter of the Fourth 
Amendment, he could not permit a search on less than compelling evidence, 
even for the kidnapped boy.  But as a human being, he would “strain” to 
make an “exception” to the Fourth Amendment to uphold the search.422  This 
is a curious reading of the Constitution in that it intimates that the Fourth 
Amendment cannot accommodate extreme situations and that a judge must 
circumvent the Constitution to authorize certain extraordinary, albeit 
necessary, measures. 
We earlier considered the Supreme Court’s abortive attempt, in Camara 
v. Municipal Court,423 to calibrate probable cause to the degree of the privacy 
intrusion imposed by a search or seizure.424  The Court in Camara suggested 
that searches “involv[ing] a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen’s 
privacy” might satisfy probable cause, viewed in such circumstances as a 
lesser evidentiary standard.425  The Camara approach to probable cause, 
 
421. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180–82 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
422. See id.  Jackson said: 
[I]f we are to make judicial exceptions to the Fourth Amendment for these reasons, it 
seems to me they should depend somewhat upon the gravity of the offense.  If we 
assume, for example, that a child is kidnapped and the officers throw a roadblock about 
the neighborhood and search every outgoing car, it would be a drastic and 
undiscriminating use of the search.  The officers might be unable to show probable 
cause for searching any particular car.  However, I should candidly strive hard to 
sustain such an action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it might be reasonable 
to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the only way to save a threatened life and 
detect a vicious crime.  But I should not strain to sustain such a roadblock and 
universal search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger. 
Id. at 183 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
423. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
424. See supra text accompanying notes 298–302. 
425. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 537 (stating that characteristics of an area-code inspection—e.g., 
they are not personal in nature, not aimed at discovering evidence of a crime, and relatively non-
intrusive—are factors that support the reasonableness of such inspections).  Of course, the flip side 
of this principle is that probable cause should be cast in stricter terms when the proposed search is 
particularly intrusive.  In this vein, Justice Stewart wrote, with respect to wiretap searches, that 
because “electronic eavesdropping . . . involves a broad invasion of a constitutionally protected 
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adjusting the evidentiary predicate for a search to the degree of the privacy 
intrusion and the social interest, died off the following year in Terry v. 
Ohio,426 where the Court contrasted probable cause with a nuanced 
reasonable suspicion standard.  However, echoes of Camara continue to 
reverberate, as two examples illustrate. 
In the 1968 case United States v. Soyka,427 the Second Circuit cast 
probable cause in stringent terms to invalidate an arrest executed in a home 
for a minor narcotics violation.428  The evidence supporting the existence of 
probable cause was, in fact, compelling, and a dissenting Judge Henry 
Friendly was moved “to speculate how my brothers would dispose of a case 
precisely like this except that [the defendant was suspected of] purveying 
government documents.”429  Friendly added that “[a]pparent disfavor for 
certain felonies,” such as minor narcotics violations, seemed to be inclining 
courts to ratchet up the probable cause standard “to unrealistic levels.”430  “If 
decision were mine to make,” Friendly continued, “I would not be at all 
averse to straightforward recognition that the gravity of the suspected crime 
and the utility of the police action . . . are factors bearing on the validity of 
the search or arrest decision.”431  The problem, according to Friendly, with 
the majority’s decision in Soyka to cast probable cause in stringent terms, 
even in a case involving a relatively minor crime and a relatively significant 
privacy intrusion, was that the precedent would not be limited to its facts—a 
more rigorous probable cause standard would be applied to all crimes.  
Friendly wrote: 
If my brothers’ ruling could be confined to narcotics pushers, . . . I 
would hardly dissent.  But that is not the received wisdom of today; at 
least in theory this decision would govern crimes of the greatest 
seriousness and cases where an arrest might lead to the recovery of 
stolen property or even a kidnapped child rather than of contraband.432 
The “received wisdom,” which Friendly seemed to reject, equated probable 
cause in cases involving stolen property and a kidnapped child, a search of a 
home and a search of a car trunk.  This wisdom would find expression a 
decade later in Dunaway v. New York, where the Supreme Court rejected a 
 
area[,] [o]nly the most precise and rigorous standard of probable cause should justify an intrusion of 
this sort.”  Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 69 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
426. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  See supra text accompanying notes 304–08. 
427. 394 F.2d 443 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). 
428. Id. at 449. 
429. Id. at 452 (Friendly, J., dissenting).  Friendly added that he had “too much regard for their 
good sense to believe they would hold on such facts that the arrest was invalid and a code book 
found in the apartment must be returned.”  Id. 
430. Id. 
431. Id. 
432. Id. at 453. 
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graduated approach to probable cause, defining it instead as a “single . . . 
standard.”433 
For a second example of a nuanced approach to probable cause, let us 
jump ahead to a 1985 opinion by Judge Richard Posner.  In Llaguno v. 
Mingey,434 police confronted “an emergency . . . about as vivid . . . as can be 
imagined.”435  A shooting spree had left four people dead, others injured, and 
two armed suspects on the loose.436  On sketchy information,437 police 
searched a house for the suspects and detained all ten people there at the 
time.438  In a subsequent civil suit, the occupants of the home conceded that 
the police confronted exigent circumstances.439  For its part, the government 
conceded that the police lacked probable cause, at least in the stringent sense 
often ascribed to the term, to search the home and detain its occupants.440  
The question, therefore, was whether the exigency of the situation—the 
extreme gravity of the investigated offense and the societal interest in the 
prompt capture of the murderers—could weigh in the probable cause 
balance.441  Judge Posner, writing for a majority of the en banc Seventh 
Circuit, acknowledged that “[i]t is true that the gravity of the crime and the 
threat of its imminent repetition usually are discussed in relation to the 
existence of an emergency justifying a search or arrest without a warrant . . . 
rather than in relation to probable cause for the search or arrest.”442  
Undeterred, however, by the doubtful case law support and flouting what 
Friendly called the “received wisdom,”443 Posner concluded that probable 
cause, rightly understood, “is a function of the gravity of the crime, and 
especially the danger of its imminent repetition.”444 
The suggestion that probable cause is a lesser evidentiary predicate in 
times of exigency sparked dissents from three judges.  Labeling Posner’s 
view “dangerous,” the dissenting judges focused on the potential infringe-
ments on civil liberties when courts condone, even in exigent circumstances, 
 
433. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 208 (1979).  For a discussion of Dunaway, see 
supra text accompanying notes 311–15. 
434. 763 F.2d 1560 (7th Cir. 1985) (en banc). 
435. Id. at 1564. 
436. Id. at 1563. 
437. Before fleeing on foot, the criminals had crashed a car registered to a Vilma Llaguno.  The 
car had not been reported stolen, and the address listed for Llaguno was two miles from the crash 
scene.  Id. 
438. Id. 
439. Id. at 1570. 
440. Id. at 1565–66, 70. 
441. Id. at 1566. 
442. Id. (citations omitted). 
443. See supra note 432 and accompanying text (quoting Judge Friendly’s dissent in Soyka). 
444. Llaguno, 763 F.3d at 1566; see also id. at 1565 (defining probable cause as “not a point, 
but a zone”). 
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“the macho urge to charge.”445  Arguably, however, the dissenting judges 
failed to grasp the point that failing to authorize police to act in potentially 
exigent situations can imperil lives and property. 
Imagine that police receive a 911 call in the middle of the night.  They 
arrive at the scene and question the caller.  He reports that he thinks he heard 
a woman’s screams and the sounds of a struggle in the apartment next door.  
Police bang on the door for several minutes, but no one answers.  They circle 
around back and see no lights in the apartment and no evidence of forced 
entry.  Should they just walk away?  Plainly, probable cause is not present—
in the strict sense that would satisfy the dissenting judges in Llaguno—to 
search the apartment.  If we disregard the exigency of the situation, the only 
evidence of wrongdoing is the uncertain, and uncorroborated, testimony of 
the neighbor. 
Police in Philadelphia received such a 911 call in 1998.  As it 
transpired, the occupant of the apartment, Shannon Schieber, a student at the 
University of Pennsylvania, was raped and strangled to death the night police 
officers visited her apartment and left without entering.446  There is evidence 
that when the police arrived, the murderer was still in the apartment.447  The 
victim’s family has sued the police force for failing to force an entry, and 
although one’s sympathies are surely excited, one must recognize the 
difficulties confronted by police when probable cause is viewed as an 
inflexibly high barrier to police action. 
The occasional academic observer, acknowledging this problem, has 
advocated a more flexible approach to probable cause. Professor Joseph 
Grano, for example, has argued that the judicial system should take the 
gravity of the investigated offense into account in the probable cause 
assessment.448  It is, he further contended, appropriate to consider the “nature 
of the intrusion” in such calculations, for “[c]ommon sense and experience 
teach that some intrusions are more burdensome than others.”449  Similarly, 
Professor Albert Alschuler, in urging courts to balance costs and benefits 
when addressing questions of probable cause, has taunted advocates of 
 
445. Id. at 1578–79 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
446. The facts are recounted in Schieber v. City of Philadelphia, 156 F. Supp. 2d 451, 455 (E.D. 
Pa. 2001). 
447. Although police apparently found the sliding door on Schieber’s balcony closed that 
evening, the following morning, the neighbor saw that it was open.  Clea Benson, Murder Suspected 
in Death of Student: A 24-Year Old Woman’s Body Was Found in Her City Apartment, 
PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, May 8, 1998, at B1. 
448. Grano, supra note 143, at 503–05.  Grano adds that this point should not be taken “too far, 
lest it enable the judiciary to nullify criminal laws [like narcotics offenses] it dislikes.”  Id. at 503–
04.  Nevertheless, “Justice Jackson’s point [in Brinegar] cannot be ignored, for intuitively we agree 
that less antecedent cause should be required as the need for the police conduct becomes more 
urgent.”  Id. at 504. 
449. Id. 
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“bright-line rules” in the context of the Fourth Amendment.450  As Alschuler 
noted, such scholars have “failed to indicate what the nonwoolly content” of 
probable cause is or could possibly be.451 
Alschuler’s point, of course, is not that probable cause should be 
abandoned, but that it should be recast.  The probable cause standard, like the 
warrant requirement, surely serves a salutary social function in constraining 
discretionless police actions, which may be especially important in modern 
times given the size and firepower of the American police force.452  The hard 
question, then, is not whether to constrain police, and to impose limits on 
their actions, but what form those restraints and limits should take. 
B. A Reasonableness Framework 
Supposing probable cause was reasonable—what then?  In posing this 
question, we begin a journey on a less-traveled path.  Before one leaves the 
mass of mankind behind, it is good to assess just who one’s fellow travelers 
will be.  As the previous section indicates, ours will include Judges Friendly 
and Posner, and Professors Grano and Alschuler.  Emboldened by the quality 
of the company, we can proceed. 
What we need is a framework for thinking about probable cause that 
takes into account a host of variables excised from the conventional view.  
Such an approach might take its bearings from Learned Hand’s celebrated 
formula for evaluating claims of negligence.453  Hand’s formula provides that 
a party’s duty to take precautions to prevent accidents is a function of three 
variables: (1) the probability of the occurrence of an accident (P); (2) the 
social loss caused by the accident (L); and (3) the burden of taking 
 
450. See Alschuler, supra note 316, at 229–31 (arguing that “[n]ot only do categorical Fourth 
Amendment rules often lead to substantial injustice, . . . their artificiality commonly makes them 
difficult, not easy, to apply”). 
451. Id. at 255–56. 
452. The Bureau of Justice notes that as of 1996, there were more than 700,000 police officers 
in the United States, which is roughly one police officer for every 400 citizens.  BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 1996 (1998), 
available at http//:virlib.ncjrs.org/Statistics.asp (last modified Aug. 15, 1998).  In contrast, in 1816, 
there was one constable in England for every 18,187 persons.  Jerome Hall, Legal and Social 
Aspects of Arrest Without a Warrant, 49 HARV. L. REV. 566, 582 (1936); see also Roger I. Root, 
Are Cops Constitutional?, 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 685, 686 n.1 (2001) (estimating that the 
police officer to citizen ratio in America today is approximately one officer for every 386 
Americans); 1 STEPHEN, supra note 125, at 196 (discussing “the inefficiency of the constables and 
watchmen” in England in the eighteenth century). 
453. I am grateful to Moin Yahya for the suggestion that Hand’s formula might be applied to 
questions of probable cause.  When writing this Article, I discovered that the thought had already 
occurred to Professor Alschuler, who mentions the idea in passing.  Curiously, Alschuler credits 
another person for mentioning the idea to him.  Alschuler, supra note 316, at 252 n.82.  For an 
entirely more elevated example of the same phenomenon, consider the simultaneous discovery of 
calculus by Newton and Leibniz.  See ROBERT S. WESTFALL, NEVER AT REST: A BIOGRAPHY OF 
ISAAC NEWTON 514–20 (1980). 
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precautions to prevent an accident (B).  When B < P · L, a party is negligent 
if it fails to take precautions and an accident occurs.454 
Applying Hand’s formula to the Fourth Amendment, one might propose 
that probable cause exists to conduct a particular search whenever the 
expected social benefit or value exceeds the social cost.  To the extent that 
formulae illuminate rather than obfuscate, a point as to which Hand himself 
remained doubtful, the model might be stated thus: 
(1) P · V > C, 
where P is the probability of a successful search, V is the social benefit or 
value associated with the prevention or detection of a particular crime, and C 
is the social cost (or privacy intrusion) resulting from a particular kind of 
search. 
The formula might be modified to take into account the Supreme 
Court’s oft-stated position that there is no privacy intrusion with respect to 
contraband.455  Because there is a constitutionally recognized privacy in-
trusion only in the event of an unsuccessful search, the formula may be 
rewritten as follows: 
(2) P · V > (1 - P) · C, 
where (1 - P) is the probability that the search will fail to uncover any 
evidence of crime.  For example, assume that there is a twenty percent 
chance that police will uncover evidence of tax fraud among a suspect’s per-
sonal papers in his home.  The social benefit of a conviction is $100,000, and 
the privacy intrusion associated with a search of one’s personal papers is 
$50,000.  The expected benefit or value of a search would be $20,000 
($100,000 · .2), which is less than the expected cost of $40,000 ($50,000 · 
.8).  Thus, the search would be unreasonable in these circumstances.  These 
numbers are, of course, arbitrary.456  The broader point, however, is that the 
expected social benefit of a successful search increases if the crime under 
investigation is, say, aircraft piracy rather than tax fraud.  Thus, a search that 
might fail to satisfy probable cause for one crime might be sufficient in 
another context. 
One should recognize, moreover, that not all searches or seizures are 
equal in the resultant privacy intrusions.  The probable cause required to 
search a car or warehouse might be insufficient to justify a house search or 
 
454. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).  The formula is 
said to result in an optimal level of precautions, for it induces actors to accurately weigh expected 
accident costs against accident-avoidance costs.  RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
LAW § 6.1 (5th ed. 1998). 
455. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (holding that a canine sniff “discloses 
only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item” and therefore does “not constitute a 
‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment”). 
456. One might, however, imagine the development of some plausible estimates by looking at 
jury verdicts in civil cases (where searches have been found to be unreasonable) and the statutory 
penalties assessed for specific crimes. 
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an arrest.  Indeed, one might tinker with the formula further to reflect the fact 
that not all seemingly identical searches are in fact identical, at least in the 
subjectively experienced intrusion on one’s privacy.  If police single me out 
for suspicion and pull my car over, the experienced intrusion is far greater 
than if, at a DUI checkpoint, I am randomly subject to an otherwise identical 
search.  Furthermore, if police repeatedly stop an African-American man, the 
internalized cost escalates from the stigmatizing police practice.457  Thus, the 
formula might be rewritten, 
(3) P · V > (1 - P) · (C · m), 
where m is a privacy multiplier.  If a car search ordinarily imposes a $1,000 
intrusion, it may be only $100 if the search is conducted in a random manner 
or $2,000 if the cost of the intrusion is borne by an individual who has 
already been searched on multiple occasions. 
This proposal might be criticized as too complicated for magistrates to 
administer, for it requires them to quantify a host of indeterminate variables.  
Such an objection both overstates the complexity of the proposal and 
understates (in some instances) the competence of the magistrates reviewing 
the warrant applications.  Magistrates will not need to apply numerical 
values, but common sense, in addressing questions of probable cause.  
Furthermore, radical departures from the probable cause standard, as it has 
currently evolved, will for the most part not be required.  The standard has 
evolved to address the paradigm search (of a home) for the paradigm crime 
(a narcotics violation).  The suggestion here is simply that the standard bend 
when the proposed search or the alleged crime reflects a significant departure 
from these paradigms.  In effect, then, this proposal breathes life into the 
suggestion in Illinois v. Gates that probable cause “turn[] on the assessment 
of probabilities in particular factual contexts . . . .”458  Common sense de-
mands that those contexts include the intrusiveness of the search (telephone 
wiretap versus search of car) and the gravity of the investigated offense 
(terrorism versus agricultural subsidy fraud). 
With respect to the magistrate’s competence to apply a more nuanced 
probable cause standard, it is worth recalling that magistrates in the federal 
system are selected by district court judges and are generally recognized as 
leading members of the local bar.459  As a practical matter, federal 
magistrates are entrusted with far more complicated legal issues than 
 
457. See Gross & Livingston, supra note 65, at 1438 (“Investigative choices that are made on 
the basis of global assumptions about the criminal propensities of racial or ethnic groups are 
stigmatizing.”); cf. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (arguing that 
“[c]lassifications based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm”). 
458. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (emphasis added). 
459. See 28 U.S.C. § 631(b)(5) (2000) (requiring federal district judges to appoint magistrate 
judges, consisting of persons in good standing for at least five years on the state bar and “competent 
to perform the duties of the office”). 
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applying the probable cause framework proposed in this Article.460  In state 
systems, by contrast, magistrates are of far more variable competence, with 
some states not even requiring magistrates to be members of the bar.461  Such 
a state of affairs legitimately undermines any confidence in the warrant sys-
tem in its current form, as well as in the alternative form proposed here.  The 
obvious correction, however, is not to preserve an unreasonable version of 
probable cause, but to enhance the quality of the magistrates entrusted with 
reviewing warrant applications.462 
C. Applications 
Let us return, after a long detour, to the debate as to whether the FBI 
had probable cause to search Zacarias Moussaoui’s laptop computer prior to 
September 11.  As discussed earlier, the two most important pieces of evi-
dence supporting the existence of probable cause were the flight instructor’s 
tip and the French intelligence information.463  Even if some of the additional 
pieces of evidence (such as Moussaoui’s religion and his refusal to consent to 
a search) could be considered in the probable cause assessment, which is 
doubtful under the current case law,464 Rowley’s claim that there was a 
greater than fifty percent likelihood that Moussaoui intended to hijack a 
plane465 is hard to credit.  Of course, this should not have disqualified the 
warrant application under Illinois v. Gates, for probable cause is there 
defined not as a preponderance of the evidence, but as a “fair probability” or 
“substantial chance” of criminal activity.466  Yet whatever the probability the 
Gates Court might have ascribed to probable cause (twenty percent?, thirty 
percent?), the conclusion reached by FBI headquarters that probable cause 
was not satisfied does not appear to be altogether unjustified, at least when 
the gravity of the suspected offense is not taken into account. 
To illustrate this point, transpose the Moussaoui case to the drug 
context.  A flight instructor reports to police suspicions that a student is using 
drugs.  A foreign intelligence service then informs the police that the student 
 
460. See, e.g., David W. Bell, The Power to Award Sanctions: Does it Belong in the Hands of 
Magistrate Judges?, 61 ALB. L. REV. 433, 433–34 (1997) (noting that federal magistrates are 
allowed to rule on discovery and suppression of evidence motions, adjudicate petty offenses, and, 
with consent, may preside over civil trials). 
461. See Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 349 (1972) (upholding warrants issued by 
magistrates who had no legal training); State v. Groff, 323 N.W.2d 204, 213 (Iowa 1982) 
(upholding warrants issued by a nonlawyer magistrate). 
462. In several localities, warrants are never issued except by duly appointed judges.  See 
Benner & Samarkos, supra note 57, at 226 & n.21 (noting that in San Diego, “[o]ver 95% of the 
search warrants were issued by judges of the San Diego Municipal Court,” and that “[t]he remaining 
5% were issued by Superior Court judges”). 
463. See supra subpart II(B)(9). 
464. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
465. See Rowley Memorandum, supra note 1, para. 7. 
466. 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
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may have dealt drugs in the past.  Would a magistrate, on these facts, issue a 
warrant to search the student’s home?  Almost surely not.  The question is 
whether Moussaoui’s case is different for probable cause purposes because 
the suspected crime—aircraft piracy or terrorism—is far graver than garden-
variety drug trafficking.  Although probable cause as traditionally understood 
treats this as a difference of no consequence, probable cause viewed 
reasonably, within the Carroll Towing framework, acknowledges that in such 
circumstances a lesser evidentiary predicate justifies a search. 
More fundamentally, the flexibility of the Carroll Towing framework 
generates incentives, for police, prosecutors, and magistrates, to think more 
creatively about striking an appropriate balance between respecting a 
suspect’s expectations of privacy on the one hand and on the other satisfying 
society’s legitimate interest in the investigation of possible crime.  During 
the investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui, for example, the FBI could have 
proposed a narrowly tailored search of his laptop computer that minimized its 
intrusiveness and in this way compensated for a possible deficiency in the 
evidentiary basis for the FBI’s suspicions.  The FBI might have proposed the 
following search to a magistrate: Only two agents would sift through the 
contents of the computer, and only if they discovered evidence of certain 
specified crimes (e.g., terrorism, aircraft piracy) could the information be 
shared with others in the FBI.  If Moussaoui was a money launderer instead 
of a terrorist, the agents who had searched the computer would simply report 
no evidence of piracy or terrorism.  In effect, then, the search would be 
framed as one without a “plain view” exception enlarging its possible scope: 
contrary to the otherwise governing rule, police could not make use of 
evidence of crime inadvertently discovered in the course of a lawful 
search.467  Thus, if Moussaoui were eventually charged with money 
laundering, the government would be forced to demonstrate in a pretrial 
hearing that none of its evidence was derived from the search of the laptop 
computer.468  Such an approach would ensure that police and prosecutors 
could not trumpet the gravity of an investigated offense only to get easy 
access to a suspect’s belongings.  And it would reward efforts by the police 
 
467. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 141–42 (1990) (upholding as lawful the 
warrantless seizure of criminal evidence in plain view in the course of a lawful search). 
468. An analogy could be drawn to a Kastigar hearing.  See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 
441, 449–60 (1972).  Such hearings typically arise after the government has indicted an individual 
after granting him immunity in return for compelled testimony; the government is forced to show 
that it has made neither direct nor indirect use of any compelled testimony.  See, e.g., United States 
v. North, 910 F.2d 843, 872–73 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the District Court erred in failing to 
hold a full Kastigar hearing to ensure that the prosecution made “no use whatsoever” of any of the 
immunized testimony).  Similarly, here, if the government eventually charged a suspect with crimes 
other than those alleged in the warrant application, it would need to show in a pretrial hearing that it 
made no use of the evidence inadvertently discovered in the course of the search. 
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to focus searches, for the less intrusive their proposed search, the more likely 
the court would be to find probable cause.469 
Consider next the case of Shannon Schieber, the University of 
Pennsylvania student slain in her apartment.470  When a credible neighbor 
reports hearing screams from an apartment in the middle of the night, what 
should police do after banging on the door for minutes without result?  In the 
absence of probable cause, rigidly viewed as some fixed percentage of 
criminal activity, one answer is simply to walk away.  The Carroll Towing 
approach to probable cause provides a far more sensible framework for ad-
dressing the problem.  First consider the social interest in a search of 
Schieber’s apartment.  Even a low probability that she had been assaulted 
would mean a robust interest in a protective sweep to ensure that no persons 
were hidden or injured in the apartment.  Next consider, on the other side of 
the balance, the privacy intrusion.  Although undoubtedly intrusive, the 
search could be cabined by its goals.  It is, of course, possible that police, 
having entered an apartment to conduct a protective sweep, will see, in plain 
view, contraband of some altogether unrelated sort.  The law governing such 
“rescue” situations could clarify that the search must be narrowly circum-
scribed, and “plain view” evidence would be inadmissible at a subsequent 
criminal trial.471 
Finally, the refusal to weigh the variable intrusiveness of police 
searches in the probable cause balance can have indefensible consequences 
in the context of the war on terrorism.  Imagine that the National Security 
Agency intercepts a cell phone call revealing that terrorists are constructing a 
 
469. See William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the Terror, 111 YALE L.J. 2137, 2185 (2002).  
There is nothing novel, in the context of the Fourth Amendment, in crediting efforts by the state to 
narrowly limit the uses made of any evidence that is obtained in the course of a search.  See 
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 650 (1995) (finding that it was significant that “the 
results of the tests are disclosed only to a limited class of school personnel who have a need to 
know; and they are not turned over to law enforcement authorities or used for any internal 
disciplinary function”); Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, 
122 S. Ct. 2559, 2566–67 (2002) (“[T]he test results are not turned over to any law enforcement 
authority.  Nor do the test results here lead to the imposition of discipline or have any academic 
consequences.”); Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 663 (1989) (noting 
that “[t]est results may not . . . be turned over to any other agency, including criminal prosecutors, 
without the employee’s written consent”).  Compare Rushton v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 844 F.2d 
562, 567 (8th Cir. 1988) (approving the urine testing of nuclear power plant employees, and noting 
that “the results of urinalysis are being used solely to determine a person’s fitness for work; they are 
not turned over to the police”), with Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 68 (2001) (finding 
it “critical” that “the immediate objective of the [urine testing] was to generate evidence for law 
enforcement purposes” (emphasis added)). 
470. See supra notes 446–47 and accompanying text. 
471. A further constraint on the intrusiveness of the police search would be to restrict the ability 
of police to publicize such private details.  As Professor Stuntz writes, “[t]he historical norm has 
been to permit the police to do anything with information that they obtain legally, but of late, the 
Supreme Court seems to have taken an interest in limiting extraneous publicity.”  Stuntz, supra note 
469, at 2184 n.145.  Stuntz cites Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999), where the Court held a 
search unconstitutional when police officers invited journalists to join them. 
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radiological “dirty bomb” in an American city.  The police, having focused 
the search on a section of the city with 100,000 homes, propose to criss-cross 
the area with a Geiger counter that measures the radiation released from each 
home.472  Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Kyllo, such a search would 
be unconstitutional, for a Geiger counter, no less than a thermal detection 
device, allows police to learn details about the interior of the home “that 
could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion.”473 
Assuming that police flout the supposed commands of the Fourth 
Amendment and a Geiger counter search uncovered a “dirty bomb,” would a 
court really hold the evidence inadmissible?  One should never underestimate 
the contortions courts perform in matters of the Fourth Amendment.  It is 
possible that a court would analogize Geiger counters to drug-sniffing dogs 
and hold that, as one has no expectation of privacy in the scent of narcotics, 
neither does one have any legitimate privacy expectation in the radiation 
emitted from one’s house.  Voila, the use of a Geiger counter is not a search 
at all and is therefore wholly outside the limitations of the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Plainly, however, the use of drug-sniffing dogs and Geiger counters 
entails searches, for the police are affirmatively seeking to gather evidence of 
criminal activity.  A far more sensible approach would be to concede that the 
Geiger counter is used to search, but to recognize that probable cause exists, 
for the privacy intrusion imposed by such a search is infinitesimal and the 
potential harm of a “dirty bomb” is so great. 
D. Revitalizing the Warrant Requirement 
An alternative defense of the roving Geiger counter search might 
purport to take its bearings from the plain text of the Fourth Amendment and 
the apparent absence of any warrant—or probable cause—requirement.  The 
first clause of the Amendment forbids “unreasonable” searches, whereas the 
second simply prohibits warrants from being issued without probable 
cause.474  Professor Akhil Amar has argued that the error in the Court’s 
current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is to insist on warrants (and 
thereby probable cause) when the Amendment, by its plain terms, imposes no 
 
472. The scenario is posed in Eugene Volokh, The Fourth Amendment Meets the War on 
Terror, SLATE, June 17, 2002, at http://www.slate.msn.com/id/2067037/.  Like Volokh, I ask the 
reader to “[a]ssume this is practically feasible, though there may be various potential difficulties 
with it.”  Id. 
473. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
474. The text of the Fourth Amendment states: 
  The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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such requirement.  Instead, Amar argues, the fundamental test should be one 
of reasonableness: Only when police get a warrant (in order to insulate 
themselves from civil liability) should probable cause be the standard.475  To 
return to the dirty bomb scenario, according to this line of argument, a roving 
Geiger counter search is plainly reasonable, weighing the social interest 
against the privacy intrusion, and there is no need to entangle the issue with 
questions of probable cause or warrants. 
Amar presents his argument as a radical critique of the Court’s 
jurisprudence.476  In fact, it is at bottom an elegant summary of the current 
state of the law.  As discussed above, most searches and seizures are evalu-
ated nowadays for their reasonableness and not according to a probable cause 
standard.477  The inevitable corollary of this development, however, is the 
much-lamented evisceration of the warrant requirement.478  Because probable 
cause is understood as a relatively high and inflexible standard, it can have 
no application to a vast range of police activity, from DUI checkpoints to a 
roving search for a dirty bomb.  And because a warrant cannot issue “but 
upon probable cause,”479 the perverse consequence of an unreasonable 
reading of probable cause is that vast reaches of police activity have been, as 
a practical matter, liberated from any antecedent check by a magistrate. 
Only if probable cause is understood reasonably can the warrant 
requirement be revitalized.  The sort of easy escape from a warrant require-
ment taken by the Supreme Court in Griffin v. Wisconsin480 would no longer 
be available.  The petitioner in Griffin, a probationer, conceded that police 
officers could enter his home with reasonable suspicion, but argued that a 
warrant was nonetheless required.481  Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, 
rejected the argument, noting that “[t]he Constitution prescribes . . . that 
where the matter is of such a nature as to require a judicial warrant, it is also 
of such a nature as to require probable cause.”482  Although as a textual 
matter, Scalia was of course correct that warrants can issue only upon 
probable cause, he failed to consider that the term probable cause is not self-
defining and may itself be imbued with an element of reasonableness.  If 
probable cause were understood reasonably, then it would no longer be 
necessary to exempt police actions, at least those not justified by some 
 
475. Amar, supra note 135, at 801–19. 
476. See id. at 759 (stating that scholars and case law seem to think that the Fourth Amendment 
requires probable cause).  But see id. at 760 n.4 (acknowledging that his proposed approach has 
substantial support in the case law). 
477. See supra subparts V(B–D) (sketching the rise of the reasonableness inquiry in terms of 
reasonable suspicion, special needs, and exigent circumstances). 
478. See supra note 19 (citing authority protesting the decline of the warrant requirement). 
479. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
480. 483 U.S. 868 (1987). 
481. Wisconsin v. Griffin, 388 N.W.2d 535, 538 (Wis. 1986). 
482. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 877. 
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exigency, from the preclearance check supplied by a warrant requirement.  
When police propose to conduct a search or seizure, they would need to 
demonstrate the reasonableness of their actions to a neutral magistrate, who 
could weigh, among other factors, the gravity of the investigated offense and 
the degree of the privacy intrusion. 
One must acknowledge that regulating conduct through prescreening 
mechanisms is generally disfavored in our legal system, and the purported 
benefits of a warrant requirement may, in some instances, be overstated.483  
There is, however, a benefit in forcing law enforcement officers to articulate 
their reasons before conducting a search: post hoc rationalizations will be 
curtailed and some illegal searches deterred.484  Even warrantless searches of 
minimal intrusiveness may excite a twinge of discomfort, if not for the intru-
sion that directly results, at least for the precedent that may result.  It may be 
said that once police can wander through residential neighborhoods with 
Geiger counters, roving drug-sniffing canine searches are soon to follow.  
However implausible such sentiments may sometimes be,485 it is nonetheless 
useful, in all but nonexigent circumstances, that police supply an antecedent 
explanation for their actions. 
The oddity of the Supreme Court’s current Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence is that searches conducted with warrants, precleared by a 
neutral and detached magistrate, are often held to a higher standard than 
searches conducted without warrants.  Precisely the opposite ordering would 
seem sensible: When police take the trouble to establish their reasons to, and 
secure the approval of, a magistrate, they should be held to at least as 
generous an evidentiary standard as when they conduct a search without any 
prior approval from an authority outside the law enforcement community.  
The oddity of the Court’s current jurisprudence stems from its disjunctive 
reading of the Amendment.  The first clause, which broadly prohibits all 
“unreasonable” searches, is set in opposition to the second, which restricts 
the issuance of warrants to contexts where “probable cause” is present.  But 
this opposition is more imagined than real: Probable cause is in fact a rea-
 
483. See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 
885–97 (1991) (discussing the costs of ex ante regulation and arguing that, outside the context of 
warrants, Fourth Amendment law follows the standard two-step process of most “regulatory 
regimes,” first articulating standards of substantive conduct and then penalizing violations of those 
standards). 
484. See id. at 915 (arguing that “warrants attack distortions that come with a suppression 
hearing by changing the timing of the relevant decision”); 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 7.2(a), at 518 (1st ed. 1978) (noting that the 
warrant process is a meaningful device to protect Fourth Amendment rights against “those police 
practices which would be most destructive of Fourth Amendment values”); Bookspan, supra note 
19, at 473–76 (stating that a “prior determination of probable cause and adherence to . . . procedures 
protect principles of government and individual freedoms”). 
485. On the overworked slippery slope metaphor, see Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the 
Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2003). 
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sonable standard.  The first clause states the general truth—that all searches 
must be reasonable—and the second clause clarifies that even searches 
precleared by magistrates must be reasonable, that is, supported by probable 
cause. 
Professor Craig Bradley has observed that the Supreme Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence embraces two models, one of which can be 
summed up with the command, “Act reasonably,” and the other with the 
instruction, “Get a warrant whenever you can.”486  He adds that “[t]he 
Court’s efforts to tread a tightrope between two extremes has resulted in a 
morass of confusion that can satisfy nobody.”487  This Article has argued that 
the two commands need not be viewed as extremes, but in fact can be 
harmonized.  The first step in such a harmonization is the realization that 
probable cause is best understood not as a fixed standard, but within a 
reasonableness framework. 
VII. Conclusion 
In the aftermath of September 11, several commentators mused that the 
Constitution would handicap our nation’s efforts to combat terrorism.488  One 
observer wondered whether the Bill of Rights was so hopelessly out of touch 
with the reality and gravity of the threat to our nation that unless we 
“abandon[] key constitutional protections . . . deaths from terrorism [will 
number in the millions].”489  This Article takes as its starting point the 
following principle: Any interpretation that renders the Constitution a suicide 
pact is almost surely an erroneous interpretation. 
The Fourth Amendment plainly imposes limits on the powers of the 
state to search private citizens.  Yet those limits are not absolute.  The first 
clause of the Amendment forecloses only unreasonable searches, and the 
second clause proscribes the issuance of warrants without probable cause.  
One possible solution to the problem of the Fourth Amendment is, in effect, 
to read the second clause into a nullity: Police would rarely be required to 
obtain a warrant, and only if they did would an antecedent showing of 
 
486. Bradley, supra note 17, at 1501. 
487. Id. 
488. For example, Professor Alan Dershowitz has argued that we need to allow government 
officials to have the power to issue “an interrogation warrant” to force those strongly suspected of 
terrorist activity to answer questions, once they are afforded immunity.  He noted, however, that 
such a procedure is “not currently permissible under our Constitution.  And yet, I think that would 
probably be a good change . . . .”  Talk of the Nation (NPR radio broadcast, June 17, 2002), 
available at 2002 WL 3297027.  The possibility of a tension between respecting the Constitution 
and credibly responding to the terrorist threat is arguably implicit in President Bush’s statement, 
“We intend to honor our Constitution and respect the freedoms we hold so dear. . . .  [At the same 
time,] we want to make sure we do everything we can to prevent a further attack.”  Gary Fields & 
John R. Wilke, Bush Defends New Powers for FBI, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2002, at A4. 
489. John Derbyshire, Unpleasant Truths, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, at 
http://olimu.com/WebJournalism/Texts/Commentary/UnpleasantTruths.htm (Aug. 2, 2002). 
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probable cause be required.  This Article rejects this suggestion, now 
associated with Akhil Amar,490 and seeks to preserve the warrant requirement 
as a vital check on the police. 
To do so, however, we need to recognize the reasonableness of probable 
cause. 
The paradox of probable cause is that, in binding us to this standard, the 
Framers were binding us to a standard that itself could adapt to changed 
circumstances.  As this Article has shown, the concept of probable cause 
evolved over the course of centuries prior to 1791, and indeed likely failed to 
have a specific meaning even in the minds of the Framers themselves.  
Moreover, from the earliest years of the republic, the probable cause standard 
has proven to be a flexible one.  Whether the Constitution is alive or dead, 
extinct or evolving, are questions I leave to those giants in the academy who 
study constitutional law.  My narrow point is that any effort to cast “probable 
cause” in “constitutional amber”491 is both unreasonable and untrue to the 
intent of the Framers of the Fourth Amendment. 
Recasting probable cause within a reasonableness framework can open 
the way for more creative thinking about accommodating law enforcement 
priorities on the one hand and preserving civil liberties on the other.  Perhaps 
the September 11 attacks can, in this way, provoke a more sensible 
discussion of the importance of criminal procedure rules in striking an 
appropriate balance. 
 
490. See Amar, supra note 135, at 762. 
491. Id. at 818. 
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